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The Psychology of Childhood, 



J-^Q 



BY 



FREDERICK TRACY, B. A., 

FKtLow IN Psychology in Clark University, Wopckstkr, Mass.; FoRMERLr 
Fellow in Philosophy in the University of Toronto. 



Appboykd as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Clark University, 

G. STANLEY HALL, 
President and Professor of Psychology. 



BOSTON, U. S. A. : 

D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS. 

1893. 



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?3f '06 



INTRODUCTION 



The author has here undertaken to present as concisely, 
yet as completely, as possible, the results of the systematic 
study of children up to date, and has included everything of 
importance that could be found. This work was greatly 
needed, and has been done with a thoroughness which all 
interested in the subject will gratefully recognize. Most 
observations have been limited to one or more aspects of the 
vast, many-sided topic. As we are now able to catch a 
glimpse for the first time of the entire field, we realize the 
importance of results already achieved, and the yet greater 
promise of the future. The questions here treated are 
fundamental for both psychology and pedagogy, for the more 
fundamental the traits, the earlier they unfold. Yet it 
should be remembered that the data for infant study are 
relatively more complete than are the records of children 
of school age. The latter, when they are fully presented, may 
be more practical, but the former are more fundamental for 
philosophy and ethics. 

It is a most auspicious fact for philosophy and for educa- 
tion, that both are coming to be based more and more upon 
the eternal and natural foundation of sympathetic observation 
of childhood, and that the same season that witnessed the 
completion of this memoir has witnessed the formation of a 
national society for child study, inaugurated by a success- 
ful three days' congress. 

This dissertation is far more than a compilation. It brings 
important additions to our knowledge upon some of the most 
important topics. This is perhaps most important in the 
case of the chapter on language, almost a monograph in 
itself, and which will interest philologists as well as psychol- 
ogists and teachers. 

G. STANLEY HALL. 

Clark University, September, 1893. 



PRELIMINARY. 



The comparative method of study has commended itself to all the 
sciences in modern times by its fertility in results, and is now being 
employed extensively in two principal directions: viz., the analogical 
and the genetical. The philologist, for example, compares his own 
language, on the one hand with other languages (in the search for 
analogies), and on the other avails himself of all manuscripts, inscrip- 
tions, etc., which show him his language in its earliest stages, and help 
him to determine by the operation of what causes, and according to 
what laws, it has developed from its original crude and inefficient state 
to its present polished and complicated condition. And similarly with 
other sciences. In the case of psychology the application of the com- 
parative method has led the investigator to the observation of mental 
manifestations in the lower animals ; in human beings of morbid or ■ 
defective mental life, such as the insane, the idiotic, the blind, deaf and 
dumb; in peoples of diflferent types of culture, ancient and modern, 
savage and civilized ; and finally to the study of mental phenomena in 
their genesis and early development in the life of the child. If the child 
is only the adult in miniature, and if society is only the individual " writ 
large.'" then in studying the infant mind we are approaching a vantage 
ground from which we may catch a prophetic view, not only of psy- 
chological, but also of sociological phenomena. 

When we compare the young child with the young animal, we cannot 
fail to be struck by the apparent superiority of the latter over the 
former, at the beginning of life. The human infant, for example, re- 
quires weeks to attain the power of holding his head in equilibrium, 
while the young chicken runs about and picks up grains of wheat before 
the first day of his life is over. This, however, carefully considered, is 
a token rather of the superiority than the inferioritj'^ of the human being. 
The higher you ascend in the scale of being, the more varied and com- 
plex is the environment in which the individual moves, and to which he 
must adapt his movements. This adaptation requires, on the physio- 
logical side, a cerebral and nervous development, and on the psychic 
side a mental growth, for which time is an absolute necessity. Animals 
go on all their lives, doing the same simple things, which require a 
minimum of mental activity, and which, by dint of constant repetition, 
produce physiological adjustments that become at length hereditary ; 
so that phenomena which seem to the casual observer the index of an 
astonishing degree of mental advancement — such a§ the " scampering" 
of the young chicks on a certain peculiar call of the mother — are really 
at bottom little more than the response of an organism, adjusted by 
heredity, to the action of an external stimulus. 

The longer and more arduous the journey, the more time is required 
for preparation; the more complicated the art to be acquired, the more 
extended is the period of apprenticeship. So the child, having an in- 
finitely grander life before him, and infinitely more exalted, complicated 
and dlflSeult operations to perform — mental, moral and physical — requires 
a longer period of tutelage than the chicken, which on the first day of 
his life scratches and pecks, and to the end of his existence makes no 



6 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

advance upon these simple operations. The young animal, before the 
end of the first day of his life, does what it takes the child a year to 
accomplish ; but the child of two years does what the animal never will 
accomplish to the end of his days.' 

The object of the present essay is to discuss infant psychology. When 
and how do mental phenomena take their rise in the infant conscious- 
ness? How far are they conditioned by heredity, and how far by 
education, including suggestion? What is the nature of the process by 
which the automatic and mechanical pass over into the conscious and 
voluntary? These are some of the questions to which the following 
pages may help to furnish an answer. That they may do so, it has 
been thought best to gather together, so far as possible, the best work 
that has been done in actual observation of children up to the present 
time, arrange this under appropriate headings, incorporate the results 
of several observations made by the writer himself, and present the 
whole in epitomized form, with copious references and quotations. The 
inquiry proceeds along the line usually followed by psychologists, and 
treats the mental endowment, from the genetic point of view, in the 
following order: Sensation, emotion, intellection, volition; child- 
language, on account of its paramount importance, being treated in a 
chapter by itself. It was intended at first to add a chapter on the moral 
nature of the child, but as the work progressed, it became more and 
more evident that, to treat this important phase of child-life adequately, 
would require not only more space than is at our disposal at present, 
but an advance into later stages of life than are embraced in the present 
work, which is intended only as a manual of infant psychology in an 
approximately strict sense of the words. 

1 cannot forbear calling attention in this place to one great general 
principle, which is so constantly illustrated in the child's mental life 
that it may be considered universal. It might be appropriately named 
the principle of transformation, and explained as follows : Every 
mental phenomenon passes through a graduated ascending series of 
development. At first, the physiological predominates, consciousness 
is at a minimum, and the so-called mental phenomenon would be more 
accurately defined as the reaction of the nervous system to external 
stimuli or to organic conditions. For example, the child cries at inter- 
vals from the moment of his birth, but at first this cry is independent 
of his will, and possesses scarcely any mental significance, for it is 
made without cerebral cooperation, and — as in the case of microcephalic 
infants — even when the cerebrum is entirely absent ( 3:272), 2 Later the 
mental aspect becomes more prominent. When the intellect and will 
have become sufficiently developed, the child directs his attention to 
the act, makes it his own and performs it voluntarily. The process 
perhaps has not changed at all, to outward appearance, but when 
viewed on the inner side, it is seen to have been completely transformed 
in character ; and one of the most diflicult tasks for the psj'-choiogist is 
to determine the when and the how of this transformation. 

The exact time at which each psychic activity makes its appearance, 
is perhaps of less importance than the order of the various activities ; 
yet in order to ascertain the latter, the former must be carefully attended 
to. Hence both absolute and relative times receive considerable atten- 
tion in the following pages. 

i"Es scheint ein naturgesetz zu walten, dass das hohere, Bedeutende sich lan^amer 
entwickele, und sich durch die langsamere Entwickelung eine lanerere Dauer gleichsam 
erkaufe." Sigismund : " Kind und Welt," p. 17. See also on this subject, Jastrow: 
"Problems of Comparative Psychology," Pop. Sci. Mo., Nov., 1892. It should be 
noted in this connection that the intra-uterine period is relatively much shorter in man 
than in most of the lov?er animals. The horse, for example, lives a much shorter life 
than man, and yet his preparatory fcBtal stage is actually longer. 

2 The numbers in brackets are references to the bibliography at the back. The first 
number Is that of the work referred to in the bibliography. When a second number 
followB, it is a reference to the page. 



CHAPTER I.— SENSATION. 

It is important to treat sensation first, because it lies at tiie founda- 
tion of all mental development. All the higher processes of mind are 
simply the result of progressive " syntheses of the manifold" as given 
in sensation. Though we may not agree with Loche, that all ideas are 
derived from sensation, yet we must agree that there are no ideas in 
the mind prior to sensation. And looking at the active side of our 
nature, the intimate connection between the senses and the will is 
equally manifest. Our sense-impressions, produced by external objects 
upon the peripheral organism, are conveyed along the afferent nerves 
to sensory centres closely connected with corresponding motor centres 
in the cerebral cortex. Hence the importance of the child's sense- 
growth. 

Are any sensations felt in the fcetal stage of existence? And if so, 
what? In answer to this question, we may, first of all, proceed nega- 
tively and determine those senses which obviously cannot be in opera- 
tion at this time. Any sense requiring as the condition of its exercise 
the medium of light or air, cannot operate until the child is born, for 
prior to this time he does not come into contact with these media. On 
this ground sight, hearing and smell are probably to be excluded : the 
first on account of the darkness of the uterus, the others because the 
auditory and nasal passages are at this time entirely filled with the 
amniotic liquid, to the exclusion of all air, even if this were availablf . 
There is reason to believe, however, that from about the middle of this 
period the foetus is susceptible to changes of temperature ( ^•^''^ ), and 
that touch is to some degree awakened by contact with the surrounding 
matrix ( ^- ^). To what extent these rudimentary foetal sensations par- 
take of the truly psychic character is very difficult to determine, owing 
to scarcity of research in the sphere of embryonic brain physiology. 
Many psychologists ^ are of the opinion that they do not at all involve 
the cooperation of the centres of sensational and motive ideality. 
Nevertheless, it is certain that during the later months of pregnancy, 
very great changes take place in the embryonic brain, especially in the 
cerebrum.* If it be allowable to conjecture, it is probable that the 
"sensations" of the embryo involve consciousness, though very dim 
and vague, and that the foetal movements are refiex or automatic, taking 
place in virtue of an organic connection between feeling and movement, 
due in large part to heredity. 

I— SIGHT. 

The Embryonic Eye. — During the earlier stages of the embryonic 
growth, the head is much larger in proportion to the other parts of the 
body than at any subsequent time ; and this is especially noticeable in 
the anterior regions, where the primary vesicle bulges out prominently 
on each side. These protruding portions gradually fold in upon them- 
selves to form the nervous parts of the eye, such as the retina and optic 

'S. g., Wirchow, uoted by Perez (6:4). 
3 Bastian (6:5)- 



S THE PSYCHOLOaY OF CHILDHOOD. 

nerve. Simultaneously with this, the crystalline lens is developed by 
the involution of the epiblast, and is received into the hollow cup formed 
by the folding in of the primary vesicle spoken of. The remaining 
space afterwards becomes filled with the vitreous humor ( 8:84i). "The 
lids make their appearance gradually as folds of integument, subse- 
quently to the formation of the globe in the third month of foetal life. 
When they have met together in front of the eye, their edges become 
closely glued together by an epithelial exudation which is removed a 
short time before birth " ( s: 848 ) . 

We have already remarked that no sensations of sight are received 
during the foetal period. If this be true, the cause lies, not in the im- 
perfection of the organ itself — for the experiments of Kussmaul ( 5:20 ) 
and Genzmer (9=21 ) on premature children, show that at least two 
months before the normal birth-time, the mechanism of the eye is fully 
developed and capable of reaction to appropriate stimuli — but in the 
absence of light-impressions. There may even be at this time vague 
sensations of light, arising from subjective or intra-uterine causes, 
though if there be, they can have but little psychological importance, 
and can by no means account for the actual functioning of the eye 
immediately after birth (io:484). 

The Eye of the New-horn. — If, therefore, the statement is made that 
the new-born child is blind, it must not be taken to mean that he is in 
darkness — for the peripheral mechanism of the eye is complete at birth, 
and the difterence between light and darkness is felt from the beginning 
— but only this, that he cannot as yet see things^ in the proper sense of 
the terms. This is due to lack of experience, to imperfect development 
of the cerebral centres, and to the dazzling eflTect of the light, which 
now streams in, as Sigismund says, with millions of waves, upon a 
delicate organ, accustomed, up to this time, to complete darkness (}'• 1*).^ 
This latter obstacle, however, is soon overcome, and the child's progress 
in seeing takes place with great rapidity. 

The sensation of light is the first feeling, having an external cause, 
which the child experiences by means of the eye. This organ is especially 
adapted, by its peculiar mechanism of retina and rods and cones, and by 
its nerves and muscles of convergence, contraction and accommodation, 
to receive the rays of light that fall upon it ; and hence, as soon as the 
first shock is over, and the infant eye has become accustomed to its new 
surroundings, it turns toward the light as naturally as the opening petals 
of a newly-blown flower turn toward the rising sun. Or, as Locke has 
said : " Even as the soul thirsts for ideas, so the eye of the child thirsts 
lor the light." This sensibility to light is normally present in the first 
minutes of life, and is rarely delayed beyond a few hours, except in the 
case of some mal-formation of the organs (2=^). At this stage, however, 
the distinction of light and darkness is felt rather than known ; and 
even the turning of the head towards the light, which has been observed 
on the second day of life (*), and even as early as the twentieth hour 
(18)2, must be considered as nearly akin to the movement of the plant 
towards the light. But this condition of things is not of long duration. 
To take a single case (that of Preyer's boy), we are told that he soon 
began to show signs of pleasure at a moderate light, pain at too power- 



'Kussmaul aJso remarks: "Ausgetrasene Kinder, welche eben zur welt gekommen 
und ruhig geworden sind, versuchen ofter das Auge wiederholt zu offnen sind aber 
immer wiedergezwuDgenes rasch und kramphaft vor dem einfallenden hellen Lichte zu 
schliessen" ( 5: 20 > 

2 Kussmaul cites the case of a boy, who, though born in the seventh month, yet 
turned his head towards the window on the second day of his life. 



SENSATION. 9 

f ul a glare, and less pleasure in darkness. Even during the first day 
the expression of his face changed when an intervening object cut off 
the light, and on the eleventh day he vi'ould cry when the light was 
carried out of the room. As time passed on, he continually took increas- 
ing notice of these sensations, until in his second month the sight of a 
bright light, or a brightly colored object was sufficient to elicit from 
him exclamations of delight. 

Too powerful a light causes discomfort, even in sleep. The child 
knits his eyelids more closely together (^■'^), or even becomes restless 
and awakes (}--^), ("='^). A very bright light is especially painful 
immediately on awakening. Preyer observed that his boy shut his eyes 
and turned his head away when a candle was held close to him on 
awakening. But when he had been awake for some hours, he looked 
steadily, without blinking, at a candle held one metre from his eyes.^ 

With these qualifications, we may conclude, then, that "light is pleas- 
ant to the eye," being its natural " food," and that under its influence 
the delicate organ of vision grows and develops, the visual centres in 
the cerebrum become differentiated and capable of performing their 
function, thus rendering possible the subsequent apprehension of quali- 
ties in external things by means of this sense. 

Physiological Adjustments to Light. — At the beginning of life, all ad- 
justments of the visual organ to the strength of the light are reflex. For 
example, from the very first the filaments that contract the pupil per- 
form their function. The pupil accommodates itself to the brightness of 
the light, expanding and contracting, as Kussmaul and Raehlmann 
have shown. Both pupils contract when the light reaches one of them. 
These movements of contraction remain automatic to the end of life. 
It is otherwise with such movements as following a moving light or 
object with the eyes. This is at first undoubtedly reflex, since it takes 
place before the conscious centres have been sufficiently developed for 
voluntary action, but it afterwards certainly comes within the domain 
of the will, as is evident from adult conscious experience. 

Eye Movements. — This includes movements of the eye-balls (upward, 
downward, and from right to left, etc.), and movements of the lids 
(raising and lowering), as well as the relation of the two to each other. 

Does the child possess a complete nerve-mechanism for eye-move- 
ments, working perfectly from the beginning, or does he gradually and 
painfully acquire all eye-movements? The most recent observations 
lead to the following conclusion : The mechanism is inherited complete 
so far as pupil, retina and nerve tracts are concerned, but the corre- 
sponding brain centres are not yet developed in the first days, and 
become so only by experience ; consequently the adjustment of move- 
ments to external conditions takes place only gradually. No doubt 
there is a hereditary predisposition to coordinated movements, which to 
some extent facilitates the subsequent adjustment, but the largest share 
is due to experience. The following facts have been established by 
careful observations : 

First. As to movements of the eye-balls : Complete conscious 
coordination of the movements of the two eyes does not take place 
during the first days. True, the eyes sometimes move together, even 
from the first, ^ but there are also numberless non-coordinated move- 
ments, which proves that the coordinated ones are accidental at first, 
and that the useless movements are only gradually eliminated. Raehl- 

'I believe this sensitiveness to light on first atvakening is also quite common among 
adults. 

^According to one observer on the fourth day, according to another on the second 
day ( B i, while a third noticed them Ave minutes after birth ( 3 ). 



10 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

mann and Witkowski, in a very large number of observations on new- 
born children, carried on for fifteen years, found that the infant eyes, 
especially in sleep, •' assume positions and perform movements which 
are entirely contrary to all the principles of association," including 
complete opposite movements of the eyes, resulting in divergence of 
eye-positions (}^). Sometimes the eyes move together, laterally and 
vertically (though this coordination is not so perfect as in the adult) , 
but just as frequently are the movements irregular (E). Sometimes 
one eye moves, while the other remains at rest Sometimes the head is 
turned in one direction, and the eyes in another. A great deal of un- 
necessary convergence takes place (}^), as I have frequently observed. 
In most observed cases, however, these asymmetrical movements have 
become very much less frequent by the third month and, at a little 
later time, have almost entirely disappeared, except in sleep (2*^), ("), 

(12), (13). 

Second. As to movements of the lids: The only lid-movement that 
can be accepted as inborn, is the sudden " blinking " when a foreign 
substance comes into contact with the lashes or the cornea, or on the 
sudden approach of a strong light. The mere approach of the object, 
without contact, does not produce blinking at first ; indeed, in some 
cases, it fails in children two months old (}^). All other lid-movements 
are at first accidental. Sometimes the lids move together, though more 
frequently they do not. Sometimes one eye remains open while the 
other is shut. The two eyes do not always open to an equal degree ; 
and often, if one eye be disturbed and blinking take place, the lid of 
the undisturbed eye will follow some time after the other. The lids are 
often raised while the look is directed downward, and vice versa. The 
child often falls asleep with the lids a little apart ( E ). Coordination, 
then, is not perfect at first, but becomes so by experience. Not only 
so, but the child actually has to unlearn several monements (e. </', 
raising the lids while the eyes are directed downward) and these have 
become impossible in the adult ("). Gradually these asymmetrical 
movements disappear, until by the end of the third month they have 
become very rare, except in sleep. 

All that has been said concerning movements of the eyes, and of the 
lids, separately, is true, mutatis mutandis, of the relation of these to 
each other. Perfect coordination among the several branches of the 
oculomotorius is not present at the beginning of life (not at all during 
the first ten days, according to Eaehlmann), but is a gradual attainment, 
requiring time and experience. But when once the awakening mind has 
taken possession of the eye, and made the movements of that organ its 
own, it becomes one of the most expressive orgaos of the body, and 
reveals the various shades of the inner feeling with astonishing 
accuracy. 

Fixation. — By this is meant conscious direction of the gaze upon an 
object as contrasted with passive staring into space. And the ques- 
tion of most importance here is : when does the child pass from the one 
to the other? The question is important, because it throws light upon 
the beginning of volition, which, in its exercise, determines in such large 
measure the mental and moral development of the child. 

Preyer divides the " seeing " of the infant into four stages. I shall 
follow his classification, bringing under each heading also the observa- 
tions made by others on the ptriod in question (2:4i) ; 

First. Staring into empty space ; experiencing a sensation, but not 
perceiving an object. The ability to "fixate" an object is lacking in 
the newly-born, because he has as yet no control over the muscles that 
move the head and eyes. The apparent looking of the first days is not, 
therefore, a voluntary or intelligent action, but only the instinctive 



SENSATION. 11 

turning of the head and eye so as to bring the light into contact with the 
central portion of the retina, where it produces the greatest amount of 
pleasurable feeling. When Champneys observes that one child '■•fixed" 
his eyes on a candle on the seventh day ("), and Darwin reports that 
another child did the same on the ninth day ("), Preyer remarks that 
this was probably not real looking, but only staring into space, since in 
other similar cases it was observed that the child continued to " look " 
when the object was withdrawn. There is probably no fixation in the 
first nine days. 

Second. The child no longer " stares," but " looks." He fastens his 
gaze upon a bright extended surface (e. gr., his mother's face) and 
when another bright, moderately large object comes within the field of 
vision, he turns his eyes from the first to the second. One child was 
observed to do this on his eleventh ( 2 j, and another on the fourteenth 
day ("). Along with the fixing of the gaze, there is also a more intel- 
ligent expression. Perez reports that a child observed by him " looked 
fixedly for three or four minutes at a flickering reflection of light before 
the end of his first month (6:113)." in another case, an object was 
looked at steadily in the fourth week for the first time(i6) ; in another, 
a yellow dress held the child's gaze at five weeks (i^), and in still 
another the power of fixation is reported on as still absent when the 
child was two months old (^). Sigismund observes that about the 
middle of the first three months the child " begins to look at objects 
with attention ;" and Raehlmann found that '' appropriate selection 
among the many possible eye and lid movements, with fixation of the 
object, took place for the first time after the fifth wfek.''^ 

Third. In the third stage, the child has acquired the power to follow 
with his eyes a bright, moving object. Here we have associated move- 
ments of the eyes, the head being motionless, or nearly so. We have 
now, therefore, a distinct advance, requiring a higher exercise of power 
over the muscles. The movement is not accomplished if the object be 
moved too rapidly. In one case the child's eyes followed a moving caudle 
in the second week (20). In another, on the twenty-third day. But 
most of the observers have noticed this activity first about the fifth 
week, some as late as the sixth or seventh. Raehlmann remarks on 
this point to the following effect : Associated lateral movements of the 
eyes can be found seldom earlier than the fifth week. Hold a bright or 
colored object at a little distance, directly before the child's eyes. One 
soon notices a peculiar change of expression, accompanied by cessation 
of the movements which the limbs until now were executing. The 
object has been fixated. Now move it slowly in a horizontal direction 
to one side, and both the eyes follow, but without movement of the 
head. If the object be moved quickly, the child's eyes lose it at once ; 
and also if the movement be vertical instead of horizontal. - 

In the early part of this third stage, Preyer holds, there is no 
necessary cooperation of the cerebrum, but only of the corpora quadri- 
gemina, and he cites in proof the experiment of Longet with a pigeon, 
from which the cerebral hemispheres had been carefully removed, and 
which, in that condition, followed with its eyes the flame of a moving 
candle (^•^^). It may be remarked, however, that since the instinctive 
and reflex play so much larger a part relatively in the lower animals 
than in man, this proof is not entirely trustworthy, forasmuch as a 
movement, which in the lower animals is reflex, may in man require 
the cooperation of the cerebrum. More to the purpose would be the 

'Taking the average of the above cases, we have the thirty-second day, or during the 
fifth week, as the time of the beginning of fixation. 

2G«nzmer, on the other hand, by shaking a bright object before the eyes, obtained 
not only fixation, but " following " movements in a large number of children, at a much 
earher age than this (9 : 2Sj. 



12 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

ease of an acephalous or microcephalous child. Kollman says of the 
microcephalous Margaret Becker, eight years of age : " Her gait is 
tottering, the movements of the head and extremities jerky, not always 
coordinated, hence unsteady, inappropriate and spasmodic ; her look is 
restless, objects are not definitely fixated.''^ This case seems to point in 
the opposite direction from that of Longet's pigeon, and Preyer's con- 
clusion therefrom. 

Fourth. Here we pass from looking to observing, to the active 
search for objects. The child has acquired ability to give definite 
direction to the gaze, and hold it there. Of course the first attempts 
are often ineffectual, but roughly speaking, from about the third to the 
fifth month, this power is obtained Q^). A girl of ten weeks looked 
for the face of a person calling her. A boy in his sixth week moved 
his head to follow a look cast in a certain direction {^'■'^^). Another 
began in his sixteenth week to look intently at his own hands. Another 
of twelve weeks, on hearing a noise made by a person on a drinking 
glass with a moistened finger, turned his head in the direction of the 
noise, and, after one or two ineffectual attempts, found the object with 
bis eyes and fixated it. In the fourteenth week he followed promptly 
the movements of a pendulum which made forty complete oscillations 
per minute ( 2 ). Sigismund's boy, at nineteen weeks, paid great atten- 
tion to the movements of a pendulum, and afterwards followed the 
movements of a spoon from dish to mouth and back again, with eager 
mien (i:«). Rapid movements, however, are not as yet preferred. In 
the railway carriage, the child of this age does not look at the passing 
objects, but rather at the wails and ceiling of the coach. Not before 
the twenty-ninth week (in one observed case) did the child look dis- 
tinctly, beyond doubt, at a sparrow flying by. Another " watched the 
flight of birds " when five months old ( M )• It will readily be observed 
that the full attainment of this fourth stage involves voluntary control 
of the mechanism of the eye as well as considerable progress in the 
intellectual apprehension of the external world. So that now the child 
is no longer the reflex, staring creature, but has become the bona fide 
" seeing " human being. 

Seeing in Perspective. — Numerous observations confirm the following 
statements : 

(a). The new-born child does not see, in any sense of the word, 
objects that are very distant from him ; or if he sees them at all, the 
impression made by them upon the retina is so vague as not to enter 
into distinct consciousness. Indeed, there are few distinct retinal 
images at first from subjects either near or distant." 

(b) . For a long time after he is able to see objects at a considerable 
distance, and several objects at unequal distances in the field of vision 
together, he still does not know how unequal their distances are, or 
even that they are unequal (2:50).i The physiological mechanism of 
the eye, by which it is '^ accommodated " to the distance of the object 
seen, operates very early ; but the estimation of distance is long imperfect. 
At one month and five days, Tiedemann's son " distinguished objects 
outside him, and tried to seize them, extending his hands and bending 
his body" (}^). By the end of the second month, there is, according 
to one observer, a vague idea of distance i^'-^). But most observers 
place it much later than this. One says: "The first real grasping of 



'" Ilestprouv6, pardes faits certains, qu'ils sent plusieurs mois, sans avoir d'id6e 
precise des distances." Cabanis, " Rapports du physique et du moral de rhomme " 

(5:8). 



SENSATION. 13 

the fixated object, with appreciation of its distance, was observed first 
about the end of the fifth month. But it is very slowly acquired, and 
not until much later than this does the hand proceed directly, by the 
nearest way, to the object " (i^). Another found but little comprehen- 
sion of size or distance until the sixth month. Another reports of a 
little boy that when nearly a year old, he " saw the moon and stars, 
and his eagerness to have the moon was most interesting. Night after 
night he would call for it, stretching out his little hands towards the 
window" (19). The girl F. did not look at anything very far away 
until she was a year old. Preyer's boy, when four months old, " often 
grasped at objects which were twice the length of his arm from him ; 
when considerably over a year old he grasped again and again at a. 
lamp in the ceiling of a railway carriage, and when nearly two years 
old tried to hand a piece of paper to a person looking out of a second 
story window, from the garden below — " a convincing proof how little 
he appreciates distance. "^ 

(c). At first the child sees only colored surface, and not figures in 
the third dimension. All objects present themselves to his eye simply 
as patches of color. Gradually, by the aid of movement and touch, he 
comes to a knowledge of their cubic properties. Hence also arises 
by experience an association between the forms and distances of objects 
and their varying degrees of luminosity, so that' the child comes to 
interpret the one in terms of the other. Hence the progress of the 
child in complete vision, including all that is meant by the appreciation 
of perspective, is immensely facilitated from the time he begins to walk, 
since, by locomotion, he is able to approach the object and bring sight, 
touch and the muscular sense to bear upon its examination. 

Color Discrimination. Not only is color blindness "notoriously 
hereditary" as an abnormal condition in the adult (21:40)^2 ^^-^^ j^ jg ^^^ 
normal condition of the new-born child. Since the tractus opticus does 
not get its nerve medulla, and with that its permanent coloring, until 
the third or fourth day of life, there is probably no discrimination of 
colors up to that time, but only of light and darkness. Moreover, even 
when discrimination of colors has begun, it proceeds very slowly, and 
the investigation is beset by difficulties. How are we to distinguish 
(e. .9.) the mere feeling of difference between sensations of color from 
intelligent apprehension of the colors themselves? Very little can be 
done until the child can speak, and even then new difficulties present 
themselves. The names of colors are more difficult to acquire than the 
names of things, because more abstract. Grant Allen found that chil- 
dren of two years and even more, who knew perfectly well the names 
of grapes, strawberries and oranges, yet had no appropriate verbal 
symbol for purple, crimson or orange as a color (22:250) • and I have found 
in examining the child-vocabularies, which I have collected for the fifth 
chapter of the present work, that out of five thousand four hundred 
words, only about thirty are color terms. In several cases the vocabu- 
lary of a child two years old contains not a single color word, though 
he habitually employs from three to five hundred words {^). Another 
difficulty lies in the association between the color and its name. The 
child may know a color — red — perfectly well ; and may also know the 
sound — red, — but he may not be able to associate the two together so 

'And yet another child had apparently attained a comparatively correct estimation 
of distance by the end of her seventh month, as she " invariably refused to reach for 
an object more than fourteen inches distant, her reaching distance being from nine to 
ten inches " (15 ). 

^Color blindness seems much more common among males than among females. Tests 
made in 1879 on nearly thirty thousand students of the various schools in the city of 
Boston, showed that of the boys four in every hundred were color blind, while among 
the girls the proportion was less than one in a thousand. B. Joy Jeffers, A. M., M. D., in 
" School Documents," No. 13, Boston, 1880. 



14 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

as, when red is named, to point it out; or, when it is pointed out, to 
name it. This is not from lack of ability to distinguish color from 
color, but from inability to associate the color with the spoken word. 

A girl ten days old had her attention arrested by the contrasted colors 
of her mother's dress. She seemed pleased and smiled (i^). A boy 
cwenty-three days old was pleased with a brightly colored curtain (*=®). 
Another child in his second month took notice of the difference between 
bright colors and quiet ones, and showed his preference for the former 
by smiles (ssus). Another, towards the end of his second month, was 
attracted by white, blue and violet, other colors being indifferent. A 
girl of three months and a boy of five months seemed pleased with some 
drawings of a uniformly gray color d^'-*^), while Genzmer's boy for the 
first four months of his life seemed attracted only by white objects, but 
after that time he began to show a preference for other bright colors, 
especially red. Raehlmann found no distinction of similar objects 
differently colored until a good while after the fifth week. Sometimes 
a strange antipathy to certain colors is manifested. In several cases 
children have refused to go to anybody dressed in black (i^). 

Experiments in color discrimination, which involve the use of words, 
may be carried on in two ways. A color may be named, and the child 
required to pick that color out of several ; or the color may be shown 
him, and he required to name it. Preyer (^■^) used both methods, with 
the following results : In the twentieth month repeated trials yielded 
absolutely no result, but in the beginning of the child's third year, the 
first correct responses were obtained, the result being eleven right 
answers and six wrong ones. In this case he used two colors, red and 
green. Then yellow was added, and at once took its place as the color 
most readily perceived (26th month). The percentages of right an- 
swers were : Yellow 82, green 77, red 72. Blue was then added, with 
the following result: Yellow 94, green 79, red 70, blue 69. Trials 
made a week later with five colors resulted as follows : Yellow 100, 
violet 92, green 90, red 83, blue 42. Then, with six colors : Yellow 96, 
violet 95, red 84, gray 83, green 74, blue 67 (26th and 27th months). 
Finally, two weeks later, trial was made with nine colors, resulting as 
follows : Yellow, gray, brown and black 100, red 94, violet 85, green 3, 
rose 33, blue 23. Preyer carried these experiments a good deal further, 
and varied the method, but with substantially the same results. The 
summary of all his tests up to the 34th month gives the following order 
of preferences : Yellow, brown, red, violet, black, rose, orange, gray, 
green, blue. When yellow and red were removed, the child showed less 
interest. Blue and green were avoided, and mostly named wrong, green 
being often called "garnix" ("gar nichts" = "nothing at all"). 

Binet (j^*) made a number of experiments with a little girl from the 
32nd to the 40th month, with results which I may epitomize as follows : 

1st series : Red 100, green 61, yellow 52. 

2d series: Red 100, blue 92, maroon and rose 89, violet 75, green 71, 
white 62, yellow 38. 

In these experiments, the child was required to point out the color 
named to her. The method was now reversed, and the child required 
to name the color pointed out to her. The result was as follows : 

1st series : Red 100, yellow 0. 

2d series : Blue 100, red 96, green 82, rose 57, violet 54, maroon 50, 
white 45, yellow 28. (M. Binet says every time an error is committed 
with yellow, it consists in confounding it with green. He noticed also 
that violet was confounded with blue.) 

Some remarkable differences may be noticed between the results of 
these two observers. For example, in the perception of yellow ; while 
Preyer's child perceived this color better than any other, Binet's little 
girl had the greatest difficulty with it. Also as regards blue : in the one 



SENSATION. 15 

case this color stands at the very bottom of the list, while in the other 
it is almost at the top.^ 

The greatest uniformity obtains in the case of bright and glaring 
colors, such as red. This may have a physiological basis in the fact 
that when the eyes are closed in a bright light, red is the only color 
visible. 

In the foregoing experiments, the child must know the names of the 
colors before the tests can be made ; and we can never be certain that 
the mistakes committed do not arise from confusion of words rather 
than of colors. On this account, the following tests made by Binet 
seem to me of far greater value. Instead of the " methode d'appella- 
tion," as he calls the system just explained, he adopted here the 
" methode de reconnaissance," which consists in showing the child a 
counter of a certain color, then shuffling it together with a number of 
counters of that color and others, and requiring him to pick out a 
counter of that color. In this way the name is not used at all, and the 
test proceeds purely on the recognition of color. The results by this 
method were much more satisfactory. With three colors— red, green and 
yellow — no mistakes being made ; and even with seven colors, and with 
an interval of time between the perception and the recognition, the 
errors were very few indeed. This seems to show that the child's chief 
difficulty is not in recognition of the color, but in the association of the 
color with the sound of its name.* 

Objeetive Interpretation. The understanding of the meaning of the 
visual sensation is the slowest in development of all the faculties con- 
nected with the eye. The subject belongs indeed properly under the 
head of Perception and Judgment, and little need be said upon it here. 

To comprehend the distance and form of an object, is an advance on 
the rudimentary "seeing" of the object ; but to understand wAaf the object 
is so as to distinguish it from other objects, and be conscious of a relation 
between it and the perceiving subject, constitutes a still further advance. 
The child attains this further advance slowly and painfully, at the cost 
of many tumbles and scratches, the result of errors in judgment that 
are sometimes pitiable, often comical. Feeling and instinct render great 
service at this time, and often lead the child to do things which, on a 
casual view, might too readily be interpreted as the work of judgment; 
as in the case of the child of less than a month, who made a wry face at 
the sight of some bitter medicine (^=1^) . 

The first object to be recognized is usually the mother's face, which 
is greeted with a smile of pleasure by children only a few weeks old 
("). But this first recognition is very vague and inaccurate, as is 
shown by the fact that the infant " recognizes" in the same way, at 
first, any other face which resembles hers in broad outlines ; and that 
when recognition of the father's face takes place, the child bestows his 
smile of welcome also on any other bearded gentleman who happens to 
come within his range of vision. For a long time, objects are not 
grasped as comprehensive wholes, but rather some striking feature is 
apprehended, and all else left out of account. Hence arise some of the 
very peculiar association groupings, which we shall notice in connec- 
tion with language. From about the sixth month, however, evidences 
of intelligent comprehension of many of the more common objects may 



1 Experiments made by Wolfe on the school children of Lincoln, Nebraska, gave 
results (tiflering from both Preyer and Binet. Following is the order in this case: 
White, black and red (nearly always correctly named) , then blue, yellow, green, pink, 
orange and violet, in the order named (23). . • ,. ^u 

2 For a criticism of all these methods, and the explanation of another, m which tn« 
whole question is viewed from the motor standpoint, see two articles by Prof. Baldwin, 
in Science for April 21st and 28th, 1893. 



16 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

be observed. The smile or nod of the parents is distinguished from 
that of strangers, and responded to in a different manner. Visual 
impressions connected with food and clothing are quickly and surely 
recognized (2=62). Yet even much later than this, many mistakes are 
made. The child of a year and a half will try to pick up a sunbeam 
from the floor, to grasp his own reflection in the mirror, to pull a stream 
of water flowing from a sponge, as though it were a string. Even at 
the close of his second year, pictorial representation is a great mystery 
to him, and he prefers the reality, yigismund's boy, at two years, 
called a circle " plate," a square " bonbon," and his father's shadow 
" papa; " and Preyer's boy, much later than this, called a square " win- 
dow," a triangle "roof," a circle " ring," and several dots on the paper 
" little birds." Pollock tells of a girl nearly two years old, who, on 

seeing a row of dots on a printed page, thus , cried out, 

" Oh, pins," and made repeated attempts to pick them out (^) ; and the 
girl F. was observed one day trying to " pick up " her father's white 
protruding cuflf from what she supposed was the underlying coatsleeve, 
as she attempted to grasp the cuff from that side, and seemed much sur- 
prised at her failure. 

II.— HEARING. 

The importance of hearing as a knowledge-giving sense would be 
diflScult to over-estimate. Besides being the channel of a large part of 
our knowledge, and the medium of a vast amount of refined pleasure, 
the sense of hearing plays so large a role in the acquisition of language 
that a child who is perfectly deaf from birth, does not learn to speak. 

The Embryonic Ear. — According to Quain's Anatomy, the more 
important parts of the organ of hearing are formed by the involution of 
the epiblast from the surface of the head, in the region of the medulla 
oblongata, by which a depression is produced. This depression 
gradually deepening, and its outer aperture becoming narrowed, a flask- 
like cavity is formed, which constitutes on each side the primary auditory 

vesicle (8:848), 

The possibility of hearing in the intra-uterine stage, depends on two 
things, viz., the presence of adequate stimuli and the permeability of 
those passages and nerve tracts by which sensations of sound are 
mediated. As to the first condition, there are probably numerous sounds 
which might produce sensations of hearing in the foetus, such as the 
visceral movements of the mother and those of the foetus itself. Hear- 
ing at this stage is, however, highly improbable, because the second 
condition is not fulfilled. The drum cavity is filled with a viscous mass, 
which probably prevents the passage of the necessary sound-vibrations 
through the tympanum, even leaving out of account the complete 
absence of air at this period (i^: 48i ). The tympanum itself also has not, 
at this time, the perpendicular position which it afterwards assumes, and 
which seems necessary for the transmission of sound, but lies rather in 
a horizontal situation (^ ) • 

Hearing in the New-born. — Czerney, in his experiments as to the com- 
parative soundness of sleep at different times, was unable to use a sound 
stimulus with new-born children as he did with adults, because of their 
failure to react to sound-impressions ; he was obliged, in their case, to 
resort to electrical stimulation {^). Kroner assured himself by many 
experiments that the child, in the first week of his life, reacts distinctly 
to strong sound-impressions ("), and the very careful experiments of 
Moldenhauer confirm this conclusion. Mrs. Talbot says of one child 
that he was sensible to sound three hours after his birth ("). Sigis- 



SENSATION. 17 

mund saw the first evidences of hearing much later. ^ Perez thinks 
there may be — through vibration — something corresponding to a 
rudimentary and general sense of hearing in the uterus ( ®=^ ). Champ- 
neys could not elicit any response — by starting or otherwise — during 
the first week, to any noise, however loud, unless accompanied by 
vibration other than air-vibration ("). Kussmaul utterly failed to pro- 
duce any impression in the first days, no matter how loud or discordant 
the noise. ^ He believes hearing sleeps most deeply of all the senses. 
But he quotes Herr Feldsbausch, assistant in midwifery at the hospital 
in Jena, to show that there was hearing in many cases from the third 
day. Genzmer found that almost all the children on whom he experi- 
mented, on the first day,or certainly on the second, reacted to impressions 
of sound; but the reaction was unequal in different children {^- 1^). Dr. 
Deneke found one child of six hours who started and closed his eyes 
tighter at the sound of two metallic covers striking together ; while 
Preyer observed one who did not react at all on the third day, and 
another who, on the sixth day, reacted only very slightly (2= ''^). Sully 
noticed, on the second day, a distinct movement of the head in response 
to sound, and this is confirmed by Professor Baldwin. Burdach declares 
the child hears nothing during the first week. 

On these the following observations are in place, and may help to the 
understanding of the discrepancies. 

(1). There is unanimity on one point: No one has succeeded in 
proving that any child hears anything during the first hours. This 
corresponds to the physiological facts that the eustachian tube is not 
permeable, nor does air find its way into the middle ear until some little 
time after respiration has begun. Lesser's experiments show that the 
foetal conditions of the middle ear may indeed persist in the prematurely 
born more than twenty hours. 

(2) . Starting in response to a loud noise may often be caused by 
vibrations which aff"ect the whole body, and act as a nervous shock. 
Children are known to start on the slamming of a door, when they make 
no such response to a voice, however loud. No doubt, in the first case, 
the child feels the jar rather than hears the noise. 

(3) . Any further discrepancies not resolved by these two considera- 
tions, may be accounted for by the differences in maturity of difierent 
children at birth, and the varying rapidity with which the physiological 
adjustments are completed. Generalizing, we may say that the period 
of beginning to hear varies according to these circumstances, from the 
sixth hour to the third week. If, in the fourth week, a healthy, normal 
child makes no response to a loud sound behind him, there is reason to 
fear that he will be deaf and dumb (}■ ^6). 

As regards localization of sounds, the ear does not render very much 
service in this, on account of its comparative immobility. Even in the 
adult, a sound made in the room above is with great difficulty dis- 
tinguished from a sound made in the room below, unless some other 
circumstance enter in to assist in the determination. 

Champneys' child, on the fourteenth day, turned his head in the 
direction of his mother's voice, but this was probably due as much to 
feeling her breath upon his cheek as to hearing, since he did not do it 
when her face was turned in another direction. Leaving this observa- 
tion, then, out of account, I find that the period in which children are 
first observed to turn the head in the direction of sounds, extends from 

' " Nach einlgen (drei bis acht) Wochen sieht man das Kind bei plotzlichem Gerausche 
zusammenfahren. Da erkennt mann klar, dass jetzt auch fiir die wahrneiimende Seele, 
dasHepbatal gesprochen ist." " Kind und Welt," p. 27. 

2 "Mann kann vor den Ohren wachender Neugeborner in den ersten Tagen die stSrk- 
sten disharmonischen Gerausche machen, ohne dass sie davon beriihrt werden (6: 21). 



18 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

the tenth week (29:329) (or the fifth week, according to Alcott) to the 
seventeenth week (ii). One child sometimes turned towards a sound 
in the sixteenth week. Another, at four months and ten days, "always 
turned his head exactly in the right direction" (12). A third turned 
his head towards a sound for the first time in the eleventh week, and 
by the sixteenth week this movement had assumed all the certainty of 
a refiex (-= ^), and still another, when five months old, on hearing the 
rumbling of the cars in the street, knew to which window to go to look 
for them Q^). Schultze observed that active hearing, with attention, 
began after the first half-year. Not only are there these differences 
among different children, but in the same child the accuracy of locali- 
zation becomes greater by exercise. The differences in time, noted 
above, are doubtless in part due to variations in the rapidity of the 
physiological development of the ear. 

By the end of the fourth month the normal child has made considerable 
progress in the understanding of the meaning of sounds^ i. e., in the inter- 
pretation of sounds by their timbre. I find here also great differences in the 
results of the observations. Tiedemann's son took notice of gestures 
on the thirteenth day. Words would stop his tears or call them forth, 
according to the tone in which they were uttered. Another child, 
sixteen days old, would sometimes leave off" crying when his mother 
spoke soothingly to him. At two months he distinguished between the 
loud bark of a dog and a coaxing yelp, being frightened by the former, 
but quickly soothed by the latter. A girl of three and a half months 
" knows when she is being scolded " {^'^). On the other hand, out of 
one hundred children observed, Dr. Demme found only two who, at 
three and a half months, knew their parents' voices (2=91). Another 
observer reports that at two months there was no apparent apprecia- 
tion of ordinary sounds, but children of four and a half months some- 
times recognized a voice (20). 

These differences are, no doubt, to some extent, due to heredity, and 
to some extent produced artificially in the life of the individual by 
exercise. The average child apparently begins to comprehend the 
meaning of tones from the second to the fourth month. 

A very interesting point in connection with the subject of the child's 
hearing, is his power to appreciate music. So intimately associated is 
it with the development of his aesthetic nature, that it deserves the 
careful study of the psychologist and the educator. 

There are two chief sources of pleasure in music : the rhythmical 
movement, and the melody — the time and the tune. With regard to the 
first, it seems safe to say that no healthy, normal child, after the first 
few weeks, fails to appreciate rhythmical movements. At sixteen days 
one boy was soothed by the gentle, regular movements of the mother. 
These first musical impressions have a physiological explanation. There 
seems almost to be a sense of rhythm. The succession of notes produces 
a flow of blood to the brain, and its energetic excitation redounds in 
lively sentiments and animated movements. Thus music responds to 
that need of muscular activity so strong in the child (25:134). The 
social instinct also enters here : the child takes more delight in noise 
and movement when someone is at hand to participate. 

With regard to the second point, the opinion may safely be ventured 
that no healthy, normal child is entirely lacking in musical " ear." I 
find no record of any child, who has been carefully observed, being 
utterly deficient in appreciation of musical harmonies. In the vast 
majority of cases the opposite is the case. Children almost always, 
from a very early age, show a lively interest in music. In one observed 
case, a child of one month manifested delight in singing and playing 
(6:265), Sometimes children only two weeks old have been observed to 
stop the motions of their limbs,and apparently listen, when a piano was 



SENSATION. 19 

played in another room (i^). From six or seven weel£s onward, and 
especially in the latter half of the first year, the child's pleasure iu 
music is often shown by a sort of accompanying muscular movements, 
which he seems unable to repress. The mother's song of lullaby is 
keenly appreciated (25: 132)^ and somewhat later is even given back by 
the child in a most charming infant warble. The emotional element 
in the music is often keenly distinguished. Dr. Brown of says one of the 
infants observed by her in New York city, that when only Ave and a 
half months old, he would cry when his mother played a plaintive air ; 
but would stop at once, and begin to jump and toss his arms about and 
laugh, if she struck into a lively melody (i^). There seems to be, as 
someone has said, a sympathy between the ear and the voice which 
antedates all experience, and which is even to a large extent independent 
of normal brain-endowment. Even idiotic children (provided they are 
not deaf) who can speak only a few simple words and syllables, are 
able to sing, and in singing they employ other words besides those 
generally at their command (^). While all this is true, it should also 
be remembered that the child's cerebral and mental endowment is ex- 
ceedingly plastic, and that consequently sounds which at first were 
disagreeable to him soon become tolerable and even pleasant. He 
accommodates himself to all sorts of noises with far greater facility than 
the adult, and soon comes to take great delight in any sort of rude, 
banging, grating sounds, especially if they are his own production. 
Hence there is no sense in the education of which greater care should 
be taken than the sense of hearing. As already said, probably all 
normal children are born with a capacity for musical appreciation, 
though of course not all in the same degree. Now in the early period 
— during the first four or five years of life, — it is very easy to cultivate 
this musical capacity or to destroy it. If the child hears, every day; 
rasping, grating and discordant noises, he will come very soon to like 
these as well as the most harmonious. It lies within the power of 
parents and teachers so to cultivate the child's capacity in this respect 
as to minister in an incalculable degree to the happiness of his life and 
the purity of his character. ^ 

III.— TOUCH. 

Touch has been called the universal sense, because, while sight, hear- 
ing, etc., have each a special, local end-organ, touch has its end-organs 
in every part of the body, numberless nerves of this sense communicat- 
ing with the brain from every portion of the skin. The importance of 
the touch-sense is, therefore, obvious. Some have gone so far as to call 
it the fundamental sense, and have endeavored to reduce all the others 
to it. Without going this far, we may readily recognize its importance 
in the mental development of the child ; from recorded cases of children 
who, from birth or from an early age, have been deprived of the other 
senses, or the most important of them, and who have, nevertheless, 
almost by touch alone reached a remarkable degree of intellectual and 
moral attainment (^i). The field of the present inquiry is covered by 
three questions : 

(1). As to the first beginnings of touch experiences. (2). As to 
the comparative delicacy of diflferent parts of the body. (3). As to 
the education of touch perception. 

(1) . All observers concur in the opinion that the sense of touch is 
exercised to a considerable degree in the foetal stage of existence. 

'"Comme I'a dit si bien le poete, Toreille est le chemin du coeur. Envelopper Tenfant 
d'une atmosphere de sons doux, tendres et rfijouissants, c'est travailler a, son bonheur 
actuel, et c'est faire beaucoup pour son humeur et sa morality futures" (25: 137 ). 



20 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

Cabanis expressed the opinion that the sense of touch is the only one 
that furnishes the child in the first days with distinct perceptions, 
" probably because it is the only one that has had any exercise before 
birth" (5:8), 

Kussmaul believes this sense is aroused in the embryonic period by 
contact with the surrounding matrix. Perez holds that there are indis- 
tinct tactile sensations during the intra-uterine life. Preyer believes 
touch-sensations are present at this time, though of far less intensity 
than in the subsequent life. Sully speaks of touch as the first sense to 
manifest itself. Erasmus Darwin expressed the belief that the foetus 
receives through this sense some representation of its own figure, and 
of the uterus itself. This opinion is concurred in by nearly all the 
authorities quoted in this connection here, and has been placed beyond 
doubt by the experiments of Kussmaul and Genzmer on prematurely 
born children, in whom they found the sense of touch already in full 
operation immediately after birth, though for a considerable time it is 
not accompanied by clear and definite objective reference, but is only a 
subjective feeling. 

(2). Differences in sensibility to touch impressions among the different 
parts of the body are not so great at first as they afterwards become. 
In the uterus, the surrounding medium has been homogeneous ; but 
from the time of birth onward, it becomes more and more varied, so 
that those parts of the body which are exposed to contact with the 
external world become relatively blunted in delicacy, while those 
which continue to be more or less protected— such as the eye and the 
tongue — retain more nearly their original sensitiveness. Nevertheless, 
the diff"erences in delicacy among the different parts at the very first are 
surprisingly great. 

The upper surface of the tongue is exceedingly sensitive. Kussmaul 
introduced a small glass rod into the mouths of children just born, 
eliciting prompt responsive movements, which varied in char- 
acter according to the part touched. When the rod touched the 
tongue near the tip, the lips at once protruded, the sides of the tongue 
curled up around the rod, and sucking movements followed. When the 
rod came into contact with the back part of the tongue near the root, 
all the responsive movements — expression of face, mouth motions, etc. 
— indicated " nausea." f Similar results were obtained by Kroner and 
Grenzmer.) No doubt we have here a sensori-motor reflex established 
before birth. The same is true in the case of the lips, which share with 
the tongue an extreme delicacy from the first. Even the lightest touch 
of a feather produced sucking movements of the lips on the sixth day 
(2:100), and gentle stroking of the lips produced the same result on the 
5th day (»:"), and even on the first day ("), (^), (^ ). 

One of the most sensitive parts of the body to touch impressions is the 
mucus membrane which lines the nostrils. This was observed to be 
sensitive on the first day of the child's life. " Tickling of the inner sur- 
faces of the wings of the nose with a feather calls from children first of 
all winking of the eyelids, stronger and earlier on the tickled side than 
on the other; if the irritation be increased, the child not only knits the 
eyebrows, but moves the head and the hands, which latter it carries to 
the face " (^■'^^). It appears, however, from the observations of the same 
authority, that this sensitiveness of the mucus membrane is formed only 
towards the end of the period of gestation, since similar experiments 
made on children born in the seventh month were without result. 

Certainly next in order of delicacy — if indeed they should not have 
been placed earlier — come the various parts of the eye : the lashes, the 
conjunctiva and the cornea. Of these three, the lashes are considered 
by Kussmaul and Kroner the most sensitive to touch impressions. The 
former says : " The eyelashes are extraordinarily sensitive to even the 



SENSATION. 21 

faintest disturbances. If the child, when awake, has the eyes open, one 
ean press with a glass rod even to the cornea before it will close the 
eyes ; but should only one of the little lashes be disturbed in the least, 
this closing of the eyes will take place at once. The disturbance of the 
eyelids is not so efficacious by far; it will by no means be answered 
every time by eye-winking, as in the case of the cilia." He goes on to 
say that if one should blow through a small tube of twisted paper upon 
the face of an infant, winking will take place only when the stream of 
air has disturbed one of the cilia. Genzmer and Preyer differ from 
Kussmaul here, holding that the cornea is more sensitive than the 
lashes. These facts are interesting as bearing on the question of 
priority between sight and touch in the eye. It has been frequently 
noticed by competent observers O*), (i) that the child does not for a 
good while blink when a finger is thrust at the eye, provided it does not 
come into contact with it. Touch-reflexes seem, therefore, to be 
developed earlier than sight-reflexes. 

If the tip of the nose be touched, both eyes will be shut tight. If one 
side be touched, the child will generally close the eye on that side. If 
the irritation be increased, both eyes will be closed and the head drawn 
somewhat back. This is an inborn defensive reflex ("=!<'*), (^^). 

If one tickles the palm of the hand of a new-born child, the fingers 
will close round the object with which it was tickled (^^i^), (2:io4), (s-n), 
(19). The skin of the face seems even more sensitive still. On tickling 
the sole of the foot, active reflex movements follow, such as bending 
the knees and hip-joints, curling and spreading the toes, etc. The 
reaction time is longer, however, in infants than in adults, sometimes 
amounting to two seconds. Slaps also are more effective than pricks, 
some children showing comparative indifference to the latter. A greater 
number of nerve ends are stimulated by a slap, hence the more speedy 
reaction. The greater sensitiveness of the adult to sense impressions in 
general is due to his more advanced cerebral development, and not to 
any superiority in cutaneous or nervous adjustment. 

The other parts of the body are, speaking roughly, sensitive to touch 
impressions in the following order : The auditory canal (in the second 
quarter of the first year, the child observed by Preyer would instantly 
stop crying and become very quiet, if one's little finger were placed 
gently in the ear cavity) , forearm, leg, shoulder, breast, abdomen, back, 
and upper part of thigh. 

(3). The susceptibility of the sense of touch to education is very 
great, as may be seen from the attainments of those who are born blind, 
the proficiency they attain in reading by touch, etc. As a knowledge- 
giving sense, it stands very high, contributing much to the child's first 
knowledge of the external world, and, together with sight and the mus- 
cular feelings, to his first comprehension of space and time relations. It 
aids greatly also in his acquirement of the notion of self— this probably 
at first through touching some portion of his own body, and then some 
external thing, and feeling a difference between the resulting sensations. 
But even before active touch has thus begun, the foundations of the 
child's education are laid in passive touch experiences, which from the 
beginning not only yield him pleasure and pain, but, being more 
frequent as well as more varied in their operations, contribute 
earlier and more largely than any of the other sense experiences to the 
development of his faculties, and to his gradual acquaintanceship with 
the world of objects by which he is surrounded. ^ 

IV.— TASTE. 

According to Sigismund, taste is the first of all the senses to yield 
clear perceptions, to which memory is attached. Not only is the exer- 

»0n this subject see Perez, " Education Morale des le Berceau," chap. V. 



22 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

cise of this sense connected from the first with the child's most primi- 
tive needs and their satisfaction, but it is more than probable that, even 
in the embryonic stage, taste has been to some degree aroused by swal- 
lowing the amniotic fluid (^'■^^). 

Numerous careful experiments show that the child is capable of 
bona-fide sensations of taste in the earliest moments of life ; and that, 
though he is for some time more obtuse and more uncertain in this 
respect than the adult, yet when a sapid object is introducted into his 
mouth, the resulting sensation really takes place by way of the gusta- 
tory bulbs and nerves, and is not merely a species of touch sensation, 
as some have held. 

Kussmaul experimented on twenty children, during the first day of 
life — some of them in the very first moments — with the following results : 
Solutions of sugar and of quinine being introduced into the mouth by 
means of a hair pencil — the mixture being warmed so that the feeling 
of temperature should not aflfect the result — the children responded with 
" the same mimetic movements which we designate among grown people 
as the facial expressions of sweet and bitter." They responded to the 
sugar by protruding the lips in a spout-like form, pressing the tongue 
between them, sucking and swallowing. On the contrary, when the 
quinine was introduced, the visage was distorted, the eyes closed, the 
tongue protruded, and choking movements were made, accompanied by 
the expulsion of the fluid and active secretion of saliva. " Sometimes 
the head was actively shaken, as in the case of grown people when 
attacked by nausea.'' These results were obtained also in premature 
children, showing that this reflex arc is capable of performing its func- 
tions before birth. He adds, however, that he found great individual 
differences among children, some being far less responsive than others. 
Sometimes also the children seemed to make a mistake at first, as they 
occasionally responded to sugar by the mimetic movement for bitter, but 
this was probably only surprise at the new sensation, as they very soon 
changed it for the correct expression. He found also by these experi- 
ments that only the tip and edges of the tongue represent the tasting 
compass, the middle of the back part yielding no sensations of taste. 

Genzmer (^=^^), experimenting on twenty-five children, most of whom 
were just born, obtained results substantially agreeing with those of 
Kussmaul. He noticed, however, that in many cases the introduction 
of an attenuated solution of quinine was responded to by sucking move- 
ments, while stronger solutions were rejected with the mimetic for 
" bitter," showing that taste sensibility is weaker at this age than in the 
adult.' 

Preyer agrees with the above deductions in every respect, and adds : 
"It is certain from all observations that the newly-born distinguish the 
sensations of taste that are decidedly difierent from one another, — the 
sweet, sour and bitter" (2:ii9). His boy, on the first day of life, licked 
powdered cane sugar, whereas he licked nothing else. Later, on receiv- 
ing a strange food, he often shuddered and distorted his face merely on 
account of the novelty of the sensation, for, in the case of an agreeable 
sensation, he directly afterwards desired it, and received it with an 
expression of satisfaction. He concludes that the association of certain 
mimetic contractions of muscles with certain sensations of taste is 
inborn. 

The development of taste-perception in the infant is interesting and 
important. The pleasures and pains of taste play a large part in his 
early education. The mouth is soon made the test organ to 
which all objects are carried, and by which their qualities are 
ascertained. Preyer's boy, on the second day, took without he si 

' These results are corroborated also by Kroner, Fehling and severalothers (17), (7), 
(20). 



SENSATION. 23 

tation cow's milk diluted with water, which, on the fourth day, 
he stoutly refused. During his sixth month, he began to refuse to take 
the breast (which was offered him only in the night), because the 
sweetened cow's milk, which he had taken in the day time, was some- 
what sweeter. From this time onward, and especially after weaning, 
his discrimination became much nicer, and by the fourth and fifth 
years he had become so "fastidious" that even the sight of certain 
articles of diet would call forth from him the mimetic movements for 
nausea, choking, etc. 

Perez (6=32) gays the sense of taste is very slightly developed in the 
new-born, yet It exists. A child observed by him distinguished milk 
from sweetened water, and sweetened water from plain water, by the 
taste. Yet there are great differences of gustatory sensitiveness among 
children. In some cases, a child of six months has been induced to take 
bitter medicine by a change in the color. On the other hand, a child 
of two and a half months refused its bottle because the milk was not 
sweetened. Most children begin very early to detect the acid taste in 
certain substances^. 

Yet in general, children's tastes change very easily, and hence are 
highly susceptible to education in almost every direction. Moreover, 
there are differences in the same child at different times : the state of the 
health, the temperature of the food (which, according to Champneys, 
is of more consequence than the taste itself), and many other circum- 
stances entering in to disturb the gustatory equilibrium (25:ii8). 

v.— SMELL. 

Taste and smell are so closely associated that they might almost be 
considered together. The savor of substances depends, to a large 
extent, on their odor. These senses resemble each other in the com- 
parative diffuseness of their perceptions, and in the fact that their 
sensations are more persistent, and, therefore, less clearly distinguish- 
able successively than those of the higher senses. 

In order to sensations of smell, there must be air in the nasal cavities ; 
hence there can be no exercise of this sense before respiration begins ; 
none, therefore, before the beginning of the post-natal life. 

Careful tests upon new-born children, however, show that they are 
susceptible to strong odors in the first hours of life. Records are at 
hand of tests made on about fifty children, most of whom were less 
than a day, some only fifteen minutes old. The tests were made with 
asafoetida, aqua fcetida, and oleum dipelli. Care was taken to experi- 
ment on sleeping as well as waking children, in order to avoid mistakes 
in interpreting the gestures and facial expressions. The result was 
that the children became uneasy, knit the eyelids more firmly together, 
contracted the muscles of the face, moved the head and arms, and, 
finally, awoke, sometimes even with crying. On the removal of the 
odor, they would fall asleep again. These results were also obtained in 
the case of eight months children, but not on those of a still more pre- 
mature birth ( 5 ),(»),(") . 

With the child's growth, progress is normally made in power of dis- 
crimination by the sense of smell, though more slowly than in the case 
of the higher senses. A little girl of eighteen hours obstinately refused 
a nipple on which a little petroleum had been rubbed, but readily took 
the other. Another child refused cow's milk when it loas brought near 
him. Another, at thirteen days, refused certain medicines, being guided 
solely by their odor (i^). Decisive discrimination of pleasant from 
unpleasant odors, with rejection of the latter, and appreciation of the 
former, has been observed in numerous instances from the early part of 

iDr. Brown thinks this is the first taste to be recognized (19). 



94 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

the second month on ; and during the second half of the first year, this 
discrimination has become, with some children, very marked indeed, a 
lively enjoyment of the scent of flowers often being noticeable from this 
time on (is), (M). 

With all this, however, the sense of smell is far less acute in children 
than tn adults. They often appear unaffected by odors which would be 
exceedingly unpleasant to the grown person. Further, their sensibility 
to smells very quickly becomes blunted by repetition or continuance, as 
is the case, to a less degree, with all persons. When the experiments 
with asafoetida, etc., described above, were repeated, no responses 
could be elicited after the first or second trial. Even after the child has 
become keenly appreciative of odors, he seems utterly to lack that dex- 
terity in the management of the organ which is so noticeable in the 
case of taste. Children well on in the second year of life may be 
observed to carry a fragrant flower to the mouth, — and even into it — 
instead of to the nose. The same awkwardness is seen in the manage- 
ment of the breath. When learning to smell, they invariably exhale 
with great vigor at first, but require considerable practice before they 
can inhale the odors (^). 

Man seems greatly inferior to many of the lower animals in regard to 
smell. A kitten, three days old, "• spat " at a hand which had been licked 
by a dog — a remarkable instance of the persistence and transmission of 
what Mr. Darwin calls •' serviceable associated movements." The keen- 
ness of scent in dogs and horses, and many wild animals, is proverbial. 
In man, on the other hand, this sense stands very low in the knowledge- 
giving scale. Even in mature life, it gives but little information 
respecting the external world, and that of an uncertain character. In 
the child, it is concerned chiefly with the recognition of food. But it 
may well be that if this sense were brought into as constant requisition 
as the sense of sight or hearing, and as much care bestowed upon its 
education, very important results might take place in the way of 
developing a smell-sensibility^. 

VI. — TEMPERATURE. 

There are two classes of thermic sensations : 1st, passive, subjective 
and general, as when we say " I am cold '' or " I am warm." 2d, active, 
objective and local, as when we touch a hot or a cold object and pro- 
nounce it hot or cold (25:i50). Both are important in the child's develop- 
ment, but the second sort lends itself to experiment more readily than 
the first. 

The sense of temperature should not be confounded with the sense of 
touch ; for, though, like touch, it is universal, having its end organs 
scattered all over the body, yet the feeling in the one case is quite dis- 
tinct from that in the other. 

With regard to the possibility of sensations of temperature prior to 
birth, Luys expresses himself as follows : " We know indeed that from 
this period (the fourth month of pregnancy) the foetus is sensitive to 
the action of cold, and that we can develop its spontaneous movements 
by applying a cold hand to the abdomen of the mother" (*-^^). Perez 
also is of the opinion that the foetus experiences certain cutano-thermal 
sensations from about this time ('=^). f reyer takes the opposite ground, 
arguing for the homogeneity of the uterine temperature, and the conse- 
quent absence of any possibility of comparing sensations. 

At all events, in the newly-born, the sense of warmth and cold 
develops very promptly. The gradual cooling, on coming into contact 

iSIantegazza complains that we aid our eyes with spectacles, inicroscop<i8 and tele- 
scopes, and our ears with trumpats, while the nose is entirely neglected. "Die Hygiene 
der Sinne." 



SENSATION. 25 

with the external world, the atmosphere, the clothing, the bath,— all 
contribute to the speedy differentiation of thermic sensations, and to the 
perception of temperature. Genzmer, in experimenting upon about 
twenty new-born children, found that there was active withdrawal of the 
parts — palm of hand, sole of foot, cheek, etc. — to which the cold object 
was applied (9=*). His experiments are not entirely satisfactory, how- 
ever, since sufficient care was not taken to exclude touch sensations from 
participating. 

Satisfactory observations as to the development of the temperature 
sense are very scarce. Preyer found that the warm bath was enjoyed 
almost from the first, but Ihe cold bath was disliked until the child 
learned by experience its refreshing effects. The lips, tongue and mucus 
membrane of the mouth were surprisingly sensitive to warmth and cold, 
even in the first days. The child would refuse milk of a temperature 
only slightly higher or lower than that of the mother. Still, on the 
whole, the infant suffers less froui extremes of temperature than the 
adult, in whose case the faculty of Judgment enters to aggravate the 
sensation. 

An interesting point in this connection is the gradual variation 
between the " neutral point " in the tongue and cavity of the mouth, on 
the one hand, and the external parts, such as the hand, on the other. 
In the former it remains through life almost the same as before birth, 
while in the latter it gradually lowers by contact with the surrounding 
medium. 



VII.— ORGANIC SENSATIONS. 

By this is usually meant those comparatively vague and general feel- 
ings of comfort and discomfort arising from certain conditions of the 
viscera, as distinguished from definitely located feelings resulting from 
excitation of the special sense organs. Hunger and thirst may serve as 
examples of visceral discomfort, and the feeling of satiety that follows 
the taking of nourishment as an example of visceral comfort. We shall 
also consider here feelings of pain in general, whether produced by 
external or internal stimuli. 

The question of the possibility of pain experiences before birth may 
perhaps be considered settled by Preyer's investigations on foetal guinea 
pigs and dogs (see "Physiology of the Embryo"). He obtained 
reactions which showed this sensibility to be present. The reactions, 
however, were very much slower than in the subsequent stages of life ; 
showing either that the sensibility to pain is much lower in the foetal 
stage than subsequently, or that pain reflexes are not firmly established 
at this time. Other investigators have found indeed that in the case of 
the very immature foetus, the prick of a pin produced no response (»), 
although in the mature child, distinct reactions took place, by cries and 
movements, to strong mechanical or electrical stimulation ( ^ ) , (i^) . 

The fact that the new-born child is capable of pleasure and pain 
also corroborates the view that his physiological apparatus is already 
adjusted before birth to this sort of experience. 

KuRsmaul has made some ODservations which go to show that very 
soon after birth, from the sixth hour on, but varying much in different 
children, the infant "is accustomed to betray distinctly that it is visited 
by a sensation which we must interpret as hunger or thirst, probably a 
mixture of both." This feeling is expressed by uneasy motions of the 
head and hands, sucking movements and crying. One child, in the 
sixth hour of her life, would turn her head with surprising quickness, 
first to one side and then to the other, in order to take into the mouth 
And suck the finger with which the observer stroked her on each side of 



26 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

her face in succession, though he took care that in stroking the finger 
should not touch her lips i^-^), (9="). 

Preyer observes that hunger and thirst assert themselves in sucking 
movements from the first. Very soon the cry of hunger is distinguish- 
able from the cry of pain, being carried on with more intervals and in a 
lower tone, while the tongue is held in a peculiar manner, being drawn 
back and spread out. The hungry infant he also observed to move its 
head from side to side in a way not seen in any other circumstances. 
Gradually the child becomes relatively less absorbed in the satisfaction 
of hunger. From the fifth month, he can be diverted from eating by new 
noises and movements. From the tenth month, his eating is not so hur- 
ried and greedy. This is partly owing to the fact that at this age he 
takes more food at a time, the stomach being very much larger than at 

first (2:162), ^ •' ^ 

For the rest, but few observations have been made. The child 
experiences organic sensations of pleasure and pain (the pain possibly 
predominating in the earliest period) in connection with the digestive, 
respiratory and circulatory processes : pleasure in their normal func- 
tioning, pain when the organs are fatigued or diseased. Pleasures in 
general are expressed by the widely open and •' swimming " eyes by the 
smile, — which, according to Darwin, occurred for the first time as a 
real smile on the forty-fifth day,— and by " crowing," joyful tones of 
voice ; pains by tightly closed eyes, mouth drawn down at the corners, 
and later by the quadrangular form of the mouth in crying, while the 
cry itself varies according to the cause. The child is much more easily 
fatigued than the adult, and during the first few days passes most of 
the time in sleep. 



VIII.— MUSCULAR FEELINGS. 

We assume that in the normal condition all muscular movements are- 
accompanied by muscular feelings. It is a sort of " internal touch'* 
(25:144)^ spread all over the body, and intimately associated with locomo- 
tion and prehension, with expansion and contraction, with pressure, 
weight, resistance, etc. It also includes the " feeling of the state of 
the muscles when at rest." So closely connected with the child's 
activity, its bearing on the rise of will is obvious. 

That the child's muscles are called into play during the later months 
of his ante-natal life, in a great variety of movements, is so fully estab- 
lished as to require here only a passing word. It has been supposed by 
some that the fcetus is incited to muscular movements by the tedium of 
his unchanged position. It seems better, however, to suppose that now, 
as at a later time, there is an instinctive necessity for movement. The 
child is exceedingly active. To move his muscles is for him an abso- 
lute necessity, and the wisest methods in child training are those which 
recognize this fact, and, instead of repressing his activity, direct it into- 
the best channels. 

Though muscular feelings are present thus early, they are probably 
very vaguely apprehended by the child during the first month of hia 
life («:36y. By the end of the third month, however, a vast number of 
these feelings have become associated with visual sensations, by means 
of co-ordinated movements of the neck, arms and eyes. About this 
time also begins the discernment of weight, though the appreciation 
and comparison of different weights are probably later attainments. 
The healthy child experiences the keenest pleasure in the exercise! of 
his muscles. One observed case may stand for many. A little boy, in 
his fourth month, was observed to hold his toy rabbit up by the ears, 
crowing proudly, in evident enjoyment of the effort (i*). It is likely, aa 



SENSATION. 27 

Terrier says, that the muscular feeling of effort, by which weight is dis- 
cerned, is first discriminated in connection with the movements of 
respiration. 

From about the middle of the first year, the healthy child develops a 
remarkable propensity to seize, lift, pull, and otherwise handle all 
objects that come within his reach. This is to be attributed partly to 
natural curiosity, but more particularly at this early period to the con- 
stitutional need of exercising the muscles, to which he yields almost 
unconsciously. As soon as he is able to walk, the range of his muscle- 
activity is vastly extended, and from this time forth, his experiences in 
this connection play a large and important part in his education^. 

iFor further remarks on muscular movement, vide infra, chap. IV. 



CHAPTER II.— EMOTION. 

The principle of transformation, which is exemplified in almost every 
lact recorded in the preceding chapter, is still more clearly illustrated in 
those departments of the mental life which we have yet to consider. In 
studying the emotions of children, for example, we shall observe that 
in the earlier stages, when intellectual comprehension (which is essen- 
tial to the emotions of the grown-up person) can by no means be pre- 
sumed to be present, yet the outward manifestation — movement, facial 
expression, etc. — resembles very closely that of the adult, or the older 
child. It seems unphilosophical to class the phenomena of these two 
periods together under a common name, and our only excuse for doing 
so is that one shades off so gradually into the other that to establish a 
rigid line of distinction seems impossible. We shall, therefore, consider 
both the stages under the head of emotion, only premising that, in the 
absence of active thought, these appearances can only be accounted for 
as the response of the organism to pleasurable or painful feeling. But 
later, when the mind asserts itself, and the human being begins to under- 
stand the cause of the feeling, and to interpret the gestures of others 
as the expression of their feelings, emotion, in the strict sense of that 
word, arises. The same physiological expressions continue to be 
employed, because through habit they have become easier than any 
others, while their employment in the first stage may be accounted for 
on the principle of heredity. 

I.— FEAR. 

These remarks are specially true in the case of fear, whose manifesta- 
tion is at first quite independent of thought, and of specific experiences 
(as in the case cited by Perez of convulsive tremblings, even in the 
foetus in certain circumstances), but which, as a true mental phenome- 
non, requires both these for its full development. 

We have, theu, two stages of fear : First, the fear that is independent 
of hurtful experiences, and must be considered hereditary ; and secondly, 
the fear that is produced by a mental image of the danger. The former 
is very marked in the lower animals. When Spalding let loose a hawk 
suddenly over a brood of young chickens in a meadow, they immediately 
"crouched" and hid themselves in the grass, while the mother hen 
attacked the foe with tremendous violence, though neither she nor her 
brood had ever seen a hawk before. A dove, let loose in the same way, 
produced no such result. So the child, when only a few weeks old, will 
start and cry at any sudden sound or strange sight, quite independently 
of experience. He shrinks from cats and dogs, without ever having 
been injured by them ; he is afraid of falling, before he has ever fallen, 
and trembles at the sight of large and majestic objects, such as the 
ocean, when he looks upon them for the first time (32:i«). Many infants 
cry when it thunders, though they do not at all understand what it is, 
and experience a shock— just as some nervous adults do when a door 
closes with a bang, or an object falls upon the floor. They contract all 
the muscles of the body nervously when suddenly lowered through the 



EMOTION. 29- 

air in the nurse's arms (E). They sometimes shrink from people 
dressed in black, and from those who speak in deep, sepulchral tones 
(j:i64), ^ little girl, slightly over two months old, appeared terrified on 
beholding a distorted face ; she cried out, and sought protection in her 
mother's arms. "It was long before she was restored to her accustomed 
tranquillity — the vision reappeared in memory, haunted her fancy and 
brought tears to her eyes " (i^). A child of seven months seemed afraid 
when a fan was opened and closed before him ; another at a loud snor- 
ing noise which he heard for the first time (}^). A boy of ten months 
was frightened by a squeaking toy ; he soon, however, became accus- 
tomed to the sound, and even took pleasure in making it squeak himself 

In this early period, most children seem more afraid of sounds than of 
sights. Sigismund says fear develops from the time of the development 
of the ear (i:"s). They are usually afraid of thunder, but scarcely ever 
of lightning. A child who started nervously when a box of comfits was 
shaken before him, made no such sign when the empty box was shaken 
(11). One may thrust with the finger, as we have seen, quite close to 
the open eye of an infant, without causing him to blink, while, if one 
speaks to him in a harsh or loud tone, he will cry. A little child has been 
known to lie smiling in his cradle, surrounded by the flames of the 
burning house ; but when rescued, has broken out into loud cries of fear 
at the noise of the engines and the shouting of the assembled crowd. 

Eye-fear, however, soon develops, and strange sights as well as 
sounds startle and frighten the child. We have a very ancient exam- 
ple of this in the Iliad, where Hector is described as bidding his wife 
and child farewell before going out to the fight. When he reached out 
his arms for the child, the latter cried out, and hid his face in the bosom 
of the nurse, frightened by his father's gleaming bronze, and the helmet 
crested with horse-hair. Sigismund describes his child as showing fear 
of a sleeve board, by association with the glowing " goose," and also at 
the sparks from a blacksmith's forge. There are also touch-fears. The 
little girl F. started back when her hand came into contact with some 
soft fur. The suddenness of the sensation apparently had more to do 
with her fear than the quality of the feeling, for she soon lost her fear 
of this article. 

Quite different from all this is the fear shown by a child in the pres- 
ence of an object which has, on some former occasion, caused him pain- 
ful feeling. Preyer's boy, at nineteen months, screamed at the sight of 
the cold bath and sponge, from which he had, on a previous day, 
received unpleasant sensations. Here the idea causes the fear, memory 
co-operates, and child has become susceptible to fear in the strict sense. 
This probably might have been observed earlier. 

The plasticity of the child's nature renders him susceptible to impres- 
sions which, in many cases, remain with him through life. Fear of the 
dark, fear of the woods, fear of being alone, are often inculcated by 
unwise nurses and teachers, and remain, in some cases, ineradicably 
fixed in the constitution. Mosso tells of an old soldier who, on being 
asked what had been his greatest fear, replied : " I am nearly seventy 
years of age. I have looked death in the face many times, and never felt 
fear ; but whenever I pass a little church in the shadow of a wood, or a 
deserted chapel in the mountains, I always remember an abandoned 
oratory in my native village, and am afraid. I look around, as if I vrere 
about to see the corpse of a murdered man which I saw in my infancy, 
and with which an old servant threatenened to shut me up in order to 
quiet me." 

The child from three to seven years is very liable to have dreams of 
exceeding vividness, and if he wake suddenly out of a deep sleep, his 
face will often bear signs of great fear, as though he saw an apparition. 



30 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

The eyes stare straight ahead, he fails to recognize persons, he breaks 
out into perspiration, his heart beats hard and his limbs tremble. These 
nocturnal fears may become so strong as to cause veritable attacks of 
epilepsy (^2). 

Sometimes a new fear is developed by sickness. Some children seem 
morbidly timid and fearful, while others seldom show signs of fear in 
any form. As the child's education progresses, his fear increases in some 
directions, and decreases in others ; as he learns, on the one hand, that 
certain objects which he supposed harmless are really harmful, and on 
the other, that some which he at first esteemed dangerous, will do him no 
injury. In other words, it is only a commonplace to say that fear is both 
increased and diminished by advancing knowledge. The man is more 
afraid of a loaded pistol, and less afraid of an empty one, than the child. 

II.— ANGER. 

Anger (which, according to Plato, is one of the natural attributes of 
the soul, and closely akin to courage) is evil only in its abuse. In a 
moderate degree, it is the index of a just and sensitive temperament, and 
a force which education should direct and not annihilate. "In my 
opinion," says Perez, " a child of ten months who does not weep or cry at 
least four or five times a day, who is not amused, and who is not 
irritated, like a savage, or a young animal, by a mere trifle (" pour une 
bagatelle"), is lacking in sensibility and in intelligence, and will, no 
doubt, be lacking in character, — bury him; he is dead." " It is neces- 
sary," he goes on to say, speaking of the education of the child in this 
regard, " to surround the cradle with an atmosphere of sweet serenity, 
but it is not always necessary to hide anger. Just anger should be 
shown, but with moderation" (25:i66). 

It is difficult to say when the dhild first feels anger, because its outward 
signs are at first very easily confounded with those of pain or distress. 
Mr. Sully thought he saw manifestations of anger at the very outset of 
life, in a little girl, who, " in refusing to accept the nutriment provided 
by nature, showed all the signs of passionate wrath." Mr. Darwin 
noticed, in a child eight days old, frowning and wrinkling of the skin 
around the eyes before crying; but he adds, " this may have been pain 
and not anger." In the third month, he thought he observed signs of 
real anger, and in the fourth month he had no doubt about it, for the 
blood rushed into the face and scalp. Tiedemann's son gave evidence 
of anger in the second month by actively pushing away the disagree- 
able object. By the eighth month, he was quite capable of violent anger 
and jealousy. Perez believes he has seen signs of impatience at the end 
of the first month, if not earlier ; and, in the second month, real fits of pas- 
sion, pushing away distasteful objects, frowning, reddening, trembling 
and weeping (^■^). At six months, children will scream if their toys 
are taken away, and towards the end of the first year, anger sometimes 
exhibits itself in revengeful actions hurtful to themselves, such as beat- 
ing a chair, etc. (^o). A child of seven months screamed with rage 
because a lemon slipped out of his hand ; and at eleven months, if a 
wrong plaything were given him, he would push it away and beat it ("). 

Up to a certain age, almost all children are exceedingly irascible, and 
I know of no particular in which the familiar analogy of the child to the 
savage is more strikingly shown. The child is a little savage. His will 
and reason are weak, his passions are strong, comparatively speaking, 
and he is ruled by his feelings. So it is with savage races. They are 
proverbially passionate (**) ; and the progressive effects of civilization 
upon a race, leading them gradually to control the impetuous and 
unreasonable rage which characterized the earlier stages of their civil- 
ization, is strikingly analogous to the wise training of the human being 
from the irascibility of the child to the calmness and moderation of the 
educated man. 



EMOTION, 31 

III. — SURPRISE, ASTONISHMENT, CURIOSITY. 

Surprise and astonishment are closely related to fear; novelty of 
impression and failure to understand being the underlying causes in 
all three ^. 

Surprise and astonishment are not identical. The former may be 
described as an active state, the latter as a passive one. The child who 
is only surprised maintains control of his muscles, and examines the 
strange object with the closest attention, while the astonished child 
suddenly loses volitional control, and remains fixed in the attitude in 
which the strange impression overtook him, with wide open mouth and 
eyes. In the one case there is activity and movement, in the other a 
sort of paralysis. 

Surprise has been observed in a child one week old, who stared at his 
own fingers with great attention. Doubtless he had never noticed them 
before (2). From this time onward, wonder is constantly manifested 
at pictures on the wall, sunbeams dancing on the floor, the fire crackling 
on the hearth, and especially at the movements of animate beings. The 
infant gazes long and steadily at these strange phenomena Q-^). A little 
girl of less than a month, on being taken down stairs into new quarters, 
stared round in great wonder for a time, but this soon passed away (i*) . 

Astonishment makes its appearance later. The following are Preyer's 
observations on this point : In the twenty-second week, the child was 
struck with astonishment when his father suddenly appeared and spoke 
to him while they were riding in a railway carriage. In his sixth and 
seventh months, the same thing occurred at the sight of a stranger in 
the room. The child's eyes opened wide, his lower jaw dropped, and 
his body became motionless. In the eighth and ninth months, these 
symptoms were still more pronounced, but it was noticed that astonish- 
ment was manifested generally at sights and sounds, and not at impres- 
sions of taste and smell. The child manifested astonishment at the 
opening and shutting of a fan (31st week) ; at the imitation of the 
voices of animals (34th week) ; at a strange face (44th week) ; at a new 
sound (52d week), and at a lighted lantern seen on awaking (58th 
week). Along with the gestures described, there was sometimes the 
sound of " ah," made by involuntary expiration of breath. By the end 
of the second year, these signs of astonishment became more rare, as the 
child grew more accustomed to strange sense-impressions. 

It is to be observed that the peculiar manner of expressing this 
emotion, as well as most of the others, is entirely original with the child 
himself. He expresses astonishment in this way before he hasjhad any 
opportunity of imitating the gestures of others. These gestures, there- 
fore, must be the result of instinctive tendencies, which, by virtue of 
heredity, have become fixed in the human race, as they are everywhere 
the same {^). 

M. Egger emphasizes the close relationship between the feeling of 
wonder and the religious sentiment, and holds that the child is by 
nature predisposed to religious ideas, whose germs he, in fact, brings 
into the world with him (^). M. Perez, on the other hand following 
Spencer, maintains that there is no innate predisposition in the child to 
look beyond the natural to the supernatural, and that, apart from train- 
ing and example, the religious ideas would never take root in his mind. 
In the absence of conclusive evidence on the point, all opinions must be 
merely hypothetical. It may, however, be suggested that if the 
familiar analogy between the infancy of the individual and that of the 
race is to hold here, we must accept M. Egger's position, since almost 

1" The most powerful agent in the develop iieiit of the understanding at the begin- 
ning is astonishment, together with the fear that is akin to it." Preyer. " Sometimes 
wonder passes into awe, or even fear." Sully. 



32 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

all savage races are deeply religious, abounding in ideas of the super- 
natural. 

Closely allied to the sentiment of wonder is that of curiosity. This is 
a natural, spontaneous tendency, which might perhaps be more fittingly 
classed under the head of intellect but for the fact that, in the very 
young child, its essential character is feeling. It consists of a sort of 
chronic hunger for new sensations, which impels the child constantly 
to handle, examine, taste, and otherwise experiment upon all objects 
that come within his reach. The little boy R. used to try to untie every 
parcel that was brought in. It is a purely sensuous impulse at first, 
but with the expansion of the intellect, it is transformed into the pure 
desire to know. It permeates the play of the child, which, as Sigis- 
mund says, is like the experimentation of the scientist, by which he 
elicits from nature the answers to his questions. It is one of the most 
powerful factors in the child's development, and should be guided into 
right channels, rather than discouraged, by the educator. 

Tiedemann believed curiosity was developed in his son in his second 
month; the eyes made an effort to follow a new or curious object. 
Perez saw evidences of curiosity almost from the beginning, and at two 
months the child " would stretch out his hand, and turn his eyes and ears 
towards objects affecting his senses. At three months he would seize 
objects within reach, and shake them about to amuse himself." From 
this time on, and especially from the time he begins to walk, everything 
within reach becomes the object of constant study. The acquisition of 
language adds greatly to his resources in this respect. " His little 
voice, a hundred times in an hour, expresses a desire, or asks a ques- 
tion, and that, not so much through need of knowing what iTiingrs are, 

as through the appetite for fresh and new sensations. So 

powerful does this impulse become that sometimes the child is sad, or 
even sick, if it be not gratified " (25:203). 

M. Taine (^') calls attention to the significant circumstance that this 
curiosity, which is so powerful a force in child life, is not found in the 
lower animals. "Any one may observe that from the fifth or sixth 
month, children employ their whole time for two years or more in making 
physical experiments. No animal, not even the cat or dog, makes this 
constant study of all bodies within its reach. All day long the child of 
whom I speak — 12 months old — touches, feels, turns about, lets drop, 
tastes, and experiments upon, everything she gets hold of, whatever it 
may be — ball, doll, coral or plaything. When once it is sufficiently 
known, she throws it aside ; it is no longer new ; she has nothing further 
to learn from it, and so has no further interest in it." It will be noticed 
here that Taine assigns a larger part to the intellectual than does Perez. 
He says physical need and greediness count for nothing. It is pure 
curiosity. "It seems as if, in her little brain, every group of percep- 
tions was tending to complete itself, as in that of a child who makes use 
of language." But the little girl observed by Taine was a year old, and 
by that time, no doubt, curiosity was beginning to assume more of an 
intellectual character. 

rv.— ESTHETIC FEELINGS. 

As early as the forty-fifth day, Mr. Darwin noticed a real smile of 
pleasure, "which must have had a mental origin." It was observed 
when the infant was looking at his mother, and also during the act of 
nursing ; and was quite different from the so-called smiles which had 
been seen prior to that time, in being accompanied by a more intelligent 
expression, and by the sparkling and " swimming" of the eyes. 

It is not to be presumed that every laugh of the young child proceeds 
from a comprehension of the humorous. The first laugh is probably — 



EMOTION. 33 

like the first vocal utterances — only the spontaneous functioning of the 
organism. Yet it is maintained by careful observers that the sense 
of fun is present in some children three months old ("). About 
this age they may be greatly amused by such little games as 
throwing a pinafore over the head and suddenly withdrawing 
it, and by the familiar gambols of hide-and-peek. Later they show 
great pleasure at being carried on one's shoulder, swung about in the 
air, or tossed up to the ceiling. They laugh most heartily while the fun 
lasts, and are very unwilling that it should stop (C). 

Something has already been said on the subject of musical appreciation 
in children. Mr. Darwin, who observed in his child a fondness for the 
piano as early as the fourth month, considers the feeling of pleasure in 
music as the first of the aesthetic sentiments, unless the appreciation of 
bright colors comes earlier. Another child, at five months, showed 
signs of pleasure when singing was going on, and even kept a sort of 
time with his body, but was indiflPerent to whistling (12). Another 
observer places the pleasure in musical sounds as early as the second 
month (2), and in another case the child was observed at eleven weeks 
to pucker up his lip a little when the piano was being played (C) . I have 
frequently observed this fondness for music at a later age, when the child 
will crowd close to the piano, and show his appreciation by rocking his 
body to and fro. Appreciation of expression in music is, however, almost 
entirely lacking at this time, and requires education to develop it. 

Sense of Material Beauty. The child at first confuses the beautiful with 
what is pleasant. Animated movement at the sight of beautiful things 
is at first, no doubt, only response to pleasant feeling. There is no 
understanding of form, color, etc., as beautiful or otherwise. This 
pleasure, in certain sensations, however, is one of the foundation stones 
upon which the aesthetic sense of material beauty is afterwards to be 
built («2:70). From about the eighth month (^), there have been 
observed the beginnings of this feeling in the pleasure shown bv the 
child in personal adornment. But even now the aesthetic and the 
sensuous are blended in the pleasure a child feels in the new dress or 
hat. " Pretty " and " good " are interchangeable terms in his mind. At 
13 months he will snatch at hap-hazard among a heap of toys, seeming 
not to discriminate at all among them as to beauty ; and, at a much later 
period, a child taken out to the country gives no evidence of any 
appreciation of the beauties of the landscape, but is attracted rather by 
some new or strange object — especially if it be an animal, or something 
that moves. Symmetry in form and harmony in colors make but little 
impression on him. Here, as in music, he demands quantity rather than 
quality, movement rather than expression. Yet these words must not 
be understood as denying to the young child all aesthetic feeling. 
Beautiful objects, if they are not too large, nor too distant, please him. 
He is charmed by the pretty butterfly and the pretty flower; he is 
greatly attracted by the human face, and by the expression of the 
human eye. 

The dramatic instinct is very strong in childhood, though stronger and 
earlier in some children than in others. Children are born actors. 
Their lively imagination and strong hereditary tendency to imitation, 
lead them, even before the first year of their life has gone (6:278)^ to 
perform many curious movements and gestures. In their plays, children 
constantly personify, represent, dramatize, assume characters, and 
assign fictitious characters to other persons and things (*''). An eminent 
teacher in Toronto assures me that his three children, in their play, 
almost always address each other by assumed names, and the play is 
carried on in make-believe characters, which are dropped as soon as the 
play is over, and never referred to at any other time^. 

lit seems best to postpone any further remarks on this subject, until the imagination 
is taken up in regular order. See infra, chap. III. sec. IV. 
3 



34 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD, 

v.— LOVE, SYMPATHY, JEALOUSY, ETC. 

If we may judge by the smiles which an infant bestows upon those 
who have charge of him, affection for persons arises very early. These 
smiles have been observed before the end of the second month ("), and 
even at a much earlier period. The earliest smiles are probably auto- 
matic, as already said, but by the end of the fourth mouth there is no 
longer any doubt that persons are recognized. A little boy of this age 
was observed to lift up both arms towards his parents, " with an inde- 
scribable expression of longing" (28) _ A girl of the same age used to 
be fond of lying beside her sister, their faces touching. After her sister 
died (she was then five months old), she seemed very lonely, and when 
she met other children of her own age, she would greet them with 
smiles and kisses (^). In another case visible signs of aflfection for 
persons whom he knew, were shown by a boy eight months old (y^)^ and 
another boy, who, when nine months old, used to return his father's 
caresses by a charming smile and gentle stroking of his father's face, 
had grown very affectionate and sympathetic by the time he was four- 
teen months old, and bestowed his caresses in abundance, not only on 
his parents and friends, but on the cat and dog also (C). Spontaneous 
expression of affection is, in many cases, indeed, first shown about the 
beginning of the second year. One child of this age kissed his nurse 
repeatedly on her return from a short absence (i^), and another was in 
the habit of showing his affection for certain persons by gently laying 
his hand upon their faces or shoulders (2:324), Affection for animals, 
and even for inanimate objects, is also very strong in many children of 
this age. The little boy R. was remarkably attached to an old scarf of 
soft wool, and to a couple of rag dolls. He would not go to sleep with- 
out them, but would lie in his cradle and call for them until they were 
brought, when he would hug them up in his arms, and fall asleep chat- 
tering and cooing to them in a charming manner. When he got into any 
trouble, especially if his mother punished him, he would run and bury 
his face in the old scarf, and weep out his childish sorrows into its sym- 
pathetic folds. 

The memory of the little child is comparatively weak, and his experi- 
ence short; and hence, though capable of strong affection, that affection 
does not persist long in the absence of its object. " Out of sight, out of 
mind," is true in the case of the child during his first year, and relatively 
true to a much later period. He is incapable of "-homesickness," with 
all its suffering, simply because he is unable as yet to form mental pic- 
tures of home and friends who are absent. He lives in the present 
rather than the past, in the realm of sense rather than that of memory. 
For the same reason, his love for persons and places is very plastic, and 
may be moulded and directed into almost any desired channel during 
these early months and years ; hence the responsibility resting on those 
who are entrusted with his earliest education in home and school. 

There are two reasons why sympathy as a characteristic of childhood 
should be, during the first few months, so weak as to be almost entirely 
lacking. The first is that the child's life at this time is so full of his 
own personal needs that he can pay but little attention to those of 
others ; the second, that he is as yet unable to comprehend the outward 
signs of feeling in others, because of the shortness of his own experi- 
ence (ssjsiG), jt seems probable that some of the earliest manifestations 
of apparently sympathetic feeling may be merely the result of sensori- 
motor suggestion (^^j. Sigismund noticed the first signs of sympathy 
at the end of the first three months (i-^^), but Tiedemann says his boy, 
when only two months old, made sympathetic responses when consoled 
by the usual vocal expressions. Mr. Sully has observed the same thing 
(13). Another boy, at six months, drew a melancholy face, with mouth 



EMOTION. 35 

depressed, when his nurse pretended to cry (ii). At seven months, 
another child manifested decided altruism, and seemed desirous of shar- 
ing his pleasures — with the exception of food — with others (^•^). In 
another case a child of eight months cried when some one pretended to 
whip his nurse, and another child of nearly the same age made a mourn- 
ful whining noise, accompanied by the facial expression of "•crying," 
on hearing another child cry, and also when a minor chord was struck 
on the piano (^). During the second year, sympathy becomes so 
strongly established that its outward evidences are sometimes seen, 
even on occasion of the imaginary sufferings of inanimate objects, and 
pictorial representation of suffering {^). A child of this age cried when 
her dolly was "hurt." Sympathy with human beings is, however, 
usually much stronger than animal sympathy. A child of one year, who 
returned home after a short absence, took no notice whatever of the cat 
or dog, but at once recognized his nurse and the other members of the 
family with pleasure (-). The strength of human sympathy, and the 
need of it in the child, is seen in the fact that when he is hurt, he rarely 
cries, unless there is some one near at hand to hear him. 

Jealousy. Children are naturally selfish and egoistic. It has been 
said that the " meum and tuum " are very much confused in the young 
child's mind. Perhaps it may be better said that his idea of "'tuum" 
scarcely exists, while his notion of "meum" is enormously exaggerated. 
The proprietary instinct is very strong in some children, and this enters 
largely into the feeling of jealousy. "The need of play engenders the 
desire of possession " — i. e., of the playthings — and this in turn gives 
rise to the instinct of property ; hence jealousy. Tiedemann's son did not 
want his sister to sit in his chair or put on his clothes, but he would 
freely take hers. "Jealousy depends in general on temperament, and is 
often the index of a very keen sensibility, though showing itself also in 
children of a calm disposition. It is easily confounded with envy, 
desire, wish to possess, need of being noticed, etc. It opens the way for 
hatred, falsehood, dissimulation ; in certain feeble natures it leads to 
discouragement" (25:m). 

"The child of three months shows by various signs a proprietary 
Interest in the breast ; handles it as his own, and is jealous if it be given 
to another. Later he demands it with still more ' authority '" (^s :!»♦), 
"At three and a half months, little Mary is jealous in the extreme, and 
cries if her sister sits upon the mother's lap" {^•^). From the eighth 
month another child gave every evidence of jealousy in similar cir- 
cumstances ; grew very angry, and tried to drive the usurper away Q^). 
A little girl of ten months would cry " in a distressful way, not express- 
ing anger, but disappointed desire, if the nurse took another child upon 
her knee." She would not be appeased except by being taken up. It 
would not do to take heron one knee, and the other child on the other; 
she must have sole possession (^o). Little R. insists on being a sharer 
in any caresses that may be going forward between his parents. Dar- 
win saw plenty of evidence of jealousy from the fifteenth month, and 
observes that it would probably be found earlier. So also Perez (6:™). 

The jealousies of children need careful treatment. They are often 
augmented and rendered morbid by injudicious conduct, and thought- 
less words of praise and blame on the part of grown-up people. Care- 
fully treated, this feeling may be developed into self-respect on the one 
hand, and a proper altruism, or "jealousy for others," on the other, 
and thus contribute much to the child's moral education^. 



1 " In der Kindheit und am frohen Morgen des Lebens lebt der Mensch eigentlich nur 
sich selbst; da bildet sich durch 'Leben fur sich,' der Korper und die Seele zum 
' Leben ftir sich und fiir andere ' " (41). 



CHAPTER III.— INTELLECT. 

Most of the phenomena described in the preceding pages involve 
thought in a greater or less degree ; yet in the earliest experiences, mental 
activity is at a minimum ; the affective predominates over the presenta- 
tive, and the representative occupies but a very small place. Yet it 
seems incorrect to say, with Nasse, that " mind comes first at birth, and 
the first breath is the earliest mark of intellect;" or with Heyf elder, 
that the first cry is the sign of awakening mind ; or with Karl Vogt, 
that the newly- born possesses no trace of intelligence (S). Kussmaul 
seems nearer the truth in the following: "It cannot be doubted that 
man comes into the world with an idea — a dark one to be sure — of an 
outer something, with a certain idea of space, with the possibility of 
localizing certain touch sensations, and with a certain mastery over his 
movements. How can it otherwise be explained that the hungry child, 
before it is suckled, not only seeks nourishment, but seeks it in that 
region where its sense of touch during the search is actively excited? 
These astonishing actions can only be comprehended under the follow- 
ing suppositions : First, that the child has already gained the dim idea 
of an outer something which is able to remove the unpleasant sensation 
of hunger or thirst, and which, to that end, must come through the 
mouth ; secondly, that he is able to decide the place from which the 
sensation of stroking came ; and thirdly, that he has already learned to 
turn the head voluntarily to the one side or to the other" (}-^). 

It is not possible, within the present limits, either to give a detailed 
exposition of the nature of the thought process, or to trace the intellect- 
ual development on into the maturer years. For these the reader is 
referred to the numerous standard works on psychology in general. 
Here we can only attempt to collate facts calculated to throw light on 
the first budding of the intelligence, and to trace each phenomenon 
only to that stage at which it may be said to be fairly " under way." 
The intimate relation between thought and language also makes it 
advisable to postpone much that might be said here, until we come to 
the consideration of the latter topic ^. 

Observation of intellectual development is hampered by two diflScul- 
ties, which render great caution necessary. In the first place, the com- 
bined influence of heredity and environment produces such wide 
individual differences among children, that no general conclusions can 
be safely expressed until a very large number of cases have been 
observed. (Certainly nothing exhaustive or final can be said at the 
present time.) In the second place, even the most careful observer, 
watching one child, is apt to be misled by certain deceptive appearances, 
and to give the child credit for a good deal that he does not really know. 
" They do clever things, and say brilliant words, by imitation and 

1 The relation of thought and lan^age has perhaps never been more aptly expressed 
than by Sir W. Hamilton in the following: " Language is to the mind precisely what 
the arch is to the tunnel. The power of thinking and the power of excavation are not 
dependent on the word in the one case, nor on the mason work in the other; but without 
these subsidiaries, neither process could be carried on beyond its rudimentary com- 
meBcement." Lectures, Vol. 8, p. 138. 



INTELLECT. 37 

accident, not knowing the meaning of tliem " ( ^■^). In this way many 
a child, supposed to be a prodigy, does not at all excel others, except in 
a quickness of imitation. When you want him to " show off," he fails 
you, simply because the words do not mean the same to him as they do 
to you, and his use of them is largely mechanicaP. 

The child's act may resemble ours outwardly, but the sentiment 
underneath the act may be very different. G. S. Hall says: "Not 
only are children prone to imitate others in their answers, without stop- 
ping to think and give an independent answer of their own, but they 
often love to seem wise, and, to make themselves interesting, state what 
seems to interest us without reference to truth, divining the lines of our 
interest with a subtlety we do not suspect" (^). In interpreting the 
phenomena here recorded, great care is necessary to avoid an inaccurate 
estimate of their intellectual value. 

I.— PERCEPTION. 

In the process of perception — which may be simply defined as " that 
act of the mind by which real external things become known through 
the senses" (^") — there are three si ages, distinguisked from each other 
qualitatively, though not chronologically. First, the simple feelings of 
the senses are differentiated. Changes, quantitative and qualitative, are 
felt and known. The child recognizes the difference between a sweet 
odor and a bitter one, for example. He could not describe the differ- 
ence even if he could speak, but is simply aware of it. Secondly, the 
sensations are localized. A definite " whereness " is attributed to them. 
This involves the recognition of space properties in objects, and opens 
up the vexed question of the origin of the idea of space, into which we 
cannot enter here. Thirdly, the manifold of sensation, thus differen- 
tiated and localized, is unified into a permanent whole, which we call 
the object. The child combines the scattered sensations, visual, tactual, 
olfactory and sapid, into the perceived object, food. 

Taste Perceptions. "The first centre of the child's psychic life is the 
mouth" (^2). Probably the first action is sucking, and later all objects 
are experimented upon by means of the lips and hands together. But 
even in the third month, the child is weak in power of compari«on, and 
will suck an empty bottle as readily as a full one, until he finds it is 
empty by failure to extract anything from it (6:192^^ From the eighth 
day, a wry face was made at the sight of bitter medicine, and by the 
seventh week this wry face was accompanied by a gesture of refusal 
(6:15)^ At one month and five days, a dose of medicine was taken with 
visible repugnance (12). The experiments of Kussmaul, already referred 
to, show that discrimination between tastes takes place from the first. 
It proceeds, generally, with considerable rapidity from the third 
month on, and by the tenth month various articles of diet are clearly 
known and distinguished from one another (6=19*). Yet the child, like 
the adult, though in a greater degree, is subject to illusions of taste, 
through confusion of sapid with olfactory sensations, and with one 
another. 

iSight Perceptions. During the first month, the child gives small 
evidence, that he has any ideas of distance, or of his own body. At this 
age he will strike or scratch his own face. A girl of thirty days 
" seemed for an instant to have caught the reflected image of herself," 
but the next moment she became lost again in the surrounding objects 
of the nursery (}^). A boy, during hii second month, gave the first 
sign of distinguishing external objects from himself, by reaching for- 
ward and grasping at them. About the same time he began apparently 

lAs J. J. Rousseau savs in Emile: "Un Instant votis diripz: C6st un g6nie, et Tinstant 
d'aprfis: Cest ua sot. Vous vous t-omperiez touj jurs: Cest un enfant.'''' 



38 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

to pay attention to the looks and gestures of others, and at six 'months 
he distinguished persons, without, however, having any clear ideas 
about them. When anything presented itself to him, he pointed his 
finger at it, to direct attention to it, and sometimes said ah (12), (C). 
From the beginning of his second year, he rapidly advanced in power of 
discrimination, though chiefly among objects fitted to satisfy his needs. 
One of the objects earliest to be recognized — if not the very earliest — is 
the mother's face and form. Children give evidence of this recognition 
in the second or third month. A boy of seven months "surely recog- 
nized three persons," — his parents and the nurse Q-'^). Another, at 
nine weeks, seemed to know his mother (i^). No objects, not even the 
parents, are known at a distance (*-). In the course of the first half 
year, much improvement takes place in this direction. A child in his 
fifth month, would no longer grasp at objects beyond his reach (M). 
Smiling at the image in the mirror has been noticed as early as the 
ninth week. 

" From the sensations of hearing and smelly there can be formed no 
representations in the first week" Q>-^^). Near the end of the second 
month, one child gave evidence that he distinguished between tones of 
voice expressive of difierent emotions and sentiments. He allowed him- 
self to be pacified by gentle tones (y^). Another, in his third month, 
actively sought the direction of sound by turning his head (2 :*''). 

Owing to the weakness of the attention, and lack of experience, the 
young child falls into many illusions of sense-perception. A child of 
four months believes the image in the mirror is a real person, as is 
shown by his surprised look when he hears behind him the voice of the 
individual to whom the reflection belongs (ii). A boy of seven months 
put out both hands to pick up a very small piece of paper i^-^^). At six 
months he mistook a flat dish for a globe, and seemed to believe all 
objects had bulk. The little girl F. tried one day to " pick up " a round 
picture, which was made to represent raised work, and another day she 
tried to walk on the water. I once heard a little girl of one year and a 
half call the moon a lamp, showing how false was her idea of its real 
distance and magnitude. 

Children are said to be peculiarly subject to illusions of hearing, 
though I have no examples to give. The imperfection of their judg- 
ments by the muscular sense is shown by the fact that a child of three 
months cannot tell a full bottle from an empty one, by the weight 
alone (6). 

II. — MEMORY. 

The power of retaining impressions, and recognizing them when re- 
produced, has a physiological as well as a psychological aspect ; the 
former consisting chiefly in the susceptibility of organic structures to 
receive impressions which are capable of a greater or less degree of 
permanency ; the latter depending principally on the power of atten- 
tion. Where the attention is actively directed towards the present sen- 
sation, that sensation is more easily and more surely reproduced in 
memory. 

Little children have but small power of attention ; from the psycho- 
logical side therefore, their memories are weak. Nearly all the expe- 
riences of the first two years of life, and the vast majority of those of 
the next four, are completely forgotten by most people.^ The cerebral 
structures in children, however, are very impressible, so that, from the 
physiological point of view, the memory of childhood is potentially, at 
least, very strong. This probably accounts for the well-known fact 

' "A writer in a recent London nnasazine declares that her own memory be^an at six- 
teen months." M. W. Wrij-ht in Babyhood, Feb. 1891. 



INTELLECT. 39 

that those experiences of childhood that are remembered, are more 
firmly fixed and persist longer than those of early manhood or middle 
age. Let the attention of a little child — which, be it observed, is weak 
in both directions^ being as hard to withdraw from a present sensation as 
it is to direct towards one — be enchained by some startling or fascinating 
experience, and an impression is made on his plastic mind, which can 
never be effaced. ^ Old men recall the events of fifty years ago better 
than those of last year. 

The little child is capable of memories long before he has learned to 
speak. A little boy, six months old, whose hand had been slightly 
burnt by a hot vase, shrank back at the sight of this article a few days 
after (se.is). Certain faces, too, are recognized by children of this age, 
showing that they have memory images of them. Strange faces, too, 
are known as strange, and distinguished from familiar ones ; but the lat- 
ter are not yet missed when absent (^=*). Sigismund gives an interesting 
case of memory in a boy about eight months old. While in the bath he 
tried repeatedly to raise himself up by the edge of the tub, but in vain. 
Finally he succeeded by grasping a handle, near which he accidentally 
fell. Next time he was put into the bath, he reached out immediately 
for the aforesaid handle, and raised himself up in triumph i}'-^^). Mem- 
ory of persons becomes strong by the end of the first year. A child of 
this age recognized her nurse, after six days' absence, "with sobs of joy." 
A boy somewhat younger knew his father after four days' absence, 
while another, seven months old, did not recognize his nurse after four 
weeks' absence, but when nineteen montlis old he knew his father, even 
at a distance, after two weeks' separation. Another child, four months 
old, knew his nurse after four weeks, and at ten months he missed his 
parents, and was troubled by their absence. A boy of twenty-three 
months manifested keen delight on again seeing his playthings after an 
interval of eleven weeks ; and when a year and a half old, was greatly 
disconcerted one day when sent to carry one towel to his mother, where 
he had been accustomed to carrying two ( C) . Darwin's boy, at a little 
over three years of age, instantly recognized a portrait of his grand- 
father, " and mentioned a whole string of incidents which occurred at 
their last meeting, nearly six months previous," the matter not having 
been mentioned in the meantime. The little boy, E., recognized a young 
lady who lives next door, after a few weeks of absence. He also knew 
me after nearly three weeks. He was then twenty-three months old. 

A boy one year and a half old heard some one say one day that an- 
other boy had fallen and hurt his leg. Some days after, the second boy 
came in, whereupon the first ran up to him, exclaiming, "Fall, hurt 
leg." A child of two years, whose mother had made him a toy sled out 
of a card, on receiving a postal card at the door some days after, ran 
with it to his mother, crying, " Mama, litten " (schlitten, sled) (8:io). 

New experiences call up memories of old experiences by association, 
and in this way events that occurred prior to the period of learning to 
speak, are remembered after that time. A little boy of my acquaintance 
related the following tale, the events of which took place before he 
learned to speak: " Pussy kime on table; pull Nonie off (i. e., Nonie 
pulled her off) ; pussy katch Nonie face, hands too." This was illus- 
trated by gestures, showing the process of scratching (M). Another 
boy, three years old, remembered perfectly well and would imitate his 
own awkward attempts at speaking {^■^). 

A very interesting question in this connection is this : Which of the 
senses ifurnish the most vivid and lasting memory-images? The 

1 My first sight of a locomotive will never, I believe, be effaced, or even bedimmed, in 
my memory, should I live for a century. To-day I cati call it up with remarkable vivid- 
ness, and with all its attendant circumstances, clearly and definitely portrayed. 



40 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

first impulse would probably be to attribute the pre-eminence to sight, 
but in so doing, we might make a mistake. It is probable, as M. Queyrat 
seems to think, that the muscular sense is of paramount importance 
here (**) . Children are full of action, and their psychic life is bound up 
with movement. If they are to develop, they must do something, and 
they remember what they do, a thousand times better than what is told 
or shown to them. This is also true in adult life. Many persons study 
out loud. We remember what we write, better than what we simply 
read. Pedagogy is now recognizing this as a great principle in educa- 
tion, and the whole kindergarten system is based upon it. 

In connection with hearing, the child remembers best, some connected 
story which is helped out by gestures appealing to the eye. The little 
boy C, at twenty-five months, reproduced after his own fashion the 
story of Little Red Riding Hood (having heard it only once, and that 
the night before) with abundant gesture, and then laughed in great 
glee. 

An interesting experiment in this direction is reported by Baldwin in 
Science for May 2nd, 1890. Tlie child was six and a half months old. 
Her nurse had been absent three weeks. On returning she first appeared 
before the child without speaking, then she spoke without appearing. 
In neither case was she recognized. But when she appeared again, and 
sang a familiar nursery rhyme, the child recognized her with demon- 
strations of joy. This is a good example of the "summation of stim- 
uli," or the co-operation of difierent sensations, reinforcing each other, 
to produce a result which neither could accomplish by itself. 

III. — ASSOCIATION. 

Memory and imagination proceed in accordance with the laws of as- 
sociation. The chief of these are resemblance, contiguity and contrast. 
The general principle of association has been expressed in this way : 
" When, for any reason, a part of an old mental movement is reinstated, 
there is a tendency for the whole movement to reinstate itself " (Y). 
The physiological under-structure of association scarcely exists at birth, 
but gradually, through experience, dynamic pathways In the cerebral 
substance are developed, constituting an associative network, connect- 
ing the various centres with one another. On the mental side an in- 
creasing readiness to note resemblances, differences, etc., and to note 
them where they are less obvious, is developed in the course of expe- 
rience. 

In Mr. Darwin's opinion, the child far surpasses the lower animals in 
associative power, ''The facility with which associated ideas . . . 
were acquired, seemed to me by far the most strongly marked of all 
the distinctions between the mind of an infant, and that of the cleverest 
full-grown dog I ever saw " (i^). 

The recorded observations on this point show great individual differ- 
ences. Champneys saw signs of association of pleasurable feelings as 
early as the eighth week, when the child accompanied a smiling expres- 
sion with sucking motions of the lips. Tiedemann thought he saw 
traces of asssociation on the eighteenth day, when the child ceased cry- 
ing and put himself into the attitude for taking nourishment when a 
soft hand came into contact with his face. Sully observed a similar 
thing at ten weeks. Darwin, on the contrary, did not notice any signs 
of associations firmly fixed before the fifth month; and Taine 
puts it as late as the tenth month ; while Perez believes that 
homogeneous sensations are, by the middle of the first month, as- 
sociated to such a point that they are recogaized when reproduced; and 
he goes on to say that " there is not one of the combinations of associ- 
ations, which have been studied so carefully by psychologists, of which 



INTELLECT. 41 

-we cannot find at least a faint foreshadowing in a child of six or seven 
months" (6=136). 

The following are examples of association by contiguity : When a lit- 
tle child's hat and cloak are put on, or he is placed in his carriage, he 
becomes restless, and even angry, if not immediately taken out. This 
has been observed in children less than half a year old ("), and in others 
of one year (}^),(^). At the latter age the association is much stronger; 
he cannot even see a hat, cloak or umbrella without manifesting the 
same restlessness. Probably also, as Perez thinks, we may see in the 
child's crying for food on the return of daylight the germ of associa- 
tion by succession, out of which is constructed the idea of time. A rudi 
mentary notion of cause and effect may also be seen in the babe of half 
a year or thereabouts, who, having been once burnt by a hot object, af- 
terwards draws back at the sight of it (6) ; and in the child, who, find- 
ing a peculiar scratching sound to follow the passage of his finger nail 
over an object, repeats the process again and again, until he has clearly 
established the relation between the motion and the sound (}^). Con- 
tiguity in the form of co-existence is seen in the following : At seven 
months the person of the nurse was associated with the sound of her 
-name ; when her name was uttered, the child would turn round and look 
for her (ii) . The same thing was observed in another child five months 
•old (6). Darwin's boy, at nine months, associated his own name with 
his image in the mirror. When ten months old he learned that an ob- 
ject which caused a shadow to fall on the wallin front of him, was to be 
looked for behind. When less than a year old, it was sufficient to repeat 
a short sentence two or three times at intervals, to fix firmly in his 
mind some associated idea. 

Resemblance, if not the earliest, is certainly among the strongest of 
the child's associations. Darwin's child, in the second half of his first 
year, would shake his head and say ah to the coal-box, to water spilt on 
the floor, and to such things as bore a resemblance to things which he 
"had been taught to consider dirty. Another boy, nine months old, on 
hearing the word " papa," would hold out his arms to another gentle- 
man who resembled his father (6:i38) ; and a little girl of this age knew 
the portrait of her grandfather as it hung on the wall. Sigismund 
says: " I showed my boy — not yet one year old — a stuffed woodcock, 
and said ' vogel. ' He immediately turned his eyes to another part 
of the room, and looked at a stuffed owl which stood there " (i="i). 
Taine's little girl, at fifteen months, on seeing colored pictures of birds, 
immediately cried out koko, which was her name for chicken (^''). The 
little boy, C., on seeing the image on a postal card, at once made a pe- 
culiar snuffing noise, which his grandfather was in the habit of doing, 
showing that he observed a resemblance between his grandfather and 
the picture on the card. 

For resemblances among sounds, children in general have the keenest 
relish. They are inveterate punsters. Rhymes and alliterations are 
their especial delight. They will catch the faintest link of resemblance 
in the sound of words. " Harry O^Neil is nicknamed Harry Oatmeal. . . 
October suggests knocked over, and from do, re, mi, they get do, re, you " 
(*5). Mere jingles, tiresome to the grown-up person, will amuse them 
for hours ; such as " Ene, mene, mine mo," etc., or, " Dickory, dickory, 
dock," etc. 

When the child learns to speak, the power of association by resem- 
blances, in his mind, is exemplified in his habit of enlarging the denota- 
tion of words, so as to make one word do duty for several objects which 
resemble each other in certain respects. The discussion of this will be 
resumed later (infra Section 5 and chap. V.). 



42 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 



IV.— IMAGINATION. 

There are two species of imagination. First, the passive, in which^ 
without the exercise of active attention, or any effort of will, images 
pass and repass, arranging and rearranging themselves in the phantasy. 
This is exemplified in dreams, and in the resuscitation of faded memory 
images, in the waking moments by the laws of association. Secondly, 
the active or constructive imagination, in which, by an effort of atten- 
tion and will, old images are worked up into new forms, inanimate 
objects have life and personality attributed to them, and curious scenes 
and combinations are produced by the inventive genius of the person 
imagining. 

With regard to the first, Perez says : "The child, hardly a month old, 
who recognizes his mother's breast at a very short distance, shows, by 
the strong desire he has to get to it, that this sight has made an impres- 
sion on him, and that this image must be deeply engraven on his 
memory. The child who, at the age of three months, turns sharply 
round on hearing a bird sing, or on hearing the name "coco" pro- 
nounced, and looks about for the bird cage, has formed a very vivid idea 
of the bird and the cage. When, a little later, on seeing his nurse take 
her cloak, or his mother wave her umbrella, he shows signs of joy, and 
pictures to himself a walk out of doors, he is again performing a feat of 
imagination. In like manner, when, at the age of seven or eight months, 
having been deceived by receiving a piece of bread instead of cake, on 
finding out the trick, tie throws the bread away angrily, we feel sure 
that the image of the cake must be very clearly imprinted on his mind. 
Finally, when he begins to babble the word papa at the sight of any 
man whatever, it must be that the general characteristics which make 
up what he calls papa are well fixed in his imagination (6:i«). when 
they are left alone, children who have acquired the word " mamma," 
will repeat this name over and over again, proving the presence of the 
mother's image in the imagination (®="^). 

One of the most significant forms of the passive imagination in child- 
hood is the dream. It is very difficult to ascertain when the child first 
begins to dream, and this for several reasons. The child who can talk, 
will "tell his dreams," in imitation of grown-up people, no dream hav- 
ing taken place. In the case of the child who cannot talk, we have very 
little reliable information to go upon. But there seems no reason ta 
doubt that dreams may take place just as soon as the child's waking 
experiences have furnished him with clear and definite sensations. 

As for the constructive imagination, our space will not admit the 
hosts of examples that might be given of the wonderful fertility of 
children's minds in this respect. Their little wooden toys become trans- 
formed into real soldiers, fighting real battles, mighty locomotives 
drawing long trains of heavily-laden cars, or great steamships sailing 
over unfathomable oceans. " Given a few broken pieces of glass, a 
flower, a fruit, a colored string, a doll, and out of them the baby 
imagination constructs an immeasurable happiness" (*)^. Indeed 
it would seem, as Jastrow says, that the function of toys is to 
serve as " lay figures, on which the child's imagination can weave and 
drape its fancies " Q*). In order to serve this purpose, the toy does not 
need to be a work of art. " We don't like buyed dolls," says little 
Budge, in Helen's Babies, and in so saying, he seems to voice the 
opinions of the majority of children. A wax doll is a nice thing to have, 



i«pe "The Story of a Sand Pile,"' by G. S. Hall, in Scribner''s Magazine ior June 
1888. 



INTELLECT. 43 

and look at occasionally, but for real, " sure enough," every-day play, 
give us the old rag dolP . 

Children in their plays imagine themselves other than they are. They 
transform themselves into kings and queens, professors and preachers, 
fathers and mothers and grandparents, and fulfill all the functions of 
neighbors and citizens with the greatest solemnity and dignity. They 
surround themselves with imaginary personages, and carry on imaginary 
conversations 2. 

I shall close this section with a quotation. W. W. Newell, in " Games 
and Songs of American Children," says : " Observe a little girl who has 
attended her mother for an airing in some city park. The older person, 
quietly seated beside the footpath, is half absorbed in reverie ; takes little 
notice of passers-by, or of neighboring sights or sounds, further than 
to cast an occasional glance, which may inform her of the child's 
security. The other, left to her own devices, wanders contented within 
the linaited scope, incessantly prattling to herself ; now climbing an 
adjoining rock, now flitting like a bird from one side of the pathway to 
the other. Listen to her monologue, flowing as incessantly and musi- 
cally as the bubbling of a spring ; if you can catch enough to follow her 
thought, you will And a perpetual romance unfolding itself in her mind. 
Imaginary persons accompany her footsteps ; the properties of a child- 
ish theatre exist in her fancy ; she sustains a conversation in three or 
four characters. The roughness of the ground, the hasty passage of a 
squirrel, the chirping of a sparrow, are occasions sufficient to suggest 
an exchange of impressions between the unreal figures with which her 
world is peopled. If she ascends, not without a stumble, the artificial 
rockwork, it is with the expressed solicitude of a mother who guides an 
infant by the edge of a precipice ; if she raises her glance to the waving 
green overhead, it is with the cry of pleasure exchanged by playmates 
who trip from home on a sunshiny day. The older person is confined 
within the barriers of memory and experience, the younger breathes 
the free air of creative fancy." 

V. — THE DISCURSIVE PROCESSES. 

Conception, judgment and reasoning, the three processes of discursive 
thought, are treated together, because it is impossible to make qualita- 
tive distinctions among them. They diflfer only in degree, not in kind. 
In every concept, there is involved a rudimentary judgment, and the 
syllogism consists simply in the apperceptive synthesis of judgments, 
whose constituent elements are concepts. The three are then at bottom 
only different stages in the one process, by which knowledge of the 
abstract is elaborated. Examples given, therefore, to illustrate the one, 
contain elements almost equally illustrative of the others. 

Conception. The child's earliest experience, being predominantly 
physiological, is also predominantly individual and concrete. He lives 
in the particular. It is a momentous juncture in his life when he first 
steps out beyond individual things, to abstract their common qualities, 
and of these to form notions. It is only then that he begins to think., in 
the strict sense of the word; and it is this thinking in abstractions and 
generals, which, in Locke's opinion, differentiates the human mind 
essentially from lower animal intelligence 3. 

iThe same thing holds with regard to pictures. I have seen a copy of a German pic- 
ture-book for children, which is almost completely lacking in artistic excellence, but 
wnich has gone through one hundred and seventy-seven editions. A movement is now 
on foot in Russia to prohibit the importation of the finely finished and elegant French 
toys, on the ground that they leave no room for the exercise of the child's imagination. 

S" One of the greatest pleasures of childhood is found in the mysteries which it hides 
from the scepticism of the elders, and works up into small mythologies of its own." 
Holmes, " The Poet at the Breakfa' t Table." 

3" Human Understanding," Book 11. chap. 2. 



44 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

Taine believes that the general notion makes its appearance only with 
the acquisition of language (^'), (29:408), Preyer, on the other hand, 
maintains that "even before the first attempts at speaking, a generaliz- 
ing and, therefore, concept-forming combination of memory-images 
regularly take place" (^="). "That the ability to abstract may show 
itself, though imperfectly, even in the first year, is, according to my 
observations, certain, infants are struck by a quality of an 
object — e. g., the white appearance of milk. The 'abstracting,' 
then, consists in the isolating of this quality from innumerable 
other sight-impressions, and the blending of the impressions into 

a concept. The naming of this, which begins months later 

is an outward sign of this abstraction, which did not at all lead 
to the formation of the concept, but followed it " (^■'^^). He also quotes 
from Oehlwein to show that deaf-mute children, in the first year of life, 
form concepts, and logically combine them with one another ; and he 
concludes that thinking is not bound up with verbal language, though 
it no doubt demands a certain degree of cerebral development. Even 
orangs and chimpanzees reason without language, but their concepts 
are neither so abstract, so clear nor so numerous as those of the child 
even before he learns to speak, while after that time the gulf between 
them widens infinitely (^-i). 

Perez agrees with the above view, and quotes from Houzeau to show 
that dogs, bees, and other dumb creatures have concepts, and carry on 
reasoning processes. As to the child, he gives several examples on this 
point. A boy of eight mouths, who used to amuse himself by stuffing 
things into a tin box, afterwards examined every new toy to find an 
opening. Another child of the same age used to make a peculiar sound 
when he desired solid food, different from that by which he expressed his 
desire of the breast. Another, at nine months, gave unmistakable 
evidence that he possessed the concept "animal'" (^=1^). 

According to Romanes, there is a class of ideas standing between the 
percept and the concept, less abstract than the latter, but more general 
than the former, to which he gives the name recept. They are complex 
ideas arising out of a repetition of more or less similar percepts. £. g., 
when a parrot, who has learned to call out bow-iooio when the house dog 
enters the room, also calls out this word on seeing other dogs of various 
sizes, colors and forms, he possesses an idea which constitutes an 
advance on the percept, but cannot, strictly speaking, be called a con- 
cept. Every child passes through a receptual stage, which does not 
require language, whereas the concept, properly so-called, or the active 
synthesis of qualities into a class, is not, in his opinion, attained until 
the child can speak ( ^^'-^ ) ^ . 

Taking the ordinary meaning of the word concept, which includes 
what Romanes expresses by recept, it seems established that the forma- 
tion of the concept is prior to, and in large measure independent of, lan- 
guage; but it seems equally clear that abstraction and generalization do 
not attain to any great degree of complexity without the aid of speech, 
as the observation of the cleverest deaf-mutes clearly shows. Even 
after speech begins, the disourslve processes develop but slowly. In 
one case, a child of seventeen months had not yet differentiated his col- 
lective concept " taste-smell " (as united in one object) into the concepts 
"taste" and "smell" (^=") ; though another child, at seven months, 
seemed to have ideas of kind (^■^^). A boy of three years did not know 
the meaning of " size " or " goodness," though long before this he per- 
fectly understood the expression: " Baby is a good boy." Children 
have very little idea of number in the first two years. A child of two 

1 See also a series of articles iu Pwbi/c 8c/it>oZ Jotinial for November and Dscember, 
1891, and January and Feoruary, 1892, entitled, •■ Hjw do Concepts arise from 
Percepts?" 



INTELLECT. 45 

and a half years confounded "naughty" with " ugly." In short, we 
find at this period only the lowest degree of abstraction (6:"8^. 

The child's first generalizations are very inaccurate. Even when he 
begins to talk and to use general names, he does not use them in the 
same sense as the adult. His generalizations are apt to be too wide. 
"Logic in the child naturally operates with much more extensive and 
less intensive notioris thanin adults. Hence he is very liable to illusion, 
not through stupidity, but simply through ignorance, arising out of 
lack of experience." After having held out grass to a sheep, he also 
ofl'ers some to the birds (^="), and in this he is acting with perfect con- 
sistency, within the range of his knowledge. He extends the term 
papa to other men. the word atta or peudu (perdu) to all sorts of dis- 
appearances (3), (^) ;he makes the word quack-quack apply not only to 
a duck, but to the water on which the duck swims, then to all birds and 
insects, then to all fluids, and finally to all coins, because he had seen 
the picture of an eagle on a French sou (33:283). jje includes an eye- 
glass in the concept bon dieu (blessed medal), and the steamboat, coffee- 
pot, and all hissing, noisy objects, in the class fafer (chemin de fer, 
locomotive). A little girl of eighteen months had been amused by her 
mother hiding in play, and saying coucou. She had also been warned to 
keep out of the hot sun, by the words <^a brule. One day, on seeing the 
sun disappear behind a hill, she put these two ideas together and 
exclaimed a bule coucou (2^) . Another child of the same age applied 
the name no-no to all eye-glasses, because she had been forbidden to 
snatch off her nurses' glasses by the words, no-no (^). Taine believes 
the characteristic mark, distinguishing the child from the lower animal, 
is this very capa<;ity of detecting resemblances amid differences, which 
leads him to extend, to such a surprising degree, the denotation of the 
term. Not only does he apply the word bow-wow to the terriers, mas- 
tiff's and Jvlewfoundlands which he meets in the street, but "a little 
later he does what an animal never does, he says bow-wow to a paste- 
board dog that barks when squeezed, then to a pasteboard dog which 
does not bark, but runs on wheels, then to the bronze dogs which orna- 
ment the drawing room, then to his little cousin, who runs about the 
room on all fours, then, at last, to a picture representing a dog (^). 

Children's notions of things are chiefly connected with their uses or 
actions. M. Binet gives a large number of interesting definitions of 
things given by children, from which I select the following: "Un 
couteau, c'est pour couper la viande." "Un cheval, c'est pour trainer 
une voiture, avec un monsieur dedans." "Une lampe, c'est pour 
allumer, pour qu'on voie clair dans la chambre." "Un crayon, c'est 
pour ecrire." " Un chapeau, c'est pour mettre sur la t§te." (Note the 
frequency of the " pour.") 

Judgment is involved, in a rudimentary form, in conception, and even 
in perception, as may be seen from the foregoing examples. When a 
child at two months recognizes his parents (") ; at three and a half 
months turns round to the cage on hearing the word coco ( " ) ; " comes 
to meet" the spoon with his mouth when being fed(i=^); at seven 
months turns his head around to the left when an object is carried so 
far behind him that he can no longer see it by turning to the right (^) ; 
at eight months recognizes a pictorial representation (ssass). and cries 
for Gourlay water, which is white and opaque, though not for ordinary 
water ; in the tenth month gives evidence of the knowledge that bodies 
have weight (^•^) ; and shows by unmistakable signs that he misses his 
absent parents, and even knows when a single nine-pin is removed from 
his set, — we cannot doubt that he is performing an act of judgment. 
These primitive judgments are mostly concrete and particular, abstract 
and general judgments being a later attainment. Children of eighteen 
months will recognize the pictures of all the more familiar animals, and 



46 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

respond with the appropriate sounds, bow-wow, moo, etc. The spoken 
judgment arises when an object arouses an idea in the child's mind, to 
which idea he attaches a name, recoguizing it as connected with the 
object. The first spolien judgment does not then require two words, as 
Taine seems to think (29=432)^ but usually consists of one word, which 
does duty for a whole sentence^. 

Beasoning. When the little boy, R., was four months old, he was 
playing one day on the floor surrounded by his toys. One toy rolled away 
beyond his reach. He seized a clothes-pin and used that as a " rake " 
with which to draw the toy within reach of his hand. Mr. Darwiu laid 
his finger on the palm of a child five months old. The child closed his 
fingers around it, and carried it to his mouth. When he found that he 
was hindered from sucking it, by his own fiogers getting in the way, he 
loosened his grasp and took a new hold farther down, then vigorously 
sucked the finger. When Preyer's boy, at six months, " after consider- 
able experience in nursing, discovered that the flow of milk was less 
abundant, he used to place his hand hard upon the breast, as if he 
wanted to force out the milk by pressure" (^•^"). Another child, at 
seven months, cried for a share of the food his nurse was eating (6=211) , 
A boy of eight months took a watch, which was offered him, and after 
biting on it with evident satisfaction, tried to break a piece off", as he 
would from a cracker. At thirteen months, a child who noticed the resem- 
blance between two men, inferred certain acts on the part of one which 
he had been accustomed to see in the other Q-^) . 

The boy, C, when fourteen months old, was one day feeding the dog 
with crackers, when the supply ran out. He immediately " crept to the 
sideboard, opened the left-hand door, pulled himself up by the shelf, 
and helped himself out of the box in which they were kept." He had 
seen crackers taken from this box before, but had never done it himself. 
He was observed to feel his own ears, and then his mother's, one day 
when looking at pictures of rabbits. One day, when eighteen months 
old, he came in from playing on the lawn, quite hot and somewhat dirty. 
He at once ran to his mother, holding up his dirty dress with a gesture 
of disgust ; then ran to the drawer where his clean clothes were kept, 
and tugged at it with all his might. Another boy of the same age, both 
of whose hands were filled with toys, wishing to grasp still another, 
quickly put one of them between his knees (*^). A little girl of this 
age used to feign sleep until the nurse left the room, when she would 
immediately resume her interrupted romps (^). Tiedemann's boy, at 
two years of age, used to employ cunning to accomplish his purposes. 
The little girl. P., at a year aad a half, furnished a good example of 
reasoning by analogy. She had been shown the pictures in a book with 
red binding. She afterwards went to the bookcase and took down two 
other books having red binding, and looked through them, evidently 
expecting to find pictures in them also. One day when I rose to take 
ray leave, she patted vigorously on the cushion of a chair, and then 
pulled at my coat to induce me to prolong my stay. 

From about the end of the second year, the reasoning power in most 
children makes such rapid progress that it is impossible to set down all 
the examples that are to hand. I content myself with one more. A boy 
of two years was quite familiar with the articles of his food by name, 
and when the word milk was spoken in his hearing, he clamored for a 
share of that article. His mother hit upon the device of spelling the 
word, when it was undesirable that his attention should be called to it. 
Before long, however, he learned to know the word, even when spelled, 
and one day, when his mother asked for the m-i-l-k, he at once cried 
out, mickey. 

1 Preyer's boy, at twenty-three months, uttered his first spoken judgment, viz.: 
"Heiss" (=" This food is too hot.") 



INTELLECT. 47 



VI. — THE IDEA OF SELF. 



The phenomena which accompany and indicate the gradual emergence 
into clear consciousness, of what Taine calls the " unextended centre," 
the " mathematical point," by relation to which all the " other " is de- 
fined, and which each of us calls " I," or " me," — the external evidences 
that the child is slowly but surely becoming '' aware of himself as a 
permanent being, distinct from the objects he knows, the feelings he 
experiences, and the ends he chooses " (y), — may be conveniently clas- 
sified under four heads : 

(I). The child's treatment of his own body. In the first weeks he will 
strike or scratch his own face (}^). One boy bit his own finger until he 
cried with the pain, even in the early part of the second year. In the 
ninth month the feet are still eagerly felt of, and the toes carried to the 
mouth, the same as foreign substances. This experimentation with his 
own limbs goes on all through the second, and in some cases well on into 
the third year. " In the first year the child's organism is not known as 
part of himself" (®). A boy of nineteen months, when asked to "give 
the foot," seized it with both hands, and tried to hand it over (3:i89). a 
little girl, a little over two years old, used to enlarge on a familiar ditty 
in the following fashion : " One for papa, one for mamma, one for toses 
(one for toes) " (B). Sigismund believes that the child learns a good 
deal about his own limbs (and so takes the first step toward a knowledge 
of self) through bringing his hand to his mouth, to ease the pain of the 
growing teeth. The feeling is different when he chews his own finger 
and that of his nurse. A child of four or five mouths studies his own 
fingers attentively. When one hand accidently grasps the other, he looks 
attentively at both. Lying on his back, he gazes at his legs stretched 
up in the air. 

Closely connected with this is the child's evident delight in his own 
activity and ability to do things. Wundt believes the muscular sense 
plays a predominant role in the genesis of self-consciousness, and there 
is little doubt that the acquisition of the power of walking contributes 
very largely to the growth of the self -idea (*i:i6). The feeling of power 
is engendered by the discovery that he can cause changes in objects. 
"An extremely significant day in the life of the infant is ihe one In 
which he first experiences the connection of a movement executed by 
himself with a sense-impression following upon it" (S:i92). Preyer's 
boy, in the fifth month, discovered that by tearing paper he could pro- 
duce sound sensations ; also by shaking a bunch of keys, opening and 
closing a box (thirteenth month), turning the leaves of a book, etc., and 
these occupations were accordingly carried on with a perseverance 
astonishing to an adult. He experienced a genuine pleasure in finding 
himself a cause. 

(II). The child's behavior towards his image in the mirror. Dar- 
win's child failed to interpret his reflection when five months old, but 
two months later he had accomplished it, and at nine months had 
learned to associate his name with the image. Another child at eight 
months used to look at his reflection with wonder (expressed by wide 
open eyes and immobility). "On being shown a hand glass, he regards 
his image with interest, smiles and tries to catch it. He puts his hand on 
the glass, and tries to take hold of the image's hand. Then he turns the 
glass over, and looks up in wonder at the result " (^'). A similar per- 
formance was gone through by a boy of ten months ; and, six months 
later, he was found one day standing before the glass, pulling his hair, 
examining his eyes and ears, and sticking out his tongue (C). Preyer's 
boy did not notice himself in the glass when three mouths old. Three 
weeks later he looked at it, but with indifference. Two weeks later 
still, he regarded it with attention, and laughed at the sight of it. Near 
the end of the sixth mouth, he stretched out his hand towards it. In 



48 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

his ninth month he grasped at it, and seemed surprised when his hand 
came against the smooth surface. At fourteen months he passed his 
hand behind the glass, as if searching for something. He afterwards- 
behaved in the same manner toward a photograph. In the sixteenth, 
month he made grimaces before the glass, laughing as he did so. Two 
weeks later he looked at himself often in the glass, with pleasure and 
evident vanity. At twenty months he connected his own name with 
the image, and when asked, "Where is Axel?" would point to the 
reflection (^■'^^). Another child knew her image in the glass at twelve- 
months, would point to it and say Tatie (Katie). A little boy of fifteen 
months calls his image Titta, by which he means child or doll. 

(III). In the third place, we have those actions which show the 
beginnings of the feeling of property, such as pride in personal appear- 
ance, and in adornment, jealousy over toys, and other things which the- 
child considers his rights. A number of examples have already been 
given in connection with the emotion of jealousy (Chap. ii. s), ^g regards 
personal adornment, there are very great diflerences among children, 
some taking great delight in it, while others seem to care but little- 
about it (*''). A little girl whom I have observed since her first year 
seems very fond of it, and will spend hours in adorning herself with 
veils and feathers and bracelets, making believe she is some fine lady. 
Whenever her best clothes are put on, or a new hat, she is very proud 
and walks very straight and dignified indeed. 

(IV). Lastly, we notice the child's use of the pronoun "I'' {Je.,Ich^Ego). 
It is interesting to remember that, according to the opinion of some 
philologists (Max Miiller, for example) , this word was, at the beginning, 
of the development of language, a demonstrative, meaning "this one," 
and was probably accompanied by a gesture, and perhaps, further back 
still, the gesture supplied the place of the word. Man spoke of himself 
in the third person before he learned to use the first person. Just so - 
with the child. He first calls himself by his proper name, or he uses the- 
word hahy^ and the intelligent use of the first personal pronoun comes 
late — most observers put it as late as the third year. I have never heard a 
child less than two years old call himself " I " or " me." The chief difll- 
culty in the way of his doing so, is that he never hears the word applied; 
to him by others. This is why he makes such errors as "Take me up 
on my (meaning your) lap." 

The " I " feeling is often present, therefore, before the word is used.. 
The concept of the self is not generated, but only rendered more exact 
and definite by speech (3:203). On the other hand, it must not be pre- 
sumed that the concept is always present where the word is used. 
Children who are constantly in the society of those who use the word 
will use it also, merely by imitation in many cases, without compre- 
hending its meaning. A child may say " I am hungry," without any 
idea that "I " is different from " hungry " (^s). Perez says : " When 
the child learns to say ' I ' or ' me,' instead of ' Charles ' or ' Paul,' the 
terms ' I ' and ' me ' are not more abstract to him than the proper names 
which he has been taught to replace by ' I ' or ' me.' Both the pronouns 
and the names equally express a very distinct and very concrete idea of 
individual personality. When a three-year-old child says ' I want that,' 
it is only a translation of ' Paul wants that,' and ' I,' like ' Paul,' indi- 
cates neither the first nor the third person, but the person whO' 
is himself, his own well-known personality, which he continually feels 
in his emotions and actions. An abstract notion of personality does not 
exist in a young child's mind" (6:284). i^ short, so great is the influ- 
ence of the environment here, that scarcely anything can be asserted in 
a general way of all children. Some children scarcely ever hear the 
pronoun "I." The members of the family avoid it, and say instead: 
"Mammals busy." " Sister is gone to school." "Baby must be good," 



INTELLECT. 49 

etc. ; in such cases, the child will of course take a long time to acquire 
the word. 

In many cases, me is used before /. It seems easier for some reason. 
Sometimes children pass through a sort of transition period, when / is 
used indifferently with the proper name, or even with he ( ^ ). Binet 
says of the little girl he observed that at three and a half years exactly, 
she first used the word je, in the sentence je ne sais pas. Two days after 
she said je ne veux pas. But long after that, she made many mistakes in 
the use of the pronoun. In two other children, the I took the place of 
the third personal designation before the end of the third year, and I 
preceded me, and you was later than either (*^). Another child at 
twenty-five months used my, but not /(^). 

Such are the various factors entering into the development of the 
child's self-consciousness, by which " he raises himself higher and 
higher above the dependent condition of the animal, so that at last the 
difference (not recognizable at all before birth, and hardly recognizable 
at the beginning after birth) between animal and human being" attains 
such infinite magnitude. 



CHAPTER IV.— VOLITION. 

We now approach the most difficult as well as the most important 
part of our subject : the most difficult, because of the exceedingly com- 
plicated character of every act of will ; the most important, because of 
the vast influence which anyone's theory of volition must exert upon 
his moral and religious ideas. Not only is it true that '• a being is 
capable of education and morality in proportion as he is capable of 
will" (*9:^), but it is also true that the most widely separated views 
touching human responsibility and destiny, have grown out of apparently 
slight difterences of opinion with regard to the nature and freedom of 
the will. The following theories are quoted to show the trend of con- 
temporary opinion on the subject, and not to set forth the present 
writer's views. 

" Out of the desire of everything that has once occasioned pleasurable 
feelings, is gradually developed the child's wiU"(2:i86). in Preyer's 
view, the will is called into life by the union of two representations, 
viz. : Ist, that of the end desired; 2d, that of the movement necessary 
to attain the end. The latter is not absolutely necessary, and at a later 
period is no longer formed, except in the case of new movements. The 
idea of the end is sufficient, without that of the means. Will, then, is 
based upon, and grows out of, desire i. 

In Guyau's opinion, also, a complete act of will involves representa- 
tions of two sorts, viz. : Of the act about to be performed, and of 
another, contrary act, which might have been performed. Action, then, 
is the resultant of a struggle among tendencies-. 

Perez says : " The will is born little by little from reflex, impulsive 
and instinctive movements, which, with the progress of the faculties of 
perception and ideation, and after having been for a long time executed 
and varied, fall under the action (coup) of the attention, and become 
conscious, reflected, and in a word, voluntary." Will in its negative 
form (inhibition), he holds to be also a matter at first of mechanism, 
unconscious and involuntary. It is a suppression, or at least a reduc- 
tion, of reflex, impulsive, and instinctive movements, by the fact of an 
excitation of the brain, a sensation. Thus arrest consists at first simply 
in the substitution of one tendency for another (25:2)3, 

Wundt, on the contrary, holds that there is no such thing as purely 
reflex and involuntary consciousness ; that activity of attention is in 

1 Preyer's theory of the origin of will is not, however, an empirical one, as the follow- 
ing quotation will show: " It is an error to think that the will arises from impressions 

in youth; a will can never be created in a child from external experiences; it 

must be allowed to develop itself from the inborn grerm of will " (38). 

2"' La pleine volont6, c'est-a-dire le dSploiement total des Snergies intfirieures, suppose 
qu'a la representation de Tacte meme qu'on va accomplir. s'associe la representation 
aflfaiblie de I'acte contraire. Et ainsi, nous arrivons acette conclusion: II n'y a pas 
d'acte pleinement voluntaire ou, ce que revient au meme, pieinement conscient, qui ne 
Boit accompagn6 du sentiment de la victoire de certaines tendances iuterieures sur 
d'autres, cons6quemment d'une lutte possible entre ces tendances, consSquemment 
enfin d'une lutte possible contre c«-s tendances " (49:44). 

3See also Ribot, "Les Maladies de la Volonte," p. 8. Bain, " The Emotions and the 
Will," Part II. Chap. I., and compare Prof. Baldwin's "Deliberative Suggestion," in 

which various "co-ordinated stimuli meet, affront, oppose, further one another, 

response answering to appeal in a complex but yet mechanical way " (39). 



VOLITION. 51 

some degree present even in movements apparently the most mechan- 
icaP. 

Prof. James lays down, as the distinguishing mark of voluntary move- 
ments, an antecedent desire and intention to perform, and consequently 
a full prevision of what the action is to be. He therefore designates 
voluntary movements as secondary functions of our organism, while 
" reflex, instinctive and emotional movements are all primary perform- 
ances." He makes voluntary movements depend on memory-images of 
former involuntary ones. " When a particular movement, having once 
occurred in a random, reflex or involuntary way, has left an image of 
itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed 
as an end, and deliberately willed. But it is impossible to see how it 
could be willed before. A supply of ideas of the various movements that 
are possible, left in the memory by experiences of their involuntary perform- 
ance, is thus the first pre-requisite of the voluntary life " (5o:4i6), 

It will be seen that all these views corroborate the position taken in 
the present work, that mental phenomena undergo a process of trans- 
formation, in virtue of which, from being predominantly physiological, 
they become predominantly psychical. We see now the application of 
this law to movements or actions. The earliest child movements, in the 
opinion of these writers, are not voluntary, but only reflex, instinctive, 
etc. Intelligent apprehension of the end sought, and of the means by 
which that end is to be attained, has not yet taken place, and, we may 
add that, until it has taken place, the movement is no more entitled to be 
called an action than is the swaying of a branch in the breeze, or the 
" action " of the piston-shaft of a locomotive. The conscious subject 
must first take hold of the movement, and put himself forth in intelligent 
direction of that movement toward a conceived and desired end, and 
then it becomes transformed into an action. It seems necessary also, in 
order to avoid misunderstanding, to express our dissent from the view 
held by some of these writers, that the will is a derived product, or 
result of mechanical movements, a something which has been brought 
to the birth by the "travail together" of accidental motions in an 
animal organism. It is an obvious hysteron proteron to explain the rise 
of will by means of this principle of transformation, while the only 
possible way of explaining the transformation is by positing voluntary 
activity. It is said, for example, that will is born ( !) little by little out 
of reflex and instinctive movements, which have come within the scope 
of the attention ; and again that will is developed out of the desire of 
everything that has occasioned pleasurable feeling. Now both atten- 
tion and desire, as we understand them, are impossible without volition. 
They involve active direction of the self toward the object, and this is 
volition. So far, then, from being the antecedents of will, they are 
modes of its manifestation, and instead of ascribing the birth of will to 
the transformation already spoken of, in virtue of which movements 
come within the scope of the attention, we should more correctly 
ascribe the transformation to the exercise of will. The will is the cause 
and not the effect of the transformation. It is correct enough to say 
with Preyer that will is developed in connection with these movements 
and desires — if by development is meant only growth and not genesis — but 
when it is asserted that will is generated out of actions to which atten- 
tion and desire are directed, it is only necessary to ask : Out of what 
are attention and desire generated? to reveal at once the insufficiency of 
the explanation. 

This criticism is all the more necessary here, because Prof. Preyer's 
classification of child-movements, — as the most scientific and exhaustive 
yet made, — is adopted in the following pages. It can be accepted in 

1 '• Menschen und Tliierseele." 



52 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

toto, as a description and classification^ without our subscribing in the 
least to any particular theory of will-genesis that may have been 
founded upon it. The classification is as follows : First, we have a 
multitude of movements, not involving peripheral stimuli, but proceed- 
ing entirely from internal conditions. They are simply the result of aa 
overflow of nervous energy, and require only motor — not sensori-motor 
— processes. They are, of course, will-less, and are designated impulsive 
movements. Secondly, we have those movements (very numerous in 
the new-born) which, though requiring peripheral stimuli, and, there- 
fore, sensori-motor processes, do not involve active attention or efibrt, 
and are, therefore, will-less. These are the well-known sensori-motor 
reflexes. In the third place, there is a kind of movements — found in great 
abundance in the human being, and constituting, probably, the majority 
of the so called actions of the lower animals — for which the physical 
and emotional organism is specially fitted by the action of heredity. 
These are the instinctive movements. Finally there supervene on all 
these the bona fide actions of the person, involving desire of end, atten- 
tion to the object, and representation of, and deliberation upon, the 
means of attainment, as well as the conscious forth-putting of the self 
in effort towards the realization of the represented end. These are the 
ideational, or consciously deliberated and voluntary movements. We 
shall consider these in this order, only premising that because any given 
movement is here classed as impulsive or reflexive, it does not neces- 
sarily follow that it is never to be found in any other class. A move- 
ment, the same outwardly, may be at one time impulsive and at 
another ideational. This is one application of the principle of trans- 
formation. 

I.— IMPULSIVE MOVEMENTS. 

The majority of the embryonic movements belong to this class. From 
the time of "quickening," the foetus performs numerous muscular move- 
ments (mostly set on by processes of nutrition and circulation) prior 
to the first exercise of reflex sensibility. In the new-born they are 
still numerous, comprising all those spontaneous kickings and rollings, 
awkward muscle-movements and comical grimaces, so noticeable in the 
early weeks of life. The hands strike right and left and move toward 
the face without any definite object; the legs tramp and kick when the 
child is held up in the air C^=") ; the eyes may be observed to move be- 
fore the lids are opened ; the intra-uterine posture is resumed on falling 
asleep ; the limbs are stretched on awakening ; in short, almost every 
muscle of the body is exercised without any assignable peripheral stim- 
ulus. The movements are often symmetrical (by accident), but usually 
at first asymmetrical. Some of them (as yawning and stretching) per- 
sist through life, but the majority have disappeared by the end of the 
second year. Many of them are unexpected by the child himself; he is 
evidently surprised to find himself performing a certain movement, and 
afterwards performs it voluntarily, with numberless repetitious, and 
evident pride in the newly discovered ability (6:i8). 

The first smile doubtless belongs here, as also the peculiar crowing 
heard so frequently in the first year; and the numerous "accompany- 
ing " movements made by the child (such as holding the hands in a cer- 
tain strained position, with the fingers spread out, while drinking, and 
the dreamy, wandering motions of the eyes during the act of sucking). 
A sleeping child suddenly threw up one of his hands, which, coming 
suddenly into contact with the eye, pushed the lid open. The infant 
slept on with one eye open, — the pupil very much contracted — until by- 
and-by the hand dropped and the eye closed (2:202). 

Although possessing in themselves no direct volitional significance, 
yet these impulsive movements are indirectly of great importance, inas- 



VOLITION. 53 

much as they are the raw materials, upon which the gradually awakening 
child-will exercises itself , making them its own, and transforming them, 
by means of conscious activity, into voluntary actions properly so- 
called. 

II.— REFLEX MOVEMENTS. 

These occur as the response of the nervous system to peripheral stim- 
ulation, without the participation of the idea. If they enter into con- 
sciousness at all, it is only during or after their performance. They are 
found in the adult in great abundance as well as in the child ; and are 
very well exemplified in the sudden movements of the hands when one's 
hat is blown off in the street. Though heredity probably plays a con- 
siderable part in facilitating them, yet they do not take place in the 
earliest infancy with that certainty and promptness by which they are 
characterized in later life, as we have seen in the case of eye niove- 
ments. What seems to be transmitted is a potentiality, which needs ex- 
perience to transform it into an actuality. 

The law of transformation has an obvious application here. Indeed 
we see in the case of these movements a double transformation : that 
which was at first a reflex movement becomes afterwards a voluntary 
one; and finally, by virtue of repetition, leading to the formation of a 
habit, it becomes once more reflex or automatic. Probably all mouth 
movements involved in the enunciation of articulate sounds, pass 
through all these stages, as we shall see later. 

Reflex movements are of great importance in will-growth, since upon 
them the voluntary movements, properly so-called, supervene. On its 
negative side also (i. e., in inhibition) the will develops chiefly in con- 
nection with the repression of reflexes. 

In the earlier stages of foetal life, according to Preyer, no reflex move- 
ments can be elicited, be the stimuli never so strong and varied ; and 
even after there have occurred many movements of an impulsive nature 
(2:211). But reflex excitability increases very rapidly in the later 
months, even gentle stroking calling forth many movements. Swal- 
lowing as a reflex occurs at this time ; and foetal movements can be 
evoked by changes of temperature. Champneys says the curling up of 
the toes, and jerking away of the foot when the sole is tick- 
led (which Mr. Darwin observed on the seventh day of life), can be 
produced in utero. Only from the beginning of extra-uterine life, how- 
ever, does the reflex activity of the nervous system obtain full play. 
And here the earliest and most prominent are the various respiration 
reflexes. The first cry is undoubtedly of this character, since brainless 
children make themselves heard in the first minutes of life as well as 
normal children.^ Sneezing, too, which in many new-born children 
takes the place of crying, is a pure reflex, as it continues to be through 
life, though the complex coordination of many muscles, by which it is 
accompanied, is not so complete in the child as in the man. Other re- 
flex movements connected with respiration ai'e coughing^ wheezing^ 
choking^ laughing when tickled, hiccoughing^ and the like, all of which, 
with the exception of laughter, may probably be observed in the first 
week. A striking proof of the reflex sensibility of the respiratory ap- 
paratus is seen in the fact that a noise, just loud enough not to awaken 
the sleeping child, has the efl'ect of increasing the rapidity of the res- 
pirations (2:217). 

Starting at any sound or jar, is not present at the very first, but 
makes its appearance early. Generally there is silence for a moment 
after the disturbance, as though the energies were temporarily paral- 
yzed. Champneys observed this starting first in the fourth week, but 

*■ See several cases cited by Taine, "Intelligenct'," Part I. Book IV. chap. 1. 



54 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

the child would not start twice at the same noise, unless it was very 
loud. Children are very susceptible to nervous stimuli, as is evident 
from the frequency of convulsions in infant life. 

Reflex movements of the limbs are numerous, prompt and early. On 
the seventh day Darwin tickled the sole of his child's foot with a piece 
of paper ; the foot was jerked away and the toes curled up. He remarks:: 
" The perfection of these involuntary movements shows that the ex- 
treme imperfection of the voluntary ones is not due to the state of the 
muscles, or of the coordinating centres, but to that of the seat of the 
will." On the fourth day another child clasped a finger laid in his 
hand (^*). From the fourteenth day on, tickling the sleeping child's 
temple was followed by a movement of the hand toward the place, 
though the hand did not always find the right spot (2:220). The left 
hand did not always respond, in Preyer's experiments, to stimulus ap- 
plied to the left side, nor the right hand to the right side ; but Pfliiger 
found the responses constant in this respect.^ There seems, mdeed, to 
be two sorts of reflexes : the inborn (such as spreading the toes on tick- 
ling), which occur from the first hour of life with perfect regularity 
and accuracy ; and the acquired /eflexes, which are neither prompt nor 
certain at first, but become so on repetition. 

Very important in this connection are the reflex eye-movements of the 
new-born child. The examples given in the first chapter of the re- 
sponses of the infant eye to impressions of light, — turning towards the 
light, following a moving light or brightly colored object, etc., — are 
mostly examples of reflex movements, as are also those movements of 
the eyes which follow touch-impressions on the lashes, lids, etc. 
According to Preyer, there are " six different regular reflex movements 
from the optic nerve to the motor oculi alone, which appear in the 
case of light impressions." 

Least developed of all in the earliest period are the pain-rejlexes. The 
new-born in many cases makes no response whatever to the prick of a 
pin, as Genzmer has shown ( 9). The response takes place, however, 
when the stimulus is such as to affect a large number of nerve ends at the 
same time (a slap for example). This tardiness of pain-reflexes in the 
new-born does not show that he is insensible to pain, — though he is, 
probably, less sensitive than the adult in this respect, — but simply that 
the nerve connections which make reflex movements possible, are in the 
case of pain sensations less developed than those of the skin and mu- 
cous membrane. 

Finally the inhibition of reflexes, by which the will of the child devel- 
ops on its negative side, is very difficult, and therefore a late attain- 
ment. In one case it was observed as early as the tenth month, when 
the child for the first time restrained his excretions (^ ) ; in another, dur- 
ing the first quarter of the second year, when the child checked an im- 
pulse to scratch (^) ; and in a third, in the fifteenth month. In marked 
contrast to this is the inhibition of reflexes in the lower animals, where 
it often takes place before the end of the fcetal period. 

III.— INSTINCTIVE MOVEMENTS. 

These differ from impulsive movements in that they do not occur in 
the absence of appropriate peripheral stimuli. There is in the child 
an inborn instinct to seize with the hand, but this movement takes place 
only when the palm comes into contact with an object. They differ 
from impulsive movements also in having an end or purpose, though 
this end may not be known at the time of their performance.^ 

'- So also Baldwin. See " Infants' Movements" in Science, Jan. 8, 1892 

2"Instinct is the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends 

■without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance'" 

(50:391). 



VOLITION. 65 

Besides the stimulus, they require a certain emotional condition. The 
child in a sorrowful frame of mind does not laugh when his toes are 
tickled. They diflPer from ideational movements in the absence of a 
pattern, and of any conscious eflfort, or previous representation. 

One of the strongest instincts in the child is to seize objects and carry 
them to his mouth. Attempts at this have been observed as early as 
the fourth day. This propensity to make the mouth the test-organ for 
all sorts of objects, has been explained by the hypothesis that the lips 
may have been used in conjunction with the hands in an earlier period 
of race-progress, much more extensively than at present (i*). The 
movements of the hands to the mouth may be at first accidental, and 
then instinctive, as in painful teething. It finally becomes reflex 
through the formation of habits. The contraposition of the thumb in 
seizing objects is quite slowly learned (in one case as late as the 12th 
week). This is in marked contrast to the facility with which young 
monkeys, less than a week old, oppose the thumb in seizing. 

As to the rise of right or left-handedness. Professor Baldwin has 
made a large number of experiments, whose results may be summarized 
as follows : 

(1) No trace of preference for either hand was discernible so long 
as there were no violent muscular exertions made. In over 2,000 ex- 
periments, one hand was preferred as often as the other. 

(2) From the sixth to the tenth month, the tendency to use both 
hands together was about twice as great as the tendency to use either 
hand alone. (The figures are : Number of experiments, 2,187 ; right 
hand used alone 585 limes, left hand alone 568 times, both hands 
together 1,034 times.) 

(3) Right-handness developed under the pressure of muscular effort. 
Preference for the right hand in violent efforts in reaching appeared in 
the seventh and eighth months. Experiments made in the eighth month 
gave this result : Right hand 74, left 5, both 1. Under the stimulus 
of bright colors, the right hand was employed 84 times, and the left 
hand only twice (i^).^ 

Often there is a period of left-handedness in children who afterwards 
become right-handed (*2), (R). Sigismund believes that most children 
up into the third year prefer to use both hands together. 

Among instinctive mouth movements the earliest and most perfect is 
sucking. Sometimes, however, even this movement is far from perfect 
at the beginning. Many of the earliest efforts are quite fruitless, owing 
to failure in co-ordination. This movement doubtless took place before 
birth, since it may be observed from the first moments of life. On its 
development, Kussmaul remarks to the following effect : An advance 
is made on the mere reflexes when the child sucks the finger thrust in- 
to his mouth, or the nipple of the breast. Here we have not only sen- 
sation, awakening movement, but also feelings of pleasure or dis- 
pleasure, with answering endeavors and mental representations of the 
simplest kind. Finally the will learns to regulate these movements in 
the interests of the individual. 

Other instinctive mouth movements are biting (which begins about 
the fourth or fifth month, and supersedes sucking from the tenth month), 
chexoing (which is performed with perfect regularity from the fourth 
month), grinding the teeth (which is quite original, and probably practiced 
by all babes during teething), and licking (which is performed in the first 
twenty-four hours "hardly less adroitly than in the seventh month" (2= ^ei ). 

'Prof. Baldwin sees, in the fact that preference for the right hand was developed only 
in connection with muscular effort, an argument in favor of the "innervation'' 
theory. For the opposite opinion see a short article by Prof. James in Science^ 14 
Nov., 1890. 



56 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

Learning to loalk involves a whole series of preliminary accomplish- 
ments, first among which is the ability to hold the head in equilibrium, 
which may be accepted as the criterion of the rise of voluntary power. 
This is usually accomplished about the fourth month (2=26*). The next 
stage is reached a month or two later in the ability to sit alone upright. 
When this is successfully accomplished for the first time, the soles of 
the feet are frequently turned towards each other — a partial re-assump- 
tion of the intra-uterine posture. To stand alone is the next stage; and 
anyone who has watched the attempts of a little child to stand upright 
and walk will be convinced that he is moved to this by a natural 
instinct. 1 

It is an important epoch in a child's life when he succeeds in standing 
alone. Whole sets of muscles, heretofore scarcely used, are now 
brought into activity, and his progress is, from this time on, more all- 
sided and symmetrical. Hitherto his locomotion has been only in the 
form of creeping (which is performed in a great variety of ways, some 
children paddling straight ahead on all fours, like little quadrupeds, 
some hitching along in an indescribable manner on their haunches, and 
some going backwards, crab-fashion) ; but for the child who has learnt 
to stand alone, the transition to walking is, in a very literal sense, 
"only a step." The first conscious steps are taken very timidly, and 
with an evident fear of falling. But frequently the first steps are 
taken unconsciously (*2j. Sometimes a child who has learnt to walk, 
partially or wholly, reverts for a season to creeping, for no apparent 
reason. Children who have older brothers or sisters are likely to walk 
at an earlier age than others, on account of the example and assistance 
of these older ones. At first the feet are placed disproportionately wide 
apart, giving rise to a curious waddling motion; while sometimes a child 
runs instead of walking, and staggers, with the body inclined forward, 
and the hands stretched out as though he were afraid of falling, the 
feet, too. being lifted higher than is necessary. Many children seem 
more amiable after they have learned to walk, doubtless on account of 
their newly acquired ability, which not only occupies their attention, but 
enables them to go more readily to the objects of their desire (M). 

It is perhaps scarcely necessary to call attention to the fact that a 
movement may be instinctive and yet not make its appearance at the 
very beginning of life ; noo* to the fact that instincts are not absolutely 
invariable, but are subject both to inhibition by habits and also to natural 
decay from desuetude. - 

III.— IDEATIONAL MOVEMENTS. 

Finally, in virtue of the aimless and will-less execution of vast num- 
bers of movements of the nature of those already treated, — impulsive, 
refiexive and instinctive, — it at length comes to pass that movements are 
performed which are the expression of the conscious self, the index of 
will in the true and only proper sense of the word, involving a previous 
representation of the end sought, and (in their earlier stages) of the 
movements involved in attaining that end, as well as a deliberate forth- 
putting of the self in conscious effbrt towards the attainment. To such 
movements, and to such only, should the name of actions be applied. 
All others are only movements. It must not be supposed that the little 
child passes per saltum from the condition indicated in the previous sec- 
tions of this chapter, to that of explicit self-conscious activity. Indeed, 
it would be a very false view of child-development that represented the 

1 Sigismund graphica)ly describes the child's first attempts to stand in these words: 
"Das Kind ist selbst von seiner Verwegenheit iiberraschr,, steht angstlich mit weit 
gestellten Fiissen, und la»!St sich bald etwas urasanft nieder" (1:98) 

2See Prof. James' chapter on Instinct, "Principles of Psychology," Vol. II. 



VOLITION, 57 

various stages as following one another in rigid succession, with hard 
and fast lines showing where the one ends and the next begins. They 
are rather to be compared to surfaces, whose boundaries, vaguely out- 
lined, overlap each other. There are a few impulsive movements, and 
very many reflex and instinctive ones, persisting to the end of life. 

We shall lind it convenient to follow Prof. Preyer's subdivision of 
ideational movements into three classes. In the lowest class, we have 
movements of imitation^ which, though indicating activity of will (at 
least in their later stages), yet depend on a model or pattern, and are 
never performed by the child unless he first observes their performance 
by others. Next we have expressive movements, which, as the name 
indicates, are a more or less conscious expression of feelings and 
desires; and finally, the full-fledged deliberative actions. 

(a). Imitative Movements. These may bo divided into two species, 
viz. : Simple imitation, in which the movement is only an approximate 
imitation, and no second attempt is made; and persistent imitation, 
" which marks the transition from suggestion to will, from the reactive 
to the voluntary consciousness" (^^). The former is exemplified in the 
single, isolated attempt on the child's part to reproduce a sound made 
by another person ; the latter, in the repeated eflorts of a girl of four- 
teen months to put a rubber on a pencil, after having seen her father 
do it (39), or of a boy of twelve months, to get a cord into the hole of a 

spool (M). 

Two points should be mentioned before we proceed to record observa- 
tions in this connection. First : When a child for the first time volun- 
tarily imitates a given movement, which he has already performed 
involuntarily a number of times, he does it far less perfectly than when 
he did it without conscious imitation. " If I clear my throat, or cough 
purposely, without looking at the child, he often gives a little cough 
likewise, in a comical manner. But if I ask: " Can you cough? "he 
coughs, but generally copying less accurately" (2:2S8 ^. Second : It must 
not be supposed, even when the child imitates a movement deliberately 
and with a clear idea of it, that he understands in every case the mean- 
ing of the movement. One child, in the ten mouth, had learnod to 
imitate the movement of beckoning, but he showed by the expression of 
his face and the attendant gestures, that he did not in the least compre- 
hend the significance of the beckoning ( ^ ). 

As early as the third and fourth months, according to one writer, 
children perform little tricks which indicate the buddings of the 
imitative propensity. Raw attempts at vocal imitation may be observed 
even in tlie second month, when the child makes a response to words 
addressed to hiui. This, however, is mechanical. In the third mouth 
the child will imitate looks, i. e., he will look at an object which others 
are looking at {^■^^). Egger saw, in the sixth month, an instance 
of imitation, together with the act of recollection which it involves (^). 
Champneys says of his child : "About the thirteenth week he began to 
appear to attempt to join in conversation, with a variety of articulate 
sounds, if talking was going on in the room." Preyer observes : The 
first attempt at imitation occurred in the fifteenth week, the child mak- 
ing an attempt to purse the lips when one did it close in front of him. 
In the seventeenth week, the "protruding of the tip of the tongue 
between the lips was perfectly imitated once when done before the 
child's face, and the child in fact smiled directly at this strange move- 
ment, which seemed to please him " (2:284). 

There is no point on which I find so much uniformity as this, that 
imitation begins during the second half of the first year. This is true of 
almost all children without exception, so far as I know, and extends 
not only to movements proper, but also to vocal imitation, as we shall 
see. A boy of seven months tried hard to say simple monosyllables after 



58 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

his mother (^). Another is reported to have accomplished his first 
unmistakable imitations when seven months old, in movements of the 
head and lips, laughing, and the like. Crying was imitated in the 
ninth month, and in the tenth, imitation of all sorts was quite correctly 
executed, though even at the end of the first year new movements, and 
those requiring complex coordination, often failed (2). A child of 
eight and a half months, having seen his mother poke the fire, after- 
wards crept to the hearth, seized the poker, thrust it into the 
ash-pan, and poked it back and forth with great glee, chuck- 
ling to himself ("). Another child, in his tenth month, imitated 
whistling, and later, the motions accompanying the familiar "pat-a- 
cake," etc. In his eleventh month he used to hold up the news- 
paper, and mumble in imitation of reading (M). Another boy, in his 
eleventh month, used to cough and sniff like his grandfather, and 
amused himself by grunting, crowing, gobbling and barking in imitation 
of the domestic animals and birds (C). A little girl of this age used to 
reproduce with her doll some of her own experiences, such as giving it a 
bath, punishing it, kissing it, and singing it to sleep. 

One fine morning in May I took the little boy, R., for a walk through a 
beautiful avenue, where the trees on each side met overhead in a mass 
of foliage. These trees were full of birds, busy with their nest building, 
and full of song. The little fellow was fairly enchanted. He could not 
go on. Every few steps he would stop (at the same time pulling at 
my hand to make me stop, too), and looking up into the trees, with his 
head turned on one side, would give back the bird-song in a series of 
warbling, trilling notes of indescribable sweetness. I very much doubt 
whether any adult voice, however trained, or any musical instrument, 
however complicated, could reproduce those wonderful inflections. 
The same boy, a little later, used to imitate with his voice 
the boys whistling in the street, giving the right pitch. Another boy,, 
at thirteen months, brushes his hair, tries to put on his shoes and 
stockings, and many other similar things (C). Indeed the whole life of 
the child of this age is full of imitation. Going out with the girl, F., I 
observed that she did almost everything I did; I brushed some dust from 
my coat and she immediately " brushed " her dress in like manner. It is in 
fact diflicult fully to realize how the child of this age is watching our 
every movement, and learning thereby. Not only parents and teachers, 
but every one who comes in contact with the child, even casually and 
occasionally, contributes his share, whether he will or not, in the child's 
education. The moral of this is too obvious to require repetition. 

(6) Expressive Movements. These arise out of those already treated 
of. Impulsive, reflex, instinctive, and even the simpler imitative move- 
ments, are not intentional expressions of mental states. But a move- 
ment which was at first impulsive or reflex may become the manifesta- 
tion of such states. The first cry and the first puckering of the mouth 
(which Kussmaul noticed In children less than an hour old, when a 
bitter substance was brought into contact with the tongue) are only 
the reaction of the organism to external stimuli. But later, both the 
cry and the gesture fall within the control of the will, and are trans- 
formed into the purposive utterances of the conscious self. Many, per- 
haps most, of the expressive movements are impulsive or other move- 
ments which have been thus transformed. 

The first so-called smile., for example (which may be observed in 
children less than two weeks old), is simply an impulsive movement 
resulting from agreeable feeling ; and a reflex laugh may be elicited 
from a child very early by tickling the soles of his feet. In one case 
the first real smiles were observed from the 26th day on ; and in the 
eighth week enjoyment of music was manifested by laughing and smil- 
ing, accompanied by lively movements of the limbs, and a bright, gleam- 



VOLITION. 5ft 

ing expression of the eyes. The imitative laugh began about the ninth 
month (2 ). Egger thinks the time when intelligence, properly speaking, 
appears is marked by the advent of the laugh, which he observed for 
the first time after the fortieth day(36). Sigismund first observed a 
smile in the seventh week. Many children, he says, smile first in sleep ; 
then soon after in response to the friendly looks of others. This 
responsive smile he believes is the first sign of consciousness of and 
response to sensations received from others Q'-^). Many have observed 
the smile as early as the second and third or even the first week, but 
so far as I am aware, no one attributes conscious expression to the 
smile of a child less than a month old. Mr. Darwin believes he saw a 
smile of mental origin on the forty-fifth day. M. Guyau thinks the 
smile is reflex in its origin. Tiedemann observed a smile in the second 
month, and genuine laughter in the third. So also several others. The 
boy C, laughed aloud when being undressed. He was then three 
months old. Three weeks later, when some one was reading aloud, he 
laughed and cooed until the reader was obliged to stop. He evidently 
thought the reading was intended for his special entertainment. A boy 
of the same age laughed aloud one day without any apparent cause (M). 
The psychic development of the smile is well stated in the following 
words : "The smile begins when the infant first begins to be conscious 
of outside things ; attention gradually becomes closer and more fixed ; 
the smile at this stage is the mere stare, vacant at first, but growing 
steadily more intelligent and wondering in its appearance. About the 
third week this begins to relax very slightly into the appearance of 
pleasure. At this point there comes first more and more of a glow on 
the face — a beaming — then in a day or two a very slight relaxation of 
the muscles, increasing every day. This dawning smile is often very 
beautiful, but it is not yet a smile. It is almost a smile, but I am con- 
fident no one will ever know the exact day when the baby fairly and 
intelligently for the first time smiles^'' (i^). 

On Pouting and Pursing the Lips as an expressive movement, Preyer 
observes in substance : There are three sorts of pouting, difiering from 
each other according to the cause. First, there is a protrusion of the 
lips, which may be observed in some children from the first hour of 
life, and which is purely impulsive. Secondly, the pursing of the 
mouth when attention is closely strained (as in learning to write or 
draw). This appears as early as the fifth week, and continues to the 
end of life in many instances. Thirdly, the pout of sullenness, which 
makes its appearance much later than the others, and is not due to 
imitation (for it occurred where there had been no opportunity for 
imitation), but is undoubtedly hereditary ( 2:3oi). 

The kiss, as an expressive action, is, on the other hand, not hereditary, 
but acquired. Some nations do not practice it. The child has to learn 
it, and he is somewhat late in learning it, as observations show. Very 
seldom does the child understand its meaning, or give it spontaneously, 
until the second year of life. 

The child's cry is at first not expressive ; and when it becomes so, it 
varies greatly in diflerent children. According to one observer, "Crying 
took place at first without any squaring of the mouth, the sound was that 
of 'nga' as expressed in German. It must have been produced by closing 
the fauces by contact of the pillars of the fauces and the soft palate, so 
as to send all the sound through the nose. Vowel sounds were then 
produced by separating the soft palate and the pillars of the fauces, 
and allowing the sound to come through the mouth" (i*). He goes on 
to say that the child seemed to cry at first for three reasons : Loneli- 
ness or fright, hunger, or pain ; and these cries seemed all diflerent in 
character ; but he does not say when this difference became apparent. 
The first crying is only squalling ; it has no expressive intonations. The 



60 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

transition from the meaningless cry to the significant voice, with difter- 
ent cries to express different mental states, has been observed as early 
as the second month (^), and in other cases during the third month 
( ® ), (11). The little girl, W., when four months old "expressed hunger 
by cries that were short and shrill, following each other rapidly, and 
not so loud as other cries. "^ 

Weeping. The new born do not shed tears, no matter how hard they 
cry. At a later period they cry and weep together, and they can also 
cry without weeping. But to weep without crying comes much later, 
and is comparatively rare in childhood. One or two eases are reported 
of tears being shed by children two weeks old (^), (^s), but most of the 
observations point to a later date. In one case the first tears were shed 
at the end of the third week (i^), in another in the fourth week (2), 
while in other cases tears were seen to flow down the face in the sixth, 
ninth, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth weeks respectively. 
Darwin's child shed tears in the twentieth week, but as early as the 
tenth hi? eyes were moist in violent crying. Pie thinks that children do 
not usually shed tears until the second, third or fourth month. From 
the second year onward, children weep much more easily than at an 
earlier period, and, later still, the inhibition both of tears and crying 
is a significant mark of the growing power of the will. 

J^odding the head in assent, and shaking it in refusal, are at first entirely 
different from each other in mental significance. The latter is an in-born 
reflexive or instinctive movement, while the former is acquired. The 
child who has satisfied his hunger, will turn his head from side to side 
in refusal of further proffered nourishment when less than a week old. 
This movement becomes expressive almost from the first. It is gener- 
ally accompanied by the partial closing of the eyes, and often by arm- 
movements of " warding off"." Nodding in one case was not imitated 
until the fourteenth month, and even then very imperfectly. Even 
after it was finally learnt, its meaning wa? often confounded with that of 
shaking the head. The child would shake his head for " yes," and nod 
it for " no." In another case, both nodding and shaking the head had 
become expressive by the fifteenth month («=2i). 

Other examples of expressive movements which may be observed in 
children at a very early age, are the following: Clasping the hands to- 
gether, or waving them very quickly back and forwards, or up and 
down, to express eager desire for something ; reaching out with uplifted 
hands and extended arms for the same purpose, or even sometimes 
clapping the hands quickly together, after the manner of an "encore; " 
violent straightening of the back in anger; a curious bearing, almost in- 
describable, showing vanity; besides several gestures expressive of 
affectation, and a variety of facial expressions and vocal inflections im- 
possible to describe. "Jealousy, pride, pugnacity, covetousuess, lend 
to the childish countenance a no less characteristic look than do gener- 
osity, obedience, ambition." All these facial expressions and bodily 
movements " appear in greater puritv in the child, who does not dis- 
semble, than they do in later life " (2:825). 

(c) Deliberative hovements. Finally we reach that stage — not neces- 
sarily subsequent to all the others, but partially synchronous with 
them — in which the will rises to its proper place as "master of cere- 
monies," brings into subjection the impulsive and instinctive tendencies 
of which we have spoken, and assumes control of the child's activities. 
To express this truth by saying that the faculty of will has corae into 
being, is misleading, simply because there is no " faculty " of will con- 
sidered as a separate entity. The will is the person considered as active ; 

1 For further remarks on this traisitiou from the meaningless to the significant cry- 
see chap, v., sec. 3. 



VOLITION. HJ 

and, instpad of saying that, with the advent of what we call ideational 
movements, the will is born, and with that of deliberative movements 
it is perfected, it would be more correct to say that these movements 
are the first outward indications that the child is becoming the con- 
scious master of his own activity. 

In order to perform deliberative or voluntary actions in the proper 
sense of the term, it is necessary that the child should have had expe- 
rience of a large number of movements of the involuntary sort. For, 
like the man, he can create nothing ; the most he can do, is to combine 
and separate, to analyze and synthesize the materials that come to his 
hand. Man's greatest achievements consist simply in modifying, chang- 
ing, separating, combining and rearranging familiar material. So the 
child in all his numerous movements accomplishes nothing absolutely 
new; he only uses old movements, varying them it is true, in number- 
less ways, but really adding nothing of his own creation. Therefore 
the exercise of voluntary activity requires memory of involuntary mus- 
cular movements previously executed. For a voluntary movement is 
one which is pictured beforehand in the imagination, or, if the move- 
ment itself be not thus pictured, the endof the movement, at least, must 
be. But in order to represent, we must first present ; or in other words, in 
order to imagine a movement, either in process or in product, that move- 
ment must first have been perceived; and this means that the child 
must have seen it performed by others, and felt it performed by him- 
self — involuntarily — before he could perform it deliberately. So we 
find that deliberative movements are gradually acquired, and supervene 
upon a vast number of impulsive, reflexive and instinctive movements. 
For example, grasping with the hand is at the beginning a pure reflex, 
as we have seen, but gradually, after many repetitions, this move- 
ment is remembered ; actual performance of the movement has led to the 
formation of a mental image of it, as well as a more perfect physiological 
adjustment favoring its performance. So that when desire, in the 
proper sense of the word, takes place, attention is bestowed upon the 
object sought and on the movement involved, and the action is deliber- 
ately performed. So we see that a strictly deliberative movement — an 
action — presupposes desire, attention and memory images. It is there- 
fore not to be expected that we shall find these bona fide actions in 
very young infants. Preyer found no movement ia the first three 
months which could be announced with absolute certainty as a deliber- 
ative movement. Tiedemann saw the first intended holding of objects in 
the fourth month. Another child, at six months, showed a great deal 
of persistent eflfcrt. " He would over and over again seem to be trying 
to solve the problem of the hinge to his nursery door, patiently and 
with rivetted attention opening and shutting the door. Day after day 
saw him at his self-appointed task " (i^). A boy of eleven months, in 
striking a spoon against another object, would suddenly change it to 
the other hand, apparently testing whence the noise proceeded. "When 
fourteen months old, while playing with a tin can, he put the cover on 
and ofl" " not less than seventy-nine times without stopping a moment, 
his attention meantime strained to the utmost " (2). Indeed the child's 
attention seems capable of surprising prolongation in connection with 
muscular movement. A little girl of nineteen months brought out her 
toy blocks to show me. I helped her to build houses with them. De- 
lighted with this play, she showed a surprising persistence ; and when 
I grew tired and wished to stop, she made me keep on longer (*' ). It 
is by means of this incessant activity that the child develops both men- 
tally and physically. 

The ability to inhibit movements, though often difiicult to observe 
with accuracy, seems to me one of the most certain criteria of the pres- 
ence of will. To keep himself from moving is surely more difficult 



62 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

than to move, in a being so constitutionally restless as the average 
child. Children of five months (ii), others of six ( ^ ), and others of seven 
or eight months (^'), have been observed to refrain from reaching for an 
object that was much beyond their reach. The little boy R., when 
threatened with punishment for continued crying, is able to desist. 

The development of desire and attention has perhaps been sufficiently 
indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. Desire, in the proper sense of 
the word, is the primary stage in every volition ; and no volition can 
take place without attention. The child's attention (in spite of some of 
the above examples, which seem to point the other way) is compara- 
tively weak and intermittent. He cannot attend to the unimpressive, 
the stimulus must be strong, must be on the motor side, and must be 
frequently renewed. His attention is very easy to obtain^ but very hard 
to retain. This double fact in his nature renders him capable of educa- 
tion, but at the same time makes his education a gradual process, which 
must consist largely in the formation of right habits in him through 
imitation, to which, as we have seen, he is so excessively prone. M. 
Guyau indeed goes so far as to say that by a judicious use of the child's 
susceptibility to imitative suggestion, we may make of him almost what 
"we please. And this seems indeed not far from the truth, when we 
consider the child's wonderful susceptibility to every passive impres- 
sion, and his no less wonderful predisposition to reproduce it in his own 
untiring activity. 



TEE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 

Reprinted from the American Journal of Psychology, Vol. VI. No, 1. 

The profound psychogenetic significance of the language function, 
not only as an index of mind development, but also as a factor in 
that development, justifies its treatment in a separate chapter. 
Such separate treatment would not otherwise be justifiable, inas- 
much as language does not constitute a new psychic phenomenon, 
or class of phenomena, differing in any essential respect from those 
already treated. It rather partakes of the nature of them all, and 
constitutes a grand product of their conjoint operation. 

In order to the employment of language of any sort,> there must 
be, in the first place, sensation. If sounds are to be intelligently 
uttered, they must first be heard. The child who is born deaf, and 
continues in that condition, does not learn to speak. In the second 
place, language presupposes perception and judgment. The sounds 
must not only be heard, they must be understood. A meaning 
must be attached to them. Otherwise they will never be given 
back by the child as the expression of his thought; i. e., as his 
language. In the third place, it is essential to any advance beyond 
the merest linguistic rudiments, that abstraction and generalization 
take place ; for the communication of thought, in its highest forms, 
cannot take place until there has been attained the comprehension 
of the general as distinguished from the particular, and of the 
abstract as distinguished from the concrete.'-' Finally, passing from 
.the cognitive to the volitional aspect of mind, it is obvious that 
language, in its most essential characteristic — i. e., as expression — 
belongs to the will. Every expression of thought, whether it be 
word or mark or gesture, is the result of an act of will, and as such 
may be classed among movements. 

It is not, therefore, as constituting a new order of facts, different 
from thoughts and feelings and volitions, but rather as illustrating 
the development of these, and entering as a factor in that develop- 
ment, that language receives this separate place. We judge of the 
child's mental development largely by the rapidity of his progress 
towards a skillful manipulation of the instruments of expression. 

•Although our chief attention is occupied here wifh the spoken word, this is by no 
means the only form of language. In its broadest sense, language includes every 
jneans by which thought is communicfl ted; and therefore the gestures of the deaf- 
mute, and the hieroglyphic characters on Egyptian monuments, as well as the written 
manuscript and the printed page, are as really languaare as th'" most eloquent oral 
paragraphs, because they are the expression of someone's thought. As Broca says, 
language is "the faculty of establishing a constant relation between an idea and a 
sign," whatever that sign may be. All thac can be said, therefore, concerning the 
psychological importance of the SDoken word, applies equally, mwtaWs ynutandis, to 
every other means of communication. 

2 On the other hand, thought itself cannot attain to any great degree of generality 
without the aid of language. Thought and language are mutually helpful, aud conduce 
each to the development of the other. 



64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

I.— HEREDITY VS. EDUCATION IN LANGUAGE. 

There is no psychological problem to the solution of which a 
study of the infant mind may be expected to contribute more largely 
than this: What is hereditary, and what is acquired, in the sphere 
of language ? Long before maturity is attained, such an abundance 
of acquired material has been added to ovir original store, and 
through constant repetition, the two have become so transformed, 
modified and assimilated in character, that we are no longer able 
to distinguish the one from the other. But from the beginning it 
was not so. If a child executes a gesture, or utters a sound, at an 
age so early as to exclude the possibility of imitation or sponta- 
neous invention on his part, we may conclude that the sound or the 
gesture — or, at least the disposition to express himself in this 
manner — has been born with him. Here only, then, are we able to 
apply the logical meihod of difference to the solution of the prob- 
lem. 

It is obvious, at a glance, that speech is a product of the conjoint 
operation of these two factors: heredity and education. If, on the 
one hand, we observe the initial babbling of the infant, and notice 
its marvelous flexibility, and the enormous variety of its intona- 
tions and inflections — and this at an age so early as to preclude 
observation and imitation of others, — it will be apparent that the 
child has come into the world already possessing a considerable 
portion of the equipment by which he shall in after years give 
expression to his feelings and thoughts. If, on the other hand, we 
carefully observe him during the first two years of his life, and note 
how the intonations, and afterwards the words, of those oy whom 
he is surrounded, are given back by him — at first unconsciously, 
but afterwards with intention — and how, when conscious imitation 
has once set in, it plays thenceforth the preponderating role, — we 
shall readily believe that, without this second factor, but little 
progress wovdd be made towards speech- acquirement. 

It may be well to consider briefly how these two factors enter at 
every point in the development of language. For example, in order 
to speak, the child must possess first of all a sensory and motor 
physiological apparatus. This physiological apparatus, including 
the auditory structure for the reception of sounds, the inter-central 
and centro- motor cells and nerve tracts for the accomplishment of 
connection between the impression and the expression, and the 
organs of vocal utterance (larynx, palate, tongue, lips, teeth), is 
his inheritance from the past, out in the new-born child it is 
all imperfect, both in structure and in functioning ; and its 
development requires the constant moulding influence of those 
educating agencies by which the human being is surrounded from 
the moment of his entrance into the world. 

Again, the disposition to utter sounds of all sorts, and to express 
states of feehng by them, is undoubtedly inherited, since, from the 
very beginning of life, and quite independently of all example, the 
child constantly exercises his vocal organs. ^ But in spite of this, 
so inadequate is heredity alone, that the child will not learn the 
language of his parents, unless he be in the society of those who 
employ it. If brought up among savages, he will speak their 
language; if among wolves, he will howl.^ 

'"Le langage est en nous une faculty si naturelle, que dSs la premiere enfance, 
Texercer est un besoin et un plaisir."— ^Bgrgier. 

2 "It is found that young birds never have the song peculiar to their species, if they 
have not heard it; whereas, they acquire very easily the song of almost any other bird 
with which they are associated."— ^ //red Rilssell Wallace, Natural Selection. 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 65 

In making this statement, we do not overlook those remarkable 
cases in which children have invented a language of their own, 
quite different from that spoken around themj and persisted for 
some time in using the former and entirely ignoring the latter. 
Mr. Horatio Hale gives an account of five different cases in which 
this has occurred, two in the United States and three in Canada. 
In one case this invented vocabulary consisted of twenty-one root- 
forms, out of which, by combination and modification, the children 
developed a complete langiTage, by which, with the aid of gesture, 
all their wants could be communicated; and in all the cases the 
invented language was suflBcient for all intercourse as between the 
children themselves; and was persistently used until the children 
were finally broken of it, by being separated or sent to school (se ). 
In all these cases, it is to be observed, the child did not learn the 
language of his parents in the absence of those who employed it. 
It is also to be noted that the new language was invented, not by 
one child, but by two. Language is possible in all normal children; 
it becomes actual only in the presence of a companion. But given 
the companion, and scarcely any limit can be set to the possibilities 
of development. Indeed, Mr. Hale has given us a theory of 
language, in which the origin of linguistic stocks is attributed to 
the inventiveness of children who have become separated from 
their tribe when very young; and in the light of such facts as those 
given above, the theory seems highly probable. On the other hand, 
that the child shall speak any specific tongue now existing, depends 
on his education. He does not inherit any particular tongue or 
dialect. Some think he will acquire his mother- tongue with greater 
facility than any other (^^ ), yet even this maybe doubted. "Speech 
is hereditary, but not any particular form of speech " ( 3 ). There 
may be an inherited tendency to find certain sounds difficult, such 
as sh to the ancient Ephraimite, or th to the modern Frenchman, 
but this is only a tendency, and does not prevent the child from 
learning any language perfectly, if his education begins early 
enough. 

Again, the careful study of the language of signs makes it quite 
clear that many gestures are inherited (e. g., holding out the 
hands to express desire, which is world-wide, and is executed 
by children who have never seen it done), but the development 
of gesture into anything like a complicated system of expression, 
is quite dependent on the social environment. Of course this 
is only another way of saying that language, being the instrument 
for the communication of thought, is not developed in the absence 
of beings to whom thought can be communicated. 

Thus, then, the case seems to stand with regard to the respective 
spheres of heredity and education in the production of language. 
As regards the child's present endowment and capabilities at the 
moment of his entrance into the world, "he is the product, the 
result of the generations which have preceded him; he is the visible 
link which connects the past with the future " (^ ); but with regard 
to that which he is to be, and the legacy which he in his turn shall 
transmit to those who shall succeed him, he is very largely depend- 
ent on his physical and social environment; and all those who 
compose that environment, assist, whether they will or no, in his 
education.' 



'"La m6re, au reste, ou la nourrice, ne sont ici que des institutriees en chef; car tous 
eeux qui entourent Tenf ant au berceau qui cocversent en sa presence, participent, sans 
s'en douter, beetle Education fondamentoJe" ( 9»:S2). 
5 



66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD, 

n. — THE PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 

If the question were asked, " Why does not the new-born child 
talk? " two answers might be given. In the first place, there is a 
psychological reason, viz., he has, as yet, no ideas, and has, there- 
fore, nothing to say C^). In the second place, there is a physio- 
logical reason, viz., his speech- apparatus is as yet so imperfectly 
developed that he could not express ideas if he had them. 

In the same way, if the question were asked. Why does any 
person ever lose the power of speech ? similar answers might be 
given. He either loses his ideas, through some mental disorder, or 
he loses the power of expression through some physiological dis- 
order. The two cases are, moreover, parallel in another sense, 
inasmuch as the acquirement of ideas in the one case, and their 
failure in the other, are closely associated with, if not indeed quite 
dependent upon, the presence or absence of the physiological 
functions. 

The physiological reason, then, why the child does not yet speak, 
lies in the undeveloped state of the speech-apparatus. " The lungs 
are not yet developed in a degree and manner sufficient for articu- 
late speech. The expiration needs to be strong, and exactly 
regulated. Now, in the infant, the pectoral muscles are still 
developed in a very small degree; the breathing is accomplished 
much more through the fall of the diaphragm than through the 
active extension of the pectoral cavity. Hence, breathing move- 
ments are more superficial and more irregular than in later years. 
Artificial speech requires complete control of the breathing 
mechanism, which the child has not yet got. To his speech-instru- 
ment is still wanting a large number of strings, whistles and 
registers. The organs of speech are the lungs, air tubes, larynx 
and vocal cords, the mouth, with tongue, palate, lips and teeth. 
The lungs create the stream of air; the tone and voice are formed 
by the larynx; according as the vocal cords open wider or come 
nearer, arises the deeper or higher tone. The form of the tone (i. e., 
vowel a or o, etc., consonant b or /, etc.) depends on the form of 
the mouth at the time. Now the larynx is still very small and 
undeveloped in its form, and so with the tongue, the lips, and the 
muscles moving them; and as for the teeth, they are still entirely 
wanting" ( 27). The undeveloped condition of the auditory appara- 
tus, and of the brain, have also to be considered in this connection. 

On the other hand, it needs to be borne in mind that the relation 
between the organs of speech and speech itself is a reciprocal one. 
If speech depends on the organs, it is also true that the organs 
depend on speech, and are not developed, except by exercise. As 
one learns to play on the harp by playing on the harp, so the child 
learns to speak by speaking. The exercise of the vocal organs 
develops those organs, so that they become capable of higher 
exercise. 

The lungs first appear, early in the embryonic stage, as a single 
median diverticulum from the ventral wall of the oesophagus, which 
soon becomes dilated towards the two sides in the form of primi- 
tive protrusions or tubercules, while the root, communicating with 
the oesophagus, remains single. The foetal lungs contain no air, 
and lie, packed in a comparatively small compass, at the back of 
the thorax. They undergo very rapid and remarkable changes 
after birth, in consequence of the commencement of respiration. 
They expand so as to completely cover the plevu'al portions of the 
pericardium, their margins become more obtuse, and their whole 
form less compressed. The entrance of the air changes their 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 67 

texture so that it becomes more loose, light and spongy, and less 
granular; while the great quantity of blood, which, from this time 
on, circulates through them, greatly increases their weight, and 
changes their color. The proportion of their weight to that of the 
body becomes nearly twice as great as before, while, at the same 
time, their specific gravity, after the beginning of respiration, be- 
comes very much less ( s^ss? ). 

The trachea, or windpipe, which connects the lungs with the 
larynx, is in the embryo almost closed, its anterior and posterior 
walls being very near each other. The small space remaining is 
filled with mucus. With the exercise of respiration, the mucus is 
expelled, and the tube itself gi-adually becomes more distended, 
but its anterior wall does not for some time become convex. With 
the growth of the child, the cartilages which form the " ribs " of 
the trachea, become stronger and better able to bear their part in 
the forcible expiration of air which is required for speech ( 8:508 ), 

The larynx, which is the organ most directly concerned in the 
production of "voice " or "tone," is an exceedingly complicated 
mechanism, consisting of a framework of cartilages comprising no 
less than nine distinct parts, connected by elastic membranes or 
ligaments, two of which, from their specially prominent position, 
are named the true vocal cords. In speaking and singing, these 
cartilages are moved relatively to one another by the laryngeal 
muscles. The larynx is situated at the upper end of the trachea, 
the mucus lining of the two organs being continuous. At the time 
of birth, this organ is very small and narrow, and continues com- 
paratively insignificant up to the period of adolescence, when rapid 
and remarkable changes take place, especially in the case of the 
male, where it becomes much more prominent, and the pomum 
adami protrudes so to be perceptible at the throat ( 8: 522 ), 

The tongue is composed very largely of muscular fibres, running 
in various directions, such as the superior and inferior lingual 
muscles, which move the organ up and down, and the transverse 
fibres, by which it is moved from side to side. Besides these, we 
have the various glossal muscles, which, though extrinsic to the 
tongue itself, yet are implicated in its operations. These muscles 
are all more or less flabby in the foetus and the new-born, and 
become strong only by nutrition and exercise. A similar remark 
applies to the lips; while the teeth, without which the dental and 
labio-dental consonants can never be properly pronounced, are at 
the beginning of life entirely absent, though the first steps toward 
their formation take place as early as the seventh week of the 
period of gestation ( s: 555 ), 

The brain of the foetus is comparatively deficient in convolutions, 
and presents a smooth, even appearance. The first of the primary 
fissures to appear is the fissure of Sylvius, which is visible during 
the third month. The other primitive sulci also begin to appear 
about this time, and by the end of the fifth month are well estab- 
lished. The secondary sulci make their appearance from the fifth 
or sixth month on. The first of these to be seen is the fissure of 
Rolando. " By the end of the seventh month, nearly all the chief 
features of the cerebral convolutions and sulci have appeared. 
The last fissures to appear are the inferior occipito-temporal, and a 
small fvirrow crossing the end of the calloso- marginal " ( ^-^^^ ). But 
long after the extra-uterine life begins, the child-brain is still 
deficient in many of the higher processes, the association fibres 
being the last to develop. The convolutions are for a long time 
comparatively simple, and their increasing complexity as life 



i^ THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

advances stands to the exercise of the various faculties, partly in 
the relation of antecedent, and partly in that of consequent. 

Speech, then, in the little child is a potentiality, though not an 
actuaUty. He is, as it were, in possession of the machine, but the 
belts have not yet been adjusted to the pulleys, nor has he yet 
learned to handle the instrument. The inability to speak is not, 
therefore, an abnormal state at the beginning of life, any more than 
the inability to write or swim or play the piano (^- ^). It is merely 
an imperfect state. But the inability to learn to speak is abnormal, 
and its cause must be sought, not in immaturity, but in abnor- 
mality, of the physiological or psychological structures and 
processes involved. The one is an unnatural condition, into which 
the child has fallen; the other a natural condition, out of which he 
will gradually rise. 

III. — PHONETIC AND PSYCHIC DEVELOPMENT. 

We shall here, first of all, give a sort of outhne history of the 
speech-progress of the average child during the first two years, 
generalizing from a large number of actual observations (made by 
different persons on different children) and proceeding by periods 
of six months each; then we shall give summarized statements of 
a number of child -vocabularies that have been carefully compiled 
at different ages; and finally, we shall examine what general con- 
clusions may be drawn from the material at hand, and set down as 
empirical laws, awaiting further substantiation. I say " empirical 
laws," because children differ so much from each other, andrehable 
observations are so comparatively scanty that, for the present, 
general statements must be held in abeyance, or made only tenta- 
tively. 

First Six Months. — "In Thuringia," says Sigismund, "they call the 
first three months ' das dumme Vierteljahr,' " and during the second 
three months, according to Schultze, no advance is made on the first. 
It might seem, then, that in this first half-year there is nothing 
worthy of our attention in the matter of language. This, however, 
is very far from being the case, for in this period a most important 
apprenticeship is going on. The little child^ even in the cradle, 
and before he is able to raise himself to a sitting posture, is receiv- 
ing impression every waking moment from the environment; is 
hearing the words, seeing the gestures, and noting — in a manner 
perhaps not purely involuntary — the intonations of those around 
him; and out of this material, he afterwards builds up his own 
vocabulary. Not only so, but dvu-ing this period, that peculiarly 
charming infantile babble (which Ploss calls " das Lallen ") begins, 
which, though only an "awkward twittering" (^), yet contains in 
rudimentary form nearly all the sounds which afterwards, by 
combination, yield the potent instrument of speech. A wonderful 
variety of sounds, some of which afterwards give the child difficulty 
when he tries to produce them, are now produced automatically, by 
a purely impulsive exercise of the vocal muscles; in the same way as 
the child at this age performs automatically many eye-movements, 
which afterwards become difficult, or even impossible (*2). M. 
Taine thinks that " all shades of emotion, wonder, joy, willfulness 
and sadness " are at this time expressed by differences of tone, 
equaling or even surpassing the adult (*''). 

The child's first act is to cry.i This cry has been variously inter- 

*''8obald das Kind zur Welt geboren ist, fangt es an gellend zu schreien" ( 1 ). "The 
child is born into the world ! He enters it struRgling ; a scream is his first utterance" 

(67). 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 69 

preted. Semmig calls it " the triumphant song of everlasting life," 
and describes it as "heavenly music" (himmlische Musik); Kant 
said it was a cry of wrath, and others have spoken of it as a 
sorrowful wail on entering this world of sin; or as a foreboding of 
the pains and sorrows of life. It seems more scientific, though less 
poetic, to accept the explanation of the "unembarrassed naturaUst," 
who sees in it nothing more nor less than the expression of the 
painfulness of the first breathing — the rush of cold air upon the 
lungs ( 1 ). 

A more important point is the relation of this first vocal utter- 
ance to the speech that is to follow. The cry at first is merely an 
automatic or refiex "squall," without expressive modulation or 
distinctive timbre; the same cry serves to express all sorts of feel- 
ings. But very soon it becomes differentiated and assumes various 
shadings to express various mental states. This differentiation 
begins at different times in different children. A girl only fifteen 
days old expressed her desire to be fed by a particular sort of cry 
(6 ). In another case, the cry had ceased to be a mere squall by 
the end of the first month ( i ). In another, the feelings of hunger, 
cold, pain, joy and desire were expressed by different sounds 
before the end of the fifth week ( ^s ). Others report the transition 
from the " cry " to the " voice " ( ^ ), involving cooperation of the 
mouth and tongue, at different times, but all within the first three 
months ( "). 

These cries are variously described. According to one, " the cry 
of pain is generally longer continued than the cry of fear" (^). 
Another speaks of the cry of fear as " short and explosive," while 
hunger is expressed by a long drawn out wail (M). Another child 
at two months expressed pleasure and pain by different forms of 
the vowel a. Sigismund's boy, in his sixth month, expressed 
pleasvire by a peculiar crowing shout, accompanied by kicking and 
prancing. 

The next step is taken when these cries and babblings assume an 
articulate character. The alphabetic sounds begin to be heard. 
Of these, the vowels usually precede the consonants; and of the 
vowels, a with its various shadings is generally the first to appear.^ 
In one case the following series was developed: a-a-u i"^). In 
another, the sound of a-a, as an expression of joy, was heard in 
the tenth week ( s ). According to Lobische, the vowels developed 
in this order: a-e-o-u-i ( ^i ). One child began with a, and then 
proceeded to ai-d-au-d,^ while the pure sound of o was late in 
appearing. In another case all the vowels were heard in the first 
five months, a being the most frequently employed; and in another, 
the primitive a (of which the child's first cries largely consisted) 
became differentiated into the various vowel- sounds during the 

'It is nece'^-i'vry at this p->inr. to adopt a system of diacritical marks, a-* in all that 
follows th'> child's pronunciation is of srreatitnp'irtanee. We shall, therefore, adopt 
the following system, ani shall take the liberty of changing, -vrherever necessary, the 
spellmg of the recorded observations, for the sake of uniformity: 

a. as m cnlm. e ^^ ee as in eat, feet, etc. oo as in food. 

a as in fat. i as in pit. oo as in foot. 

a as in fate. l as in ice. u as in up. 

d as in aiul. o as in jMjt. u as in use. 

a (German a umlaut). o as in o'rf. it (German u umlaut). 

e as in ptt. 6 (German o umlaut). 

Some changes will al.so be made in the use of the consonants. For example, such 
words as comer, chorus, coffee, etc., will be spelled with a fc; w^rds like cigar, center, 
cellar, etc., with an s\ and in such words as r^-ite the silent w will be omitted. Other 
ohaoges will be indicated as they are made. 



70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

first month (i^). Preyer reports the use of the vowel-sounds in 
the following order : ud-ao-ai-uao-d o a-d a a-o a o-u-e-d-i-u; and 
Sigismund in the following : a-d-u-ei-o-i-'6-u-du-au. 

Long before the sixth month, the primitive vowels are corabined 
with one another (as we see) and with consonants, to produce the 
the first syllabic utterances. These first syllables are, for the most 
part, mechanical. In a great many of the cases under consid- 
eration, the first consonants to make their appearance are the 
labials, b-p-m, and these are almost always initial at first, and not 
final. The easy consonant m, combined in this way with the easy 
vowel a, yields the familiar combination ma, which, by spontaneous 
reduplication, becomes mama. In a similar manner, papa, baba 
(afterwards baby) and the hke, are constructed. The labials are 
not always, however, the first consonantal sounds uttered. Some- 
times the gutturals (g or k) precede them; and the two consonants 
which are usually the last to appear (viz., r and I) are used by 
some children quite early. In the case of the boy A., the first 
sounds were guttural, gg, though the earliest combination was 
m,am-mam, used in crying. At five months " he dropped the 
throat- sounds almost entirely, and began the shrill enunciation of 
vowels;" and at six months he lowered his voice and began to use 
lip-sounds, simultaneously with the cutting of his first teeth. In 
another case, m appeared as the first consonant in the second 
month and was followed by b-d-n-r, occasionally g and h, and very 
rarely fc; the first syllables were pa-ma-ta-na (^). Lobische 
observed the consonants in this order : m-(w)-b-p-d-t-l-n-s-r; 
Sigismund in this : b-m-n-d-s-g-w-f-ch-k-l-r-sch; and Dr. Brown 
in this : b-p-f-r-m-g-k-h-t-d-l-n (i^). In some cases nearly all 
syllables have been correctly pronounced during the first half-year 
( 3 ) ; while in others progress is much slower, very few syllables 
being certainly mastered before the ninth month {^^). 

We may sometimes observe here also the beginnings of vocal 
imitation. The boy A. was observed to "watch attentively the 
lip-movements of his attendants;" and other observers have 
remarked, from about the fourth month, " a curious mimicry of 
conversation, imitating especially the cadences, so that persons in 
the adjoining room would think conversation was going on" ( * ). 
The same thing was observed in A. a little later. 

/Second Six Months. — Most children make a very marked advance 
during this period in the imitation of sounds, in the intentional use 
of sounds with a meaning, and in the comprehension of the mean- 
ings of words and gestures. The actual vocabulary of most children 
at this age is, however, exceedingly small. Many children, a year 
old, cannot speak a single word, while the average vocabulary does 
not probably exceed half a dozen words. 

A new advance accompanies the rise of active hearing, and the 
increasing power of attention in the third three months. The child 
begins to keep a sort of time to music, in which he shows pleasure, 
and this strong excitement stimulates the production of new sounds 
( 27 ). He delights in being carried about with a galloping rhythmic 
motion, and will smack his lips and make other sounds in imitation 
of chirping to a horse (M). He pats his hands together in imita- 
tion of the accompanying motions in a nursery rhyme, and some- 
times makes an attempt to say the words also. He shows a fondness 
for ringing the changes on certain syllables which he has learned, 
varying and reduplicating : e. g., mama, baba, gaga, nana, etc., and 
other less intelligible combinations. 

He understands many words which he cannot pronounce, and he 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 71 

Sronounces some in a mechanical way without understanding. 
;e knows each member of the household by name, and will reach 
a biscuit to the person named to him. He knows the principal 
parts of his own body, and will point to them when asked (M) ( » ). 
The words papa and mama, whose surprising universality may be 
partly accounted for by the physiological law of ease (the sound 
most easily produced and, therefore, earliest used, being naturally 
associated with those persons whose presence arouses the earliest 
and most vivid emotions and ideas), are by many children at this 
time intelligently used, though some are later in this. 

Imitation usually makes rapid strides in this period. In one case 
gestures were imitated at eight months, and words at nine. If 
someone is being called, the child also calls loudly. In another 
case, towards the end of the child's first year, he began to imitate 
the sounds made by animals and inanimate objects ( ^ ). Sigismund 
observed the instinct of imitation showing itself in the third quarter 
of the first year; the reduplication of syllables composed of a labial 
or dental consonant and the vowel a; and the more frequent 
occurrence of syllables in which the vowel is initial. Champney's 
child distinctly imitated the intonation of the voice when any word 
or sentence was repeated to him several times. This has been 
observed also in other cases (m). 

Children who are able to use a few words at this age, show by 
their use of them how inadequately defined is their meaning. A 
little girl, who had learned to say S gel (all gone) and ga ga 
(gegangen), applied the latter term to herself when falling down 
(M). Humphreys says the child he observed was able, at this time, 
to name many things correctly, and to pronounce all initial conso- 
nants distinctly, except th-t-d-v and I. Some final consonants were 
indistinct. Another child, at eleven months, knew what guten tag 
meant, and responded witn tata; he also answered adieu with adaa. 
In this case, the first association of a sound with a concept was ee, 
which meant wet ( s ). A boy of ten months used intelligently the 
words mama, Aggie (Maggie, this afterwards became Waggie) and 
addie (auntie). At eleven months, WaggievjSiH shortened to Wag, and 
addie to att (A). Another at seven months used to wave his hand 
and say tata at parting; and one day he did this when a closet door 
was opened and shut again (^). Taine's little girl at twelve 
months, on learning the word bebe, as connected with the picture 
of the infant Jesus, afterwards extended it, curiously enough, not 
to all babies, but to all pictures. Occasionally a word is invented, 
such as the word mum, reported by Mr. Darwin, which the chila 
used with an interrogatory sound when asking for food, but also 
" as a substantive of wide signification." I observed a similar 
general use of da, in the case of F. In another case, the word 60 
was used to signify anything that pleased the child. The words 
maina, papa and hahe, which had been used for some time mechanic- 
ally, were dropped about the middle of this period, to be resumed 
five months later, " when they were applied to their proper 
objects" (^^). Sully observed in the beginning of this period 
(which he calls the la la period) the rise of spontaneous articula- 
tion. Combinations of syllables were suddenly hit upon, and 
repeated without any meaning, except as indications of baby feeling. 
Long a indicated surprise, and " a kind of o, formed by sucking in 
the breath, indicated pleasure at some new object" (^). In one 
case, a little sentence — which really consisted of two words — was 

uttered by a child at the close of this period. He said: " Papa 

mama," which meant: " Papa, take me to mama " ( «=26i ). 



72 THE PSYCHOLOaY OF CHILDHOOD. 

The wide differences among children make it unsafe to venture 
any generalizations, except one, viz., this second half-year seems to 
be par excellence the period of the rise of imitation. Some children, 
however, are as far advanced at the beginning of this period as 
others are at its end. Perhaps it ought also to be remarked that 
the child who shows a great precocity in imitation, or in learning 
to speak, will not necessarily, on that account, turn out a more 
intelligent child. Imitation does not require a very high degree of 
mental acuteness, and the child who has been slow in this may 
in the end surpass his more precocious companion. 

Third Six Months. — While the child is learning to walk, there is 
very often a standstill, or even a retrograde movement in the 
matter of speech. After walking is mastered, the acquisition of 
language goes forward again with greater facility than ever. 

During this third period, marked progress is usually made in the 
understanding of words, and in their intelligent application, though 
the vocabulary is still very limited, and the pronunciation imper- 
fect. DiflBcult sounds are omitted, or replaced by easier ones. 
Sometimes the change in one consonant has an influence on 
another which precedes or follows it. In longer words and combi- 
nations, only the prominent part — the accented syllable, or the 
final sound— is reproduced. A final ie is often added to words. 
The child says dinnie for dinner, ninnie for drink, and beddy for 
bread. Other imperfect pronunciations are : apy tee (apple tree), 
piccy book (picture book), gamy or nannie (grandma), pee (please), 
pepe (pencil), mo-a (more), ho or ha (horse), Balbert (Gilbert), Tot 
(Topf), Ka-ka (Carrie), and Kakie (Katy). 

Most children at this age understand a great deal of what is said 
to them. Such phrases as "bring the ball;" "come on papa's 
knee;" "go down;" "come here;" "give me a kiss," are perfectly 
understood and obeyed. Parts of the child's body, as eyes, nose, 
ear, other ear, hand, etc., other person's eyes, ears, etc., are pointed 
to when named. Articles are fetched, carried ana put where one 
commands (A), (F), (W). 

Some children begin, towards the end of this period, to express 
themselves in short sentences, which are usually elliptical, or, as 
Romanes says, "sentence-words," only the most prominent word 
or words in the sentence being pronounced. E. g., ta (thank you), 
nee (take me on your knee) {^); del off; detup; where cows George? 
(where are Uncle George's cows ?) ( M); mo-a, mama (give me more, 
mama); dao (take me down from my chair) ( ^ ). Many combinations 
of words are made, which fall short of the dignity of sentences. 
E. g., mama dess, ding-a-ling, etc. A boy of eighteen months 
" knows the last words of many of Mother Goose melodies, as 
moon O; place O; bare, bare, bare; putting them in at the right 
time, enthusiastically" (^s). 

Some words are invented by the child. E. g., the word tem, which 
Taine's little girl spontaneously used as a sort of general demon- 
strative, " a sympathetic articulation, that she herself has found in 
harmony with all fixed and distinct intention, and which conse- 
quently is associated with her principal fixed and distinct intentions, 
which at present are desires to take, to have, to make others take, 
to look, to make others look " C*^). The same child invented the 
word ham to signify " something to eat," just as Darwin's boy used 
mum for the same purpose. 

The love of reduplication shows itself very distinctly now, as 
indeed it has almost from the beginning; no doubt for the physio- 
logical reason that it is easier for the vocal organs to execute a 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 73 

movement over again, to which they are adjusted, and which they 
have performed once, than to adjust themselves to a new move- 
ment. Very probably the love of repetition and "jingle" which is so 
noticeable in children (and which, as Sigismund says, lies at the 
foundation of rhyme), also enters as a factor here. Numerous 
examples of the onomatopoetic naming of animals and things may 
also be observed at this time, though many of these are, no doubt, 
imitated from grown-up people. One or both of these tendencies 
may be observed in such expressions as the following : dada, 
mama, papa, wawa (water), wah wah or oua oua or bow wow (dog), 
es es (yes), nl nl (nice), ko ko (chicken), puff (wind), quack quack 
(duck), gotloh or lululu (all rolling objects), bopoo (bottle), too too 
(cars), tuppa tuppa tee (potato), etc. The child imitates (often 
spontaneously) the sounds made by the dog, cat, sheep, ticking of 
clock, etc., while many sounds are reduplicated. The opposite 
process, a spontaneous curtailing of certain words, may be some- 
times noticed. In one case a boy of fifteen months contracted 
papa, mama and addie into pa, ma and att respectively, having 
never heard any of these latter words (A). 

Imitation is now very strong. The child attempts to repeat 
everything he hears ; but some sounds give him diflBiculty , and the 
shifts to which he resorts in such cases are of very great interest. 
The boy R. used to say nana for thank you, and dit taut for get caught 
(in play); but the phrase excuse me was too much for him; he 
therefore used oho in its place, with a rising inflection on the second 
syllable. Singing is often imitated better than speech. A boy of 
fourteen months " gave back a little song, in the right key" (^-^^o); 
and another, in the sixteenth month, knew some simple little 
hymns ( ^^ ). 

But perhaps the most interesting thing of all at this time is the 
gradual " clearing " of the childish concepts, as indicated by the 
steady circumscription of the application of names. Even yet, 
however, names are applied much too widely; much more 
experience is necessary before they acquire, in the young mind, a 
clear and definite connotation. ( Even in mature life, most of our 
concepts are still very hazy and ill- defined; and it might be allow- 
able to describe the whole process of intellectual education as a 
process of the clarification of the concept.) It is interesting, also, 
to note how the principle of association enters as a factor in the 
determination of the application of the name. When a child calls 
the moon a lamp, or applies his word bo (ball) to oranges, bubbles, 
and other round objects; calls everything bow wow which bears any 
sort of resemblance to a dog ( ^) (includingthe bronze dogs on the 
staircase, and the goat in the yard) (^7); applies his words papa 
and mama to all men and all women respectively; makes his word 
cfitie do duty, not only for knife, but also for scissors, shears, sickle, 
etc. _(®^); says bd (bath) on seeing a crust dipped in tea (^)', 
appUes ati (assis) to chair, footstool, bench, sitting down, sit down, 
etc. (^); peudu (perdu) or atta (gone or lost) to all sorts of dis- 
appearances; — it is evident that one great striking resemblance has 
overshadowed all differences in the objects. Another child, who 
had learned the word ot as a name for objects that were too warm, 
extended it to include, also, objects that were too cold (association 
by contrast). Later, on looking at a picture, he pointed to the 
representation of clouds and said ot. The clouds reminded him, 
no doubt, of the steam from the tea-kettle ( ^ ). This aptitude for 
seizing analogies, which Taine believes to be the source of general 
ideas and of language, has numerous illustrations, not only in the 



74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

language of the child just learning to speak, but also in the use of 
words by uncivilized or semi- civilized peoples, i 

Fourth Six Months. — Dirring the latter half of the second year 
linguistic progress is usually so rapid as to render a detailed 
account impossible. We can only call attention, with examples, to 
some of the most striking features. 

"By the end of the second year," says Schultze, "the normal 
child can make himself understood in a short sentence." His own 
child was able, at nineteen months, to use sentences containing 
subject, predicate and object. In another case, quite a complicated 
sentence (but very elliptical, only the nouns being uttered), was 
heard in the twentieth month ( :"^ ). In the case of A., a genuine 
sorrow was the occasion of his first sentence. His father, of whom 
he was very fond, had been playing with him for some time, and 
finally, being called away, put him down and went out, closing the 
door behind him. The child gazed for a moment at the closed 
door, and then, throwing himself on the floor, cried out, / want my 
papa. Before this, he used to express himself chiefly in elliptical 
sentences and sentence -words. When slightly over two years of 
age, he used to weave little stories of his own; e. g., mama fa wite 
dovmy toppy houf. One day, while the dinner was waiting for his 
father, who was expected home on the train, the child said: Toot- 
toot corny wite up tair, iny doh, uppy tdpool; toot-toot m,ake big noise. 
Another of his sentences was: Take a badie bidy to; badie tiehd, 
feepy. The boy C. uttered his first sentence in the twenty-first 
month: Pees mama. Two months earlier he had used sentence- 
words; e.g., papa cacker (papa has fire- crackers j. In the twenty- 
fourth month he told quite an extensive story, in which the verbs 
were not expressed. Even compound sentences, and sentences 
containing subordinate clauses, are often mastered before the close 
of this period {^) ( ^' ). Sometimes verbal inflections appear; e. g., 
naughty baby kllde C cried) (^). Another day the same child said 
corned for came, thus unconsciously rebuking the inconsistent 
English language. Interrogative sentences appeared in another 
case; e. g., whereas pussy? and negation was expressed by an 
affirmative sentence, with an emphatic no tacked on at the end, 
exactly as the deaf-mutes do. Many of these primitive sentences 
are in the imperative mood, and many are still " sentence-words." 
Most children talk a great deal, and gesticulate profusely, at this 
time. Their expressions are concrete, and abstract words are 
avoided as far as possible. A little boy, on seeing the picture of a 
half-grown lad, spoke of it as a little baby man (A). Anything that 
has rhyme or rhythm is most easily picked up. A little nephew of 
my own was able, at this age, to sing a large number of Uttle songs 
and hymns, giving the melody quite correctly. Another boy, at 
twenty -one months, on hearing the milkman's bell in the morning, 
used to say: 3Iik man mik cow, crump horn, toss dog, kiss maid alt 
florn; or peeping through the fence at the cows, would sing: Moo 
cow, moo cow, how-de-do cow (^^). 

The child's progress is marked here by his gradual mastery of the 
personal and possessive pronouns. These are peculiarly difficult 
for the average child, and, according to Egger, are not usually 
attained until near the close of the second year; according to 
others, much later still (thirtieth month, according to Lindner). 
Previous to mastering the I, the child calls himself by his proper 
name, or by the name baby, as he may have been taught. When I 

'See Romanes' Mental Evolution in Man, chap. 8. 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 75 

first appears, it is frequently employed, — quite consistently from 
the child's point of view, — not in the first person, but in the second: 
i. e., he calls others land himself you. One child used the word I 
correctly as early as the nineteenth month, but often exchanged 
it for her proper name C^'?). Another, in the twentieth month, 
still called himself by his proper name, but, a month later, said me 
for the first time ( ®* ). Another spoke of me as a personality in her 
twenty-second month ( ^^). Another, at two years, often used the 
word my, meaning your; e.g., let me get up on my lap (^). 
Another, at the same age, still speaks of himself as baby in ordinary 
converse, but in great desire says, I want it, and in great fear says, 
/ afraid. 

In some cases, almost all the sounds are mastered by the end of 
the second year, but from the obervations at hand, this may be 
considered the exception. Most children still have diflBculty with 
certain sounds. Some of these difficulties are seen in the follow- 
ing: apoo (apple), zhatis (there it is), es (yes), yleg (egg; note diffi- 
culty with initial vowel), oken (open), task (mustache), sh'ad 
(thread), dam (gum). Pal (shawl), uppervator (elevator), nobelUx, 
(umbrella), bannicars (banisters), aw yi (all right), setto (cellar), 
pato (potato), it da (sit there). One observer reports a special diffi- 
culty with s,z, d, g k, I, n, g, r and t (^o). Another says that at 
nineteen months, the sounds s, sh, ch andj were generally indistinct; 
while w, V and/ were formed, but not well developed. On the other 
hand nasal g appeared, o was mastered, I, p and t as final conso- 
nants began to be used, and k became a favorite sound, used in many 
words. Sibilants were more at command when final than when 
initial, while short a was just beginning to be formed. In the 
twenty- second month the sounds of ch, j and th were still imper- 
fect, the hard sound of th being replacea by s and the soft sound by 
2, A month later, r was still generally replaced by I; when s came 
before another consonant, one or the other was dropped, and k was 
sometimes confused with p ort (26;. In another case, the double 
consonant sp made its fio'st appearance at the end of the second 
year (1). 

There are still many examples of the inadequate limitation of the 
concept. In one case the word poor, which was learned as an ex- 
pression of pity, was applied on occasion of any sort of loss or 
damage whatsoever, and was even used in speaking of a crooked 
pin. Dam (gum), with which toys were mended, became a univer- 
sal remedy for all things broken or disabled; and afterwards, when 
the child acquired the word sh^ad (thread), broken things were 
divided into two classes, viz., those that were to be mended with 
dam,, and those that were to be mended with sh^ad (26). Behwys, in 
another case, was at first the name for all small fruits, but after- 
wards became restricted, yielding a portion of its territory to gape 
(grape) (A). Another little boy extended his word gee-gee (horse) 
to a drawing of an ostrich, and a bronze figure of a stork; and his 
word apoo (apple) to a patch of reddish-brown color on the mantel- 
piece (^), (69:43). The boy C. applied the word boke (broke) to a torn 
pocket-handkerchief; and R. extended his word do (door) to every- 
thing that stopped up an opening or prevented an exit, including 
the cork of a bottle, and the little table that fastened him in hia 
high chair. 

Healthy children of two years ot age will usually attempt all sorts 
of sounds in imitation of others, and will practice on new and diffi- 
cult combinations with great perseverance, sometimes carrying the 
word through several stages of transition, until it finally assumes. 



76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

the perfect form. The boy A. first heard the word pussy when 
seventeen months old; he at once undertook to say it, but called it 
at fijst pooheh, then poqfle, then poopoohie, then poofee, until finally, 
after much persevering practice, he was able to say pussy, when 
he seemed to be satisfied, and discontinued its use, except when 
pussy was in sight. Schultze gives, among others, the following ex- 
amples: The German word wasser passed through these stages, — 
wawaff—fafaff—waffwaff-^wasse — wasser; the word grosmama was 
first omama, and then dosmama, before assuming its final form. 
The strength of the reduplicating tendency, and the influence of 
the initial consonant on the remainder of the word, is seen in the 
following imitations: wawa (Mary), dudu (Julia), ih ih (little), ba ba 
(blanket), fafa (faster), mama (master), papa (pasture), nana 
(naughty) (*2).i 

I have taken the trouble to collect, for purposes of comparison, 
a number of vocabularies of children, which have been recorded by 
careful and competent observers, with as much completeness and 
accuracy as possible. I will now give these in summarized form, so 
as to show the relative frequency of the various sounds as initial, 
and also the relative frequency of the various parts of speech. In 
order the more accurately to show the sounds actually made by the 
child, I have been obliged to use an alphabet differing somewhat 
from the ordinary English alphabet. The following changes are 
made: c is dropped out altogether, such words as corner, candy, 
etc., being classed under k; words like centre, cigar, etc., under s; 
and words like cJutin, cheese, chair, etc., forming a new series under 
ch. Words like George, gentleman, etc., are classed under J instead 
of G; words like Philip under F; words like knife, knee, etc., under n; 
and words like wrap, write, etc., under r. Other new letters besides 
ch are sh and th. In short, it is sought to classify the child's words 
according to his pronunciaton, and not according to the English 
alphabet. If he says tatie for potato, the word is classed under t. 
I am convinced that this is the only way to obtain reliable and 
valuable results. 

I. A child of nine months is reported as speaking " nine words 
plainly." The words are not given ( ^^ ). 

II. A boy at twelve months has " four words of his own " ( ^^ ). 

III. A child of twelve months uses ten words with meaning. Six 
of these are nouns, two adjectives and two verbs ( ^ ). The initial 
sounds are m (three times), p (four times), n, a and k (each once). 

' I cannot forbear quoting the following from Siglsmund in this connection. A child of 
twenty-one months attempted to repeat, line by line, a piece of poetry after another 
person. Thf first line in each pair represents the pronunciation of the adult, the second 
the imitation of the child: 

Guter Mond. du gehst so stille, 
Tute Bohnrl, du tehz so tinne. 
Diirch die abendwolken hin, 
Puch die aten-honten in. 
Gehst so trauri?, und ich fiihle, 
Teoz so tautech, und ich biiue. 
Dass ich f>hne Ruhe bin, 
Dass ich one Ule bin. 
Guter Mond, du darfst es wissen, 
Tute Bohnd, du atz es bitten. 
Weil du so verschwiegen bist, 
Beia do so bieten bitz. 
Warum meine Thranen flies?en, 
Aniuaa meine tiinen bieten. 
Und mnin Herz so tratirig; ist, 
Und mein Aetz so atich iz (1:144). 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 77 

IV. A child of one year used eight words, seven of which were 
nouns, and one an adverb. The initial sounds are b (four times), m, 
p, d and u (once each) (T). 

V. The boy R. had at command about twenty words, thirteen of 
which were nouns, and four or five interjectional words. For initial 
sound b was perferred, then p and t. 

VI. Another child is reported, at fifteen months, as having 
" syllables, but no words " ( i^ ). 

VII. A girl of seventeen months is reported as using thirty- 
five words, twenty-two of which are nouns, four verbs, two adjec- 
tives, fovir adverbs and three interjections. The initial sounds are 
d (eight times), s (four), m, b and ch (three each), p, t, k, a and y 
(two each), i, j, n, o (one each) (L). 

VIII. A girl of twenty-two months uses twenty-eight words, dis- 
tributed as follows: Nouns sixteen, verbs three, adjectives three, 
adverbs and interjections five. The initial sounds are 5 (six times), 
d (five), m (four), p (three), g, h and fc (two each), e, i, n and o 
(one each) (G). 

IX. A girl at two years employs thirty- six words, distributed 
as follows: Nouns sixteen, adjectives four, pronouns three, verbs 
seven, adverbs three, interjections three (G). Initial sounds are p 
(five times), m, b and w (each four times), g, k and ft. (each three 
times), d, i, n and r (each twice), a and o (each once). 



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O 




•nrxox 


rHrHt-lOt^rHlOT-ICO-^J>-<*H-^COOOlCrHOOCO-*(N-*rHOO-<*< 
rH -"Jt (M (M rH CO ■* rH (N rH CO W >0 <N rH r-i 


rH 
lO 




THBiNI 


CO rH rH rH rH 


t~ 




■fKOO 


rH 


-^ 




•dSHd^ 


rH rH rH tH i-H rH 


CO 




■AQV 


(N rH rH rH (N (N (N (N l-H rH (N (N 


OS 

■r-i 




•HHiaA 


rH 05 t- rH CO ■<* l> tH CO tO lO rH rH ■<}< CO 00 rH TjH (N lO 


OS 
00 




•XOHJ 


■* (N eC rH rH <N 


CO 
rH 




rav 


CC CO rH rH rH rH (N (N i-t y-i i-t r-t (M lO rH C9 rH 


OS 




•ssno^i 


Tf<00t-C0l0CClt'-CDCil'*«>C0i005(?1OT-(OiCit-t-'<J<cqT-lt^ 
C^ t-i r^ r-t CO rH eC rH CC rH 


00 






<JMoQWfeOMwH,M,qg^OaHC?tfaDMHHP>^N 


'3 








TVIOX 


l0l0(NC0rHt-lO(N05rHl0O-*e0l0(MrHI>l>-<JHrHrHlClQ0e0CD 
tH CO rH CO rH (N rH CO rH lO CO CO (N rH lO (N l> rH '^ rH -"JH 


CO 




•fHaiNi 


rH rH rH rH 


•^ 




•fKOO 


rH rH 


<N 




•dHHJ 


COrH (N (M (N rH rH 1 






•AOV 


(N rH rH (M rH (M Tt< IM rH r^ rH rH rH rH N 


CO 




aaaA 


OS rH O rH ■<** Cq CO rH rH 1^ -U* (N tJH rH O Tt< rH (N (N Tjt 1 
7-t rH y-t i-i C^ T-t rH 






•NOHJ 


(M <N rH Ca (N 


OS 




■rav 


CO 00 CO rH TJI (N (M rH lO ■* (M •* ■* rH Tj( CO •* lO CO 


CR 
CD 




•SNflON 


t- CO rH iH 05 CO O OS lO 0> 05 00 t- •* '^ Tjl (N CO O CO CO rH t» OS (N 
■^ rH (M rH rH rH CO rH N rH CO rH IC tH Cq i-t 








<JmoQHfeOWKHHsMh:5S!250PuC?P5cc»&HSt2>^N 






•irxojj 


O lO 00 rH 05 l> N IC lO t» rH O CO lO rH CD OS rH C<l rH 
rH rH rH l-l rH rH rH rH rH 


1-^ 




fHHiNl 1 


T-i 1 


y-i 




•fNOO 


I-H 1 


y^ 




•dSHd 


T-i 1 


rH 




•Aav 


CC iH (N CO rH 


O 
rH 




•HHaA 1 


C« rH rH N C<l ■* N rH N (N rH N "^ 1 






•NOHJ 


1-i y* 1 


94 




•fov 


C<l COrHCQN rH CO T^^ ^ \ 


CD 

rH 




•sjmoii 


■«*< CO l» ■* CD 00 rH rH ■«*< OS t» rH Cfl rH -^ •^ COrH 1 
rH T-i T-t ■>-< \ 


CO 

rH 






<jpq6QpqfeOWw^Mh:5S^OPHC?pHOQwHEHp>^N 


i 





THE LANGUAGE OE CHILDHOOD. 83^ 

Summarizing these vocabularies, we find some interesting facte 
bearing on language -growth, both on the physiological and on the 
psychological side. 

For example, with regard to the relative frequency of the various 
parts of speech, the following table is instructive. Of the five 
thousand four hundred words comprising these vocabularies. ^ 



60 per 


cent. 


are nouns. 


20 " 




" verbs. 


9 " 




" adjectives. 


5 " 




" adverbs. 


2 " 




" pronouns. 


2 " 




*' prepositions. 


1.7 " 




" interjections. 


0.3 " 




" conjunctions. 



100.0 

Of the nouns, less than one per cent, are abstract. Nearly all are 
names of persons or familiar objects. The majority, in the earlier 
months, seem to be used almost with the force of proper nouns, a£ 
Schultheiss has also observed ( ^^ ). The adjectives are mostly those 
of size, temperature, cleanliness and its opposite, and similar 
familiar notions. This table also corroborates Sigismund's observa- 
tion that the conjunction is especially difficult (i=is5). Another 
interesting point is the comparison of the above table with a similar 
table, showing the relative frequency of the various parts of 
speech in ordinary adult language. Professor Kirkpatrick says 
that of the words in the English language, 

60 per cent, are nouns. 
11 " " " verbs. 
22 " " " adjectives. 
5.5 " " " adverbs. 

An important consideration is involved here. If we look only at 
the first of these two tables, and consider the child's words by 
themselves, it will seem that the nouns have greatly the advantage 
over the other parts of speech. But such a conclusion obviously 
cannot be drawn, unless a comparison of the child's vocabulary 
with that of the adult justifies us in so doing. In order to show 
that the child learns nouns more easily than verbs, we must be able 
to show that the number of his nouns bears a larger proportion to 
the number of nouns he will use as an adult, than the number of 
his verbs bears to the number of verbs he will use in adult life. To 
represent the matter symbolically, 

Let n = the proportion of nouns in the child's vocabulary. 

And N = " " •' " " " man's " 

Let V = " " " verbs '* " child's " 

And V = " " " " " " man's " 

Then, if the child learns nouns more easily than verbs, the 
proporiion of n to N will be greater than that of v to V. But on 
comparing the two tables, the very opposite is found to be the case. 

'In all the calculations that follow, I have taken the liberty to include, along with 
my own vocabularies, those of Professor Holden ( 68 ), and Professor Humphreys ( 6T), 
which I have re-arranged phonetically for the purpose. 
6 



82 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

n 60 

^°^ N" = W = 1 

V 20 

But -y- = -^ = 1.81+ 

In other words, the child of two years has made nearly twice as 
much progress in learning to use verbs as in learning to use nouns; 
according to my tables of child -language and Professor Kirk- 
patrick's table of adult -language. A comparison of the adjectives 
and adverbs in the two tables justifies a similar conclusion in favor 
of the adverb. To my mind, this fact — which, so far as I know, has 
been hitherto overlooked by all writers on child -language — possesses 
great value for philology and pedagogy as well as for psychology. 
In the first place it supports the view that the acquisition of 
language in the individual and in the race proceeds by similar stages 
and along similar lines. Max Miiller says that the primitive 
Sanscrit roots of the Indo-Germanic languages all represent actions 
and not objects; that in the race the earliest ideas to assume such 
strength and vividness as to break out beyond the limits of gesture 
and clothe themselves in words are ideas of movement, activity. 
We have found^ from examination of the vocabularies of these 
twenty-five children, that the ideas which are of greatest 
importance in the infant mind, and so clothe themselves most 
frequently (relatively), in words, are the ideas of actions and not 
objects, of doing insteaa of being. The child learns to use action- 
words (verbs) more readily than object-words (nouns); and words 
descriptive of actions (adverbs) more readily than words descriptive 
of objects (adjectives). 

In the second place this fact confirms the Froebelian principle, on 
which child-education is coining more and more to be based, viz., 
that education proceeds most naturally (and, therefore, most easily 
and rapidly) along the line of motor activity. The child should not 
be so much the receptacle of instruction as the agent of investiga- 
tion. Let him do things, and by doing he will most readily learn. 
He should not be passive, but active in his own education. The 
kindergarten is the modern incarnation of this idea, but the idea 
itself is as old as Aristotle, who says, " We learn an art by doing 
that which we wish to do when we have learned it; we become 
builders by building, and harpers by harping. And so by doing 
just acts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance and 
courage we become temperate and courageous." ^ 

Turning now to the consideration of these vocabularies from the 
standpoint of ease or difficulty of pronunciation of the various simple 
sounds, we find some instructive data here also. The following 
table shows the relative frequency of the various sounds as initial. 
In this calculation no heed is paid to the English spelling of the 
words, but only to the sounds actually uttered by the child, as 
already pointed out. Of the five thousand four hundred words 

11. per cent, begin with the sound of b. 



10.3 
9, 

8. 
6.1 
6. 
6. 



s. 
k. 

P- 
h. 
d. 
m. 



'Eth. Nic, Bk. II. chap. 1, par. 4. 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 



83 



6. per cent, beg 


5.2 * 




4. ' 




4. ' 




3.2 ' 




3.1 * 




3. ' 




3. ' 




2. ' 




2. ' 




1.3 ' 




1.2 ' 




1.1 ' 




1. ' 




1. ' 




1. ' 




0.8 ' 




0.5 ' 




0.2 ' 





t. 

w. 

/. 

n. 

9- 

l. 

a. 

r. 

i. 

sh. 

th. 

e. 

o. 

ch. 

3- 

y- 

u. 

V. 

3- 

A glance at this table shows how prominent a place the explosive 
consonants occupy as initial sounds in child -language. The vowels, 
on the contrary, though undoubtedly the earliest sounds to be used 
in most cases, are very infrequent as initial, not only absolutely 
but relatively. In the English dictionaries the vowel a occupies 
foiirth place as initial letter (^^), (*^); in my tables it occupies 
fourteenth place; while the other vowels stand still lower. The 
reason of this is not far to seek. It is simply a case of the opera- 
tion of the law of physiological ease; as anyone may verify by 
pronouncing, in succession, the following syllables: ap, pa, ah, 6a, 
afc, ka, am, ma, ad, da; and observing how much more easily those 
syllables are pronounced in which the consonant leads and the 
vowel follows. 

Another interesting feature of this table is the high place occupied 
by the guttural k as initial sound. It stands above p and m, and 
next to s and 6. This fact does not bear out the theory propounded 
by several writers on child -language, that those sounds are 
selected by the child for earliest acquirement whose pronunciation 
involves those portions of the vocal apparatus which are most 
easily seen, such as the lips (^), (™). According to this theory, 
not only the labial p. but the sounds d, m, /, sh, th, etc., ought 
to stand high in the list, because the movements involved in their 
pronunciation are plainly visible; while the guttural k, whose 
movements are absolutely out of sight^ should stand very low. The 
contrary is the case; k stands third in the list of initial sounds, 
while th, whose movements are exceedingly obvious to sight, 
occupies the eighteenth place. This seems to prove that the child 
does not learn to utter sounds by watching the mouths of those who 
utter them in his presence ; and this opinion is confirmed by the 
observation of Schultze, that the child does not usually look at the 
mouth, but at the eyes of the person speaking to him. On the other 
hand there seems no sufficient ground for the statement that the 
law of least effort is overturned by this frequency of the sound of k. 
This guttural sound is, for most children, no more difficult than the 
labials. Often it is one of the very earliest sounds employed. I 
know one child with whom it is more frequently used than even h. 
In short, so far as my observations go, I have no hesitation in 
saying that the child's earliest vocal utterances are not acquired 



84 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 



by imitation at all, either of sound or of movement, but that they 
are pvirely impulsive in their character. They are simply the result 
of the overflow of motor energy, which we have seen so promi- 
nent in other departments of the child's life; and they proceed 
at first along the lines of least resistance. 

In the following tables I have given the results of a careful 
examination of seven hundred instances of mispronunciation 
which I have found in the above vocabularies. The first table 
shows the various sounds in the order of the number of times they 
are misused as well as the ways in which they are misused ; the 
second and third tables enter into more detail. 

In the following table the first column gives the sound misused; 
the second shows the number of times it is replaced by another 
sound; the third shows how often it is dropped, without being 
replaced; and the fourth shows how often it is brought into a word 
to which it does not belong (not as a substitute for some other 
sound, but as a piu-e interpolation, for no apparent reason). 



Sound Misused. 


Replaced. 


Dropped. 


Interpolated. 


Total. 


B. 


51 


87 


4 


142 


L. 


35 


70 




105 


S. 


25 


34 


1 


60 


G. 


25 


6 




31 


T. 


13 


17 


1 


31 


8h. 


26 


4 




30 


K. 


20 


8 




28 


Th (hard). 


21 


2 




23 


F. 


15 


4 


1 


20 


D. 


5 


12 


2 


19 


Th(soft). 


14 


4 




18 


Ng. 


15 






15 


H. 


7 


7 


1 


15 


W. 


7 


5 


3 


15 


Oh. 


13 






13 


Y. 


1 


10 


1 


12 


V. 


8 


2 




10 


E. 


2 


5 




7 


H. 


2 


5 




7 


J. 


5 






6 


P. 


4 


1 




5 


A. 




4 




4 


M. 


4 






4 


Wh. 


3 






3 


O. 


3 






3 


B. 


3 






3 


Z. 


1 


1 




2 


Q. 


1 






1 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 



S6 



The following table shows the relative frequency of replacement of 
the sounds when initial, medial and final, and also (in the case of the 
consonants) when occurring as one member of a double consonant 
(e. g.j as r in cream). It also gives the relative frequency of the substi- 
tuted sounds: 



Sound 


When 


When 


When 


When 


Replaced 






Beplaced. 


Initial. 


Medial. 


Final. 


Double. 


by. 


Times. 


Examples. 












w 


29 


kweem (cream). 












1 


6 


tommoUa (tomorrow). 


R. 


21 


21 


9 


4 


y 

e 

V 

t 

m 
p 
k 


3 

8 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 


all y ite ( all right ) . 
tumblie (tumbler), 
voom (room), 
tautech (traurig). 
pipe (ripe). 
Kaka (Carrie). 


L. 


8 


8 


19 




e 


9 


minnie (milk). 










3 


w 

u 

n 

t 

b 

d 

oo 


7 
7 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 


table (table), 
singu (shingle), 
setta (celery). 
bampe (lampe). 
degen (legen). 
apoo (apple). 


Sh. 


17 


2 


7 




s 
h 
b 
t 
n 


19 

4 

1 
1 
1 


fis (fish). 
hoogar (sugar). 
tooz (shoes). 


S. 


18 


4 


3 


6 


t 
h 
f 
b 
d 


8 
8 
3 
3 
3 


tweet (sweet). 
Mate (slate). 
poofee (pussy). 
dide (side). 


G. 


19 


5 


1 


4 


d 

k 
t 
b 
w 

J 
n 


17 
2 
2 

1 
1 
1 
1 


dass (glass). 
hookoo (sugar), 
toss (gross). 
bavy (gravy). 
dettin (getting). 














Th(hMd). 


11 


3 


7 


5 


f 

t 
s 

P 
d 
n 


10 
4 
3 
1 

1 
1 


free. (three) 
mous (mouth), 
sank (thank), 
harf (hearth), 
nuppln (nothing). 










r 


1 





86 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 



Sound 
Replaced. 


When 
Initial. 


When 
Medial. 


When 
Final. 


When 
Double. 


Replaced 

by- 


Times. 


Examples. 


K 


11 


7 


2 


7 


t 
s 

g 

d 


15 

2 
2 

1 


bastet (basket). 
sun (come), 
untie (uncle), 
tanny (candy). 


F. 


7 


4 


4 


2 


P 
s 
k 
t 


6 
5 
2 
2 


nup (enough), 
butter sy (butterfly), 
kork (fork). 
6t (off). 


Ng. 




5 


10 


1 


n 
e 
a 


12 

2 
1 


finner (finger), 
tockies (stockings), 
lockatair (rocking chair) j 


Th (soft). 


11 


3 






d 

m 


13 

1 


altogedder (altogether), 
dare (there). 


T. 




6 


7 




e 
k 
w 

g 
P 


6 
4 
1 

1 
1 


dockie (doctor), 
bankie (blanket). 
Jackie (jacket), 
coak (coat). 
wawer (water). 


Ch. 


9 


2 


2 


1 


s 

t 

sh 


7 
4 
2 


sair (chair), 
tillens (children), 
shick (chick). 


V. 


1 


5 


2 




b 

f 
d 


5 
2 

1 


gib (give). 
shufer (shovel). 
Dadie (David). 


N. 




1 


6 




e 

m 

1 


4 
2 
1 


buttie (button), 
pim (pin), 
lemolade (lemonade). 


W. 


6 


1 






V 

1 


6 
1 


go vay (go away), 
lalla (water). 


D. 


1 


4 






n 
t 
k 


2 
2 

1 


towntownt (down town), 
vinner (window), 
kankie (candy). 


J. 


4 


1 






d 

g 


4 

1 


demidon (demijohn). 
Gekkie (Jessie). 


P. 


3 




1 


1 


b 

t 


2 
2 


bee (please), 
patie (paper). 


M. 


2 


2 






k 
n 
w 


2 
1 
1 


hankie (hammer). 
Waggle (Maggie). 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 



87 



Sound 
Replaced. 


When 
Initial. 


When 
Medial. 


When 
Final. 


When 
Double. 


Replaced 


Times. 


Examples. 


Wh. 


3 








f 
h 


2 

1 


feel (wheel). 
haiah (where). 


0. 






3 




a 

e 


2 

1 


winna (window). 


B. 


1 


2 






d 
m 


2 

1 


badie (baby). 
Milly (Billy). 


E. 






2 




a 
oo 


1 

1 


vera (very). 
cookoo (cookie). 


H. 


1 


1 






t 
1 


1 

1 


torns (horns), 
la lo (la haut) 


Y. 




1 






e 


1 


be wo (bureau). 


Z. 




1 






d 


1 


Doderfeen (Josephine). 


Q- 




1 






k 


1 


skeeze (squeeze). 



The following table gives similar information with regard to the 
dropping of difficult sounds: 



Sound 
Dropped. 



R. 



L. 



T. 

D. 

Y. 
K. 

N. 

G. 
W. 

E. 

H. 

Sh. 

F. 

Th (soft). 

A. 
Th (hard). 

V. 

P. 
Z. 



When 
Initial. 



10 



27 



When 

Medial. 



61 



37 



When 
Final. 



24 



23 



When 
Double. 



50 



39 



30 



12 



Examples. 



each (reach), 

apicot (apricot), 

dotca (daughter), 

baselet (bracelet). 

etta be (let me be), 

peeze (please). 

fa (fall), 

buttafy (butterfly). 

poon (spoon). 

Bottie (Boston), 

ga (gas), 

tabewie (strawberry). 

dissance (distance), 

bonny (bonnet), 

sottin (stocking). 

sanny (sandy). 

§amma (grandma), 

ines (blinds). 



ard 
panna 



(yard), 
(piano). 



opf (kopf). 

basset (basket), 
boo (book). 



Pi 
burr 



(pin), 
(burn). 



atten (garten). 



ont 
oodn't 



nuflf 
koff 



eah 

litta 



(want), 
(wouldn't). 

(enough), 
(coffee). 

(here), 
(schlitten). 



satie pin (safety pin), 
natanoon (afternoon) . 

at (that). 

ober air (over there). 



fade 
nudda 



ba 
mao 



(afraid), 
(another). 

(bath), 
(mouth). 



ammum (warum). 
Duttie (Gustave). 



tatie 



(potato), 
(nose). 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 89 

A word of caution is perhaps necessary here. These tables do 
not show accurately the order of difficulty of the various sounds, 
inasmuch as they indicate the misuse of the sounds, not relatively 
to the number of correct pronunciations of each sound, but only 
relatively to the total number of mispronunciations. For example, 
in the first table q seems an easier sound than b, because it is only 
misused once, while b is misused three times. But if we remember 
that in the vocabularies b occurs fifty-five times as often as q, the 
case is entirely altered. Considered in this way, the order of 
difficulty, according to my observations, is approximately the 
following : r, I, th, v, sh, y, g. ch^ s, j, e, /, t, n, q, d, k, o, w, a, h, m, 
p, b. The most difficult sound is r and the easiest b. 

It will be observed also that, according to these tables, mispro- 
nunciation is very frequent in the case of double consonants, and 
most frequent of all in those combinations which belong to what 
Mr. Pitman calls the pi and pr series. Such words as cream, 
bracelet and fly are almost always mutilated; sometimes r and I are 
replaced by w or some other sound; sometimes they are omitted 
altogether. 

Another thing to be observed is that the choice of a substitute 
for a difficult sound is often determined by the prominent conso- 
nant in the preceding or succeeding syllable. This leads to a 
reduplication of the easier sound in preference to the use of the 
more difficult one. The child says cawkee for coffee, kork for fork, 
or Id lo for la haut. The number of these reduplications is very 
large, and the device is adopted also in the case of difficult vowels; 
€. g,, Deedie occxirs for Edie, and Dida for Ida. 

Another significant thing is the frequency with which the sound 
of e is used as a substitute for difficult sounds, both vowel and 
consonantal, especially at the end of a word. The child says ittie 
for little, finnie for finger, and ninnie for drink. 

In addition to the mispronunciations tabulated above, I find a 
large number of miscellaneous mispronunciations difficult to 
classify, such as the following : medniss for medicine, Mangie fag 
for American flag, skoogie for excuse me, kidlie for tickle, pd-td-soo 
for patent leather shoes, etc., etc., etc. 

If we seek now to discover some principle underlying the develop- 
ment of child-speech from the psychic point of view, we shall find, 
I believe, that principle of transformation, which we have already 
observed so frequently elsewhere, operating in this sphere also. 
The earliest utterances of the new-born have little or no psychic 
significance. As expressions of his thought, they have none at all. 
But by slow degrees these primitive utterances, modified, increased 
and combined, are associated with ideas, which are also modified, 
increased and combined, until finally the instrument of language is 
completely under control, and becomes the adequate medium for 
the expression of thought. 

Not only may we make this statement in this general way, but it 
seems possible to trace, with approximate minuteness, the progress 
of a sound upward, from the earliest unexpressive condition to the 
highest, latest, most expressive state, and to indicate the principal 
stages on the way. These stages appear to be the same as those 
through which movements pass, viz., the impulsive, the reflex, the 
instinctive, and the ideational. The first sounds uttered by the child 
are simply the spontaneous will-less, idea-less manifestation of 
native motor energy. They do not require a sensory, but only a 
motor process, and that motor process is automatic. The same 
overflowing energy, the same muscle-instinct, which impels the 
child to grasp with the hands, to kick with the feet, etc., impels 



90 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

Mm also to the exercise of his lips, tongue, larynx and lungs ( 59: 47 ^^ 
This is the impulsive stage. Then we find him uttering sounds in 
response to certain sensations. He sees a bright light, hears a 
peculiar sound, feels a soft, warm touch, and these sensations call 
forth certain sounds. These sounds are still only babblings, not 
involving the cooperation of will, but they do involve sensory as 
well as motor processes. The reflex arc, in its simplest form, is 
complete. Here imitation takes its rise. This is the reflexive stage. 
In the next place we can detect certain sounds which are expressive 
of the child's needs, and though still uttered probably without 
conscious intention, yet have a purpose and an end, viz., the satis- 
faction of those needs. The cry, which was at first monotonous 
and expressionless, now becomes differentiated to express various 
states of feeling, hunger, pain, weariness, etc. Here we have the 
instinctive stage. Finally the will takes full possession of the 
apparatus of speech, the child utters his words with conscious 
intention; imitation of sounds, from being passive and unconscious^ 
becomes active and conscious; and words are joined together to 
give expression to ideas of constantly increasing complexity. Here- 
we have reached the ideational or deliberative stage. 

As an example of the transformation of a single sound through, 
all these successive stages, let us take that sound which is, in the 
majority of cases, the first articulation, the syllable ma. At first 
this is pure spontaneity. The child lies contentedly in his cradle,, 
motor energy overflows, the lips move, gently opening and closing, 
while the breath is expired, and this sound is produced, mamamama. 
As yet it has no meaning; it is a purely automatic utterance. But 
by and by the same sound is called forth by certain sensations, one 
of which is very probably the sight of the mother, or of some other 
person. The word as yet has no definite meaning, but is merely a 
sort of vague demonstrative ejaculation, a pure reflex. Later it 
becomes the expression of certain bodily needs and conditions, and 
now the hungry child utters this sound as the expression of the 
need of his natural nourishment. By this means, the word 
becomes firmly associated with the mother, first probably with the 
breast only ( ™), but afterwards with her person in general, and so 
the final step in the transition is made, and the word mama now 
passes out of the semi-conscious, instinctive stage into the idea- 
tional. It becomes firmly associated with the mother, and with her 
only, it is used with a conscious purpose of communicating to her 
the child's wishes and ideas and, finally, in her absence, it is used 
in such a way as to show that her image is firmly stamped on his 
mind, and retained in his memory. In later life, more abstract and 
complex applications of this word are gradually mastered; but we 
have followed it far enough in its development for our present 
purpose. This word was chosen because it probably exemplifies 
better than any other the principle which we desired to illustrate, 
being associated with those feelings which arise earliest, last 
longest, and take the deepest hold upon the human soul; but almost 
any primitive utterance of infancy could be employed to exemplify, 
in a less complete manner, the principle enunciated. 

A. A little Boston boy, whose mental development was observed 
and recorded by Miss Sara E. Wiltse. 

B. Observations made by Professor J. M. Baldwin, of the 
University of Toronto, at whose suggestion the present work was 
undertaken. 

C. A little Vermont boy, whose mother, a graduate of Smith 
College, made a very careful record of his mental development. 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 91 

D. Vocabulary kindly sent me by Professor H. H. Donaldson, of 
the University of Chicago. 

E. Observations made by a student of Wellesley College. 

F. A little girl in Worcester, Mass., whom I observed for some 
time, and from whose parents I received some valuable notes. 

G. Two little girls in Springfield, Mass., aged respectively 
twenty- four and twenty- two months. Observations made by their 
mother. 

K. Observations kindly sent me by Professor E. A. Kirkpatrick, 
of Winona, Minnesota. 

L. A girl in North Carolina, aged seventeen months. Notes 
taken by her mother. 

M. Observations made by Professor and Mrs. J. F. McCurdy, 
of the University of Toronto. 

R. A strong, healthy Canadian boy, whom I observed during a 
large part of his second year. 

5. Notes on a little girl in Brooklyn, N. Y., sent me by her father. 
T. A little boy in Boston. Vocabulary recorded by his mother. 
W. A little girl in Worcester whose development was recorded 

by her mother. 

Y. References to the lectures of the late Professor G. P. Young, 
on Philosophy and Psychology, delivered in the University of 
Toronto, but as yet unpublished. 

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3. Preyer, W. "The Development of the Intellect." Part II. of 
" The Mind of the Child." Translated, H. W. Brown. New York, 
1889. 

4. LuYS, J. '*The Brain and its Functions." International 
Scientific Series. New York, 1882. 

6. KussMAUL, A. " Untersuchungen iiber das Seelenleben des 
Neugeborenen Menschen." Tubingen, 1884. 

6. Perez, B. " The First Three Years of Childhood." Trans- 
lated by Alice M. Christie. London, 1889. 

7. Fehling, H. "Das Dasein vor der Geburt." Stuttgart, 1887. 

8. QuAiN's " Anatomy," Vol. II. London, 1882. 

9. Genzmer, a. "Untersuchungen iiber die Sinneswahrneh- 
mungen des Neugeborenen Menschen." Halle, 1882. 

10. Preyer, W. " Physiologic des Embryo." Leipzig, 1885. 

11. Darwin, Chas. " Biographical Sketch of an Infant." Mindy 
Vol. II. p. 285. 

12. TiEDEMANN. " Rccord of Infant Life." Translated, Perez, 
Syracuse. 

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14. Champneys. " Notes on an Infant." In Mind. Vol. VI. p. 
104. 

15. Baldwin, J. M. "Origin of Right and Left-handedness." 
/Science, October 31, 1890. 

16. TALBOT, Mrs. E. "Papers on Infant Development." Pub- 
lished by the education department of the American Social 
Science Association. Boston, 1882. 

17. Kroner, T. " Ueber die Sinnesempflndungen der Neugebor- 
nen." Breslau, 1882. 

18. Raehlmann, E. " Physiologisch— psychologische Studien 
iiber die Entwickelung der Gesichts — wahrnenumgen bei Kindern 



^2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

und bei operierten Blindgeborenen." In the Zeitschrift fiir Psycholo- 
gie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, Vol. II. (1891), pp. 53-96. 

19. Bbown, Elizabeth Stow, M. D. "The Baby's Mind." 
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Academy of Anthropology, April, 1889. Published in Babyhood, 
July-November, 1890. 

20. Chaille, S. E., M. D. " Infants, their Chronological Prog- 
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21. RiBOT, Th. "Heredity." New York, 1889. 

22. Allen, Grant, B. A. "The Color-Sense: Its Origin and 
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23. Wolfe, H. K. "On the Color-Vocabulary of Children." 
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24. Binet, a. " Perceptions d'Enfants." In Revue Philosophique, 
December, 1890. 

25. Perez, B. " Education Morale des le Berceau." Paris, 1888. 

26. Pollock, F. "An Infant's Progress in Language." Mind, 
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27. ScHULTZE, F. " Die Sprache des Kindes." Leipzig, 1880. 

28. CzERNY, A. " Beobactungen iiber den Schlaf im Kindesalter 
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29. Taine, H. " De rintelligence." London, 1871. 

30. Clarus, A. "Ueber Aphasie bei Kindern." Leipzig, 1874. 

31. Lamson, M. S. " Life and Education of Laura D. Bridgman." 
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32. Mosso, A. "LaPeur: Etude psycho-physiologique." Paris, 
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33. Romanes, G. J. " Mental Evolution in Man." New York, 
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34. Jastrow, J. "Problems of Comparative Psychology." 
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35. Darwin, Chas. "Expression of the Emotions." New York, 
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36. Egger. " Sur le Developpment de I'Intelligence et du Lan- 
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37. Taine, H. " Acquisition of Language by Children." Mind, 
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38. Preyer, W. " Psychogenesis." Jour. Spec. Phil., April, 1881. 

39. Baldwin, J. M. " Suggestion in Infancy." Science, Feb- 
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40. Stevenson, A. " Jealousy in an Infant." Science, October 
28, 1892. 

41. Faust, B. C. "Die Perioden des Menschlichen Lebens." 
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42. Hall, President G. S. "Notes on the Study of Infants." 
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43. Baldwin, J. M. " Handbook of Psychology: Senses and 
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44. QuEYRAT, Fr. " L'Imagination et ses Varietes chez I'En- 
fant." Bibliotheque de Philosophic Contemporaine. Paris, 1893. 

45. Hall, G. S. "Contents of Children's Minds on Entering 
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46. Marwedel, E. " Conscious Motherhood." Boston (Heath), 
1889. 

47. Perez, B. "L'Art et la Poesie chez I'Enfant." Paris: F. 
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48. Warner, F. " The Children : How to Study them." Lon- 
don, 1887. 



THE LANGUAGE OF CHILDHOOD. 93 

49. GuYAU, M. " Education et Heredite." Paris, 1890. Biblio- 
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50. James, W. " Psychology " (Briefer Course). American 
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51. Sully, J. "Outlines of Psychology." New York, 1885. 

52. Ploss, H. " Das Kleine Kind." Berlin, 1881. 

53. ViERORDT, H. "Das Gehen des Menschen." Tubingen, 1881. 
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June, 1892. 

55. Semmig, H. "Das Kind: Tagebuch eines Vaters." Leip- 
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56. Hale, Horatio. " The Origin of Languages, and the An- 
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57. Marenholtz-Bulow, Baroness. " The Child, and Child- 
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58. OuROUSSOV, Princess Mary. " Education from the Cradle." 
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59. KussMAUL, A. " Die St(>rungen der Sprache." Leipzig, 1877. 

60. Leonard, W. E. "Elementary Training of Infants." In 
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61. LoBiscHE. "Die Seele desKindes." Wien (Carl Haas), 1851. 

62. Pollock, F. " F. Schultze, Die Sprache des Kindes." Mind, 
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63. Canfield, W. B., M. D. " The Development of Speech in 
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64. Sully, Jas. "Baby Linguistics." In Eng. III. Mag., Novem- 
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65. Allen, Margaret A. (Mrs.) " Notes on the Development 
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68. HoLDEN, E. S. " On the Vocabularies of Children under Two 
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69. MiJLLER, F. "Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft." Band I. 
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70. Ploss, H. " Das Kind, in Brauch und Sitte der Volker." Two 
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71. Tylor, E. B. " Early History of Mankind." New York, 1878. 

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73. LiEBER, F. " The Vocal Sounds of Laura Bridgman." Smith- 
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75. ScHULTHEiss, W. K. " Das Kind, in der Entwickelungszeit 
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76. Noble, Edmund. " Child Speech, and the Law of Mispro- 
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78. Steinthal, H. "Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammen- 
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79. Ross, J. " On Aphasia." London, 1887. 



94 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD. 

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83. Keber, A. "Zur Philosophie der Kindersprache." Leipzig, 
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84. Geiger, L. " Ursprung und Entwickelung der Menschlichen 
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89. Bell, A. G. " The Progress made in Teaching Deaf Children 
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92. Frobel, F. "Mutter-und Kose-Lieder." Translated, 
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94. Newell, W. W. " Games and Songs of American Children." 
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F, Tracy, Fellow in Clark University. 



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